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ORIGINS OF FEDERAL COMMON LAW: PART TWO*
STEWART JAYt

Thomas Jefferson wrote Edmund Randolph in August 1799 of the
need "to portray at full length the consequences of this new doctrine,
that the common law is the law of the US, & that their courts have, of
course, jurisdiction co-extensive with that law, that is to say, general
over all cases & persons." 1 Closing the letter in the next line, he remarked, "But, great heavens! Who could have conceived in 1789 that
within ten years we should have to combat such wind-mills." 2 Somewhat more than a year later, John Marshall commented in a private
correspondence:
In political controversy it often happens that the precise
opinion of the adversary is not understood, & that we are at
much labor to disprove propositions which have never been
maintained. A stronger evidence of this cannot I think be
given than the manner in which the references to the common law have been treated.'
© Copyright 1985 by Stewart Jay. All rights reserved.
* Part One of this essay appears at 133 U. PA. L. REv. 1003 (1985) [hereinafter
cited as Jay, Part One].
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Washington.
1 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Randolph (Aug. 23, 1799), reprinted
in 9 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 76 (P. Ford ed. 1905).
2 Id.

at 76-77.
" Letter from John Marshall to St. George Tucker (Nov. 27, 1800), reprinted in
Appendix A, infra.
(1231)
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Marshall added that he did not believe that "one man [could] be
found" who maintained "that the common law of England has . . .
been adopted as the common law of America by the constitution of the
United States."14 "This strange & absurd doctrine," he continued, "was
first attributed to the judiciary of the United States by some frothy
newspaper publications which appeared in Richmond something more
than twelve months past, but I never suspected that an attempt would
be made to represent this as a serious opinion entertained by respectable men ....

"5

Although the roots of the controversy over federal common-law jurisdiction extend far back into American history, its emergence in the
public consciousness, at the time Marshall mentioned, came at a moment of exceptional political crisis.' In Part One of this essay, we visited the manifestations of the common-law controversy by following the
places in the public debate where the common law emerged as an issue
and exploring the development of common-law criminal adjudications
in federal courts during the decades prior to United States v. Hudson.7
The aim of this half of the essay is to pursue the clashes over federal
common law to more fundamental levels. First, the manner in which
the common law became embroiled in controversy is traced. We see, for
example, why the discussion of common law and federal courts led to
Republican charges that a consolidated national government was being
foisted upon the country. Second, we untangle the usages of the term
"common law." This analysis is undertaken by reconstructing the key
features of theories about judicial jurisdiction and the nature of law. In
doing so, it becomes apparent that the arguments employed have very
little to do with the issues that we now associate with federal common
law.
The first two sections concentrate on the central sources of Republican anxiety over the federal courts and the common law and explain
4Id.

5Id.
6 Peter Du Ponceau recalled that the "spirit of hostility" toward "this doctrine of
the nationality of the common law . . . began in Virginia in the year 1799 or 1800, in
consequence of an opposition to the alien and sedition acts." P. Du PONCEAU, A DIsSERTATION ON THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS OF

UNITED STATES 102 (Philadelphia 1824). Speaking in 1801 against continuation
of the Sedition Act, ch. 73, 1 Stat. 596 (1798), Representative Nathaniel Macon stated
that at the time the Act was initially adopted in 1798, "this common law of the United
States, of which we now hear so much, was not talked of." He continued by noting that
"[alt the last session," when a motion to repeal the Act was being entertained, "the law
was then supported on this reason, to prevent the operation of the common law, and to
afford the gentlemen themselves the liberty of expressing their sentiments .... " 10
ANNALS OF CONG. 963 (1801).
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).
THE
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how the matter crystallized around the question of states' rights. Then,
we take up a recent suggestion by Morton Horwitz that the concern
over common law had little to do with party politics or states' rights,
but instead was largely an issue of separation of powers at the federal
level. In rejecting Horwitz's thesis, this essay does not deny the increasing perception among Americans that judges were making law and,
hence, should be controlled by the elected branches of government. The
contention is that the relationship between the federal government and
the states became the primary manifestation of deeper conflicts and that
this debate was heavily influenced by partisan confrontations. The recognition of judges as instruments for formulating public policy was
more likely a part of the fallout from the clash over states' rights than it
was the cause of any revolt against the common law.
These initial sections serve to show why the common-law authority of federal courts was seen by the Republicans as a vital component
in their quarrel with Federalists over the national union. From here we
proceed to a more basic plane of inquiry directed at the theories of
judicial jurisdiction that lay behind the public disputes over states'
rights and national consolidation. We examine the framing of article
II8 itself to see if anything in the structure of the text or the attendant
debates casts light on what role the common law was to have in the
federal courts. Then we approach the first judiciary act, singling out
section 34's well-known command to employ state law in federal
courts. 9 These two sections are preparatory to a third, which argues
that the nature of jurisdictional theory at this time was unreceptive to
the development of an understanding of "federal common law" in the
modern sense of the term. The reasons for this failure revolve around
two themes. One is associated with a prepositivist conception of law as
a body of rules and principles subject to discovery that in turn made
plausible the idea of "general" common law. The second centers on the
notion of sovereignty itself, by which governmental authority was considered to be bound up in a single sovereign with exclusive control over
a particular territory. Together these themes complicated immensely
the production of a theory of common-law jurisdiction applicable to the
national establishment.
Concluding the investigation of jurisdictional theories is a look at
what might appear to be the likely alternative to a common-law jurisdiction for federal courts: jurisdiction assigned by Congress. At this
juncture we return once again to Hudson. We come away from this
8 U.S. CONsT. art. III.
9 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1652 (1982)).
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discussion with the impression that Justice Johnson, the author of
Hudson, was saying a great deal about the limitations on Congress's
power to authorize federal courts to act like common-law courts. In the
end, however, Hudson emerges not so much as a resolution of the affair, but rather as a signal of an inability to depict the essential powers
of federal courts given the jurisdictional theories then in place.
In the remaining part of the essay, we ask what the relevance of
the Hudson era might be to our present deliberations about federal
common law. Initially this presents the persistent question of the
proper use of historiography by the courts. Any time one generation
scrutinizes another there is the likelihood of error or simply the invocation of a supposed past to accomplish a current political end. The modem theory of federal common law-to the extent it can be called a
unified theory-is often justified as a correct rendition of the essential
role that federal courts were initially designed to have. This justification turns out to be wrong merely at the level of faithfulness to history.
Moreover, it assumes that the questions asked about the common-law
powers of federal courts in the early debates are similar to the ones
arising today. That assumption is quite misplaced.
I.

THE GENESIS OF FEDERAL COMMON LAW: AN ANALYTIC
ASSESSMENT

A.

The Various Meanings of "Common Law"

In reviewing the discussions about common law that took place
during the period we have been considering, it is striking how variously
the term was used. Especially when the contest among partisans escalated significantly with the Sedition Act prosecutions, Republicans construed their opponents' statements concerning the force of the common
law in light of their worst suspicions about Federalist motives. The
result was a caricature of their rivals' views, an occurrence not unusual
in political exchanges. When Federalists began to claim with some consistency toward the end of the 1790's that "the common law existed
under the Constitution of the United States," 0 or "the common law
10

10 ANNALS

OF CONG.

411 (1800) (statement of Rep. Bayard). During the de-

bates on the repeal of the 1801 Judiciary Act, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 89, repealed by Act of Mar.
8, 1802, ch. 8, § 1, 2 Stat. 132, 132, Bayard made similar remarks: "[T]he Constitution
of the United States was predicated upon an existing common law .... [S]tripped of
the common law, there would be neither Constitution nor Government." 11 ANNALS
OF CONG. 613 (1802). Bayard probably meant no more than that "[tihe Constitution is
unintelligible without reference to the common law," id., but Republicans found a sinister intent lurking in such statements.
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was the law of this land,"11 Republicans could point to these broad
statements as evidence of a Federalist plan to incorporate the common
law, and all that accompanied it, into the new Republic.
The common law became a convoluted symbol in political discourse, whose elasticity was equaled only by the hold it had on the
public consciousness due to its association with Britain. Republicans
traded on its susceptibility for identification with "the mass of maxims,
principles and forms of judicial proceeding" 12 utilized in England. Federalists, on the other hand, were more likely to use it to refer to a mode
of reasoning common to all court systems of the Anglo-American world.
The Federalist judge Alexander Addison wrote, "The common law of
England is the foundation of our law. Their language is ours. We use
the terms of the English law in the English sense of those terms."1 "
The former interpretation invited images of a foreign system imposed
on unwilling recipients, and served nicely to show the supposed ambitions of a federal judiciary claiming it as a proper domain of jurisdiction. By emphasizing the common law as a type of principled adjudication, Federalists meant it "as a metaphor for an extensive and reliable
system of national justice," 4 one based on ever-accumulating custom
and appropriate to the affairs of the Union. "[Tihat left the problem on
as imprecise a footing as the law of nature,"" 5 and went over poorly
with those anxious for precise delineations of authority.
Although Part One was intended to demonstrate how the assorted
faces of the common-law controversy were tied to the emergence of
party politics in America, it would be incorrect to assume that the issues and terminology of the debate were determined solely by immediate political advantage. Soon after complaining about the mischaracterization of the Federalist stance on the common law, Marshall wrote to
George Washington on the subject of the Alien and Sedition Acts. His
mood was pessimistic: "I am firmly persuaded that the tempest has not
been raised by them. Its cause lies much deeper & is not easily to be
removed. Had they never pass'd, other measures would have been selected which would have been attacked with equal virulence."1 " Mar, 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 420 (1800) (statement of Rep. Lee).
12

Eliot, The Common Law of the Federal Courts, 36 AM. L. REv. 498, 501

(1902).

Addison, Analysis of the Report of the Committee of the Virginia Assembly, in
1760-1805, at 1090
(C. Hyneman & D. Lutz eds. 1983).
1S

AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING DURING THE FOUNDING ERA

14 L. KERBER, FEDERALISTS IN DISSENT: IMAGERY AND IDEOLOGY IN JEFFERSONIAN AMERICA 170 (1970).
15 1 J. GOEBEL, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 655 (1971).
16

Letter from John Marshall to George Washington (Jan. 8, 1799), reprinted in
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shall's perception that there were profound underlying differences in
the society was penetrating in its accuracy." The Acts and the common
law were but the surface manifestations of essential tensions in a society that was defining itself in the midst of what was literally a revolutionary era.
Any society that experiences the rupture of revolution necessarily
faces the problems of establishing a new governmental structure. All
such societies confront as well the existence of established rules of conduct for public and private affairs. The degree to which these rules are
associated with governmental institutions will naturally vary by the culture involved. For Americans of the post-Revolutionary generation,
there was scarcely any question that the courts would supply a major
portion of the standards for behavior. Nor could there be any doubt
that the common law of England, at least as it was seen through colonial eyes, was the reference point for legal analysis. Americans had,
after all, expended considerable blood to pursue a rebellion that was in
large measure inspired by the invocation of the common law as their
"birthright." For instance, John Adams, while Vice President, was said
to have risen "from his chair, and emphatically declared to the whole
Senate, that if he had ever imagined that the common law had not by
the Revolution become the law of the United States under its new gov-

ernment, he never would have drawn his sword in the contest."",
Expressions of the sort used by Adams 9 could have a number of
connotations. Americans living at the time of the Revolution would
have taken the demand for the common law as a reference to the basic
principles of personal liberty, a prime example being the right of
habeas corpus. They were not thinking of "the vast body of rules regulating the rights of contract and property and the ordinary proceedings
4

3 (C. Cullen ed. 1984).
11 For discussion about the competing visions of the American union and the role
of the state itself, see Jay, Part One, at 1024-31.
18 1 LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY 300 (W. Story ed. 1851). This account was related to Joseph Story by Adams' private secretary. For a similar statement,
see Jay, Part One, at 1078.
'9 This usage was common in the years during and immediately after the RevoluTHE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL

tion. See, e.g., Declaration of Rights of the Continental Congress (1774), reprintedin
READINGS ON THE HISTORY AND SYSTEM OF THE COMMON LAW 309 (R. Pound &
T. Plucknett eds. 3d ed. 1927):
[T]he respective colonies are entitled to the common law of England, and
more especially to the great and inestimable privilege of being tried by
their peers of the vicinage, according to the course of that law.
...[T]hey are entitled to the benefit of such of the English statutes
as existed at the time of their colonization; and which they have, by experience, respectively found to be applicable to their several local and other
circumstances.
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in court."' Throughout the pre-Revolutionary period there had been
significant ambiguity associated with the idea of law. This ambiguity
was rooted in a conflict over the extent to which British law applied in
the colonies and a fundamental belief that law was nothing more than
the "principles of right reason."2 1 Principles of natural justice could
never be wholly encapsulated in any system of rules: "Laws, grants,
and charters merely stated the essentials," and no statement of English
law could "wholly exhaust the great treasury of human rights."2 2
Through the vague association of the common law with natural justice,
revolutionaries were able simultaneously to lambaste the British while
regarding their enemies' law "as a palladium of liberty."2
In Blackstonian terms, the common law was understood to be a
system of customs stretching far back into the English past. Americans
were nonetheless fully aware that the incorporation of the British common law had been selective in all the states. That feature was not
troublesome by itself. As James Wilson remarked, "the expanding and
accommodating genius of the common law" permitted the courts to apply "easily and aptly its maxims and rules . . . in new situations and
emergencies." Still, Americans knew that much of the content and
procedural formalities of the British common law were kept intact. 5
20 Reinsch, The English Common Law in the Early American Colonies, in 1 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 384 (E. Freund, W. Mikell & J.

Wigmore eds. 1907); accord Pope, The English Common Law in the United States, 24
HARV. L. REV. 6, 16 (1910).
21 G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 295
(1969); accord W. CARPENTER, THE DEvELOPMENT OF AMERIcAN POLITICAL
THOUGHT 27 (1930).
22

B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 78

(1967). Law, Gordon Wood writes, was "in such a confused and chaotic state that the
only criterion for its authority had seemed to be its intrinsic justice .
G. WOOD,
G..."
supra note 21, at 296.
23 Goebel, The Courts and the Law in Colonial New York, in ESSAYS IN THE
HISTORY OF EARLY AMERICAN LAW 268 (D. Flaherty ed. 1969); accord M. HORwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 4 (1977).
24 Charge to the Grand Jury for the District of Massachusetts (June 7, 1793),
reprinted in Federal Gazette (Philadelphia), June 25, 1793.
25 American courts generally persisted in their adherence to the essentials of the
English legal system:
From the established settlements of Massachusetts, New York, and Virginia, to the frontiers of the Indiana and Michigan Territories, it was
English law and legal forms that defined American jurisprudence. There
may well have been widespread impatience with the technicalities that
often made justice expensive and inaccessible, and certainly there were
scattered incidents of local resistance to the courts. But the fathers and
sons of the American Revolution concentrated on trying to make the old
system more responsive, instead of destroying it or creating a more rational system to supersede it, as their counterparts in Napoleonic France
did during these years.
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For lawyers the intricacies of British law represented "a welcome
continuation of the accepted order of things."2 6 Courts went on functioning after the Revolution as they had before with few changes of
note. The new state constitutions treated the judiciaries incidentally,
"as . . .going concern[s]" that "needed no words of creation, let alone
a direct and explicit affirmation of [their] existence."'2 7 Largely this approach was a product of necessity: there were virtually no American
case reports available until some years after the Revolution," and "[i]n
the first generation, more English than American cases were cited in
29
American reports" that were published.
This persisting reliance on British common law should not have
been startling; it would have required real effort and determination to
upset the customary ways of resolving human conflicts. To many, however, the dependence on English law was a galling circumstance, all the
more so since Americans were in a position to dictate the terms for
accepting the common law. Necessity might require a continuation of
the understood law and judicial mechanisms, but it was clearly perceived that much of the common law was inconsistent with premises of
republicanism. Why should Americans turn to these "ancient British
Judges," demanded the fiery Matthew Lyon, "who have derived their
greatness and sucked their principles from the very poisonous breast of
monarchy itself"?30
A large measure of the evident tension over the common law
flowed, then, from the dilemma with which the country was confronted.
Americans understood, said James Wilson, that the "civil society and
government" rested on "the Social Contract [which was] found to be an
assemblage of agreements, equal in number to the number of individuM. TACHAU, FEDERAL COURTS IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: KENTUCKY 1789-1816, at
78 (1978) (footnotes omitted). Tachau's exhaustive researches into Kentucky federal
court records found that on the whole those courts "were very conservative" and
demonstrated "rigorous adherence to the antiquated technicalities of English law." Id.
at 77.
2e E. BROWN, BRITISH STATUTES IN AMERICAN LAW 1776-1836, at 22 (1964).
" 1 THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 12 (J. Goebel ed. 1964);
see also Morris, Legalism Versus Revolutionary Doctrine in New England, in ESSAYS
IN THE HISTORY OF EARLY AMERICAN LAW,

supra note 23, at 431-32. Likewise, no

sudden "reception" of British law as a foreign body occurred, despite the existence of
numerous reception statutes. See Chafee, Colonial Courts and the Common Law, in
ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF EARLY AMERICAN LAW, supra note 23, at 75-76 (noting
no reception in Delaware and doubting that reception occurred in other states).
28 See E. BROWN, supra note 26, at
PROFESSION IN AMERICA 78-79 (1965).

41; 2 A.

CHROUST, THE RISE OF THE LEGAL

L.

FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 98 (1973).
30 A. AUSTIN, MATTHEW LYON: "NEW MAN" OF THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLU29

TION,

1794).

1749-1822, at 53 (1981) (quoting Farmers' Library (Fairhaven, Vt.), Aug. 19,
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als who form the society."3' By then this was old rhetoric; the novelty
was in the application. "[T]he United States, is now put upon an experiment," Wilson added, and the "important question is

. .

.are men

capable of governing themselves?" 32 Choices had to be made. It hardly
behooved the character of republican experimentation to persist with a
major social institution such as the common law without serious reflection. Even a casual inquiry, though, revealed the obvious. The common
law was not a system set up for revolutionary change. Yet Americans
were obliged to live with it if they wanted the advantages of stable
expectations-not only for their basic liberties, but also for the founda33
tion of economic life.
While the common law endured as the basis for American law, the
country's passage into the nineteenth century was accompanied by increasing hostility to this state of affairs."' Although a complex set of
factors contributed to this change in attitude, much of the aversion
came simply from a realization of what British common law entailed.
Julius Goebel put it well: "The common law as an ideal was devoutly
prayed for; the law in fact-a tangle of technicalities-was what the
lawyers brought." 35 Lingering bitterness toward the British, a recognition of the unsuitability of much of English law to America, and the
Republicans' charge that their opponents were trying to introduce elements of the English monarchial system, all combined to make the common law a topic of stormy public exchanges. 6 Some states forbade cita31 Charge to the Grand Jury for the District of Massachusetts (June 7, 1793),
reprinted in Federal Gazette (Philadelphia), June 25, 1793.
32 Id.

" Vermont, for example, faced the question whether former Loyalists who reacquired lands confiscated during the Revolution should pay for improvements made by
those who had taken title during the interim. Lawyers and judges in the state united
behind the common law principle that no "betterments" were required for individuals
who had obtained titles by confiscation. See A. AUSTIN, supra note 30, at 49. Leading
the forces in opposition to the legal community, Matthew Lyon decried these
"voracious enemies" of the "soldiers and sufferers in the late British war ....
[The
lawyers'] books and their rich clients told them that the Common Law of England
knew nothing of paying for betterments of labor." Id. at 50 (quoting Farmers' Library
(Fairhaven, Vt.), Aug. 19, 1794).
34 See M. HORwrrz, supra note 23, at 11.
s Goebel, supra note 23, at 270; accord 2 A. CHROUST, supra note 28, at 56-57.
38 See A. HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE: MAGNA CARTA AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 260 (1968); L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 29, at 94; Pound,
The Place ofJudge Story in the Making of American Law, 48 AM. L. REv. 676, 68182 (1914). Then, as now, many people simply disliked lawyers: Thomas Paine harangued against the "'chicanery of law and lawyers,'" L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 29,
at 94 (quoting COMPLETE WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 1003 (P. Foner ed. 1945));
quite a few saw attorneys as "innately depraved and dishonest," R. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE YOUNG REPUBLIC 176 (1971). A

great deal of the hostility reflected "suspicion of, and disrespect for, intellectuals-an
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tion of British cases decided after 1776," and even the Supreme Court
appeared reluctant to rely on English authorities in the years before
Marshall's tenure."8 James Monroe wrote in 1802 that "the application of the principles of the English common law to our constitution"
should be considered "good cause for impeachment." 9 And the Republican Aurora, once the target of a state common-law seditious libel
prosecution, seethed in 1805 against "the dark, arbitrary, unwritten,
incoherent, cruel, inconsistent, and contradictory maxims of the common law of England."4
The term "common law" took on progressively different meanings
as the years passed, and changed according to the needs of the times.
When United States v. Hudson4" arrived at the Supreme Court, what
for Justice Johnson had "been long since settled in public opinion"' 2
was the resolution of the federal common-law issue as Republicans had
defined it. Republican partisans such as St. George Tucker knew also
that it was important to consider "candidly, and respectfully," judicial
statements about the existence of a national common law, lest they
antagonism not new in American life and much commented on at the time by foreign
writers." G. HASKINS, FOUNDATIONS OF PoWER: JOHN MARSHALL, 1801-1815
(PART ONE) 157 (1981). Others, not without reason, suspected lawyers of lingering
Toryism. See Morris, Legalism Versus Revolutionary Doctrine in New England, in
ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF EARLY AMERICAN LAW, supra note 23, at 431-32.

11 See F. AUMANN, THE CHANGING AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM: SOME SELECTED PHASES 79-80 (1940); 2 A. CHROUST, supra note 28, at 67; Waterman,
Thomas Jefferson and Blackstone's Commentaries, in ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF
EARLY AMERICAN LAW, supra note 23, at 453 n.12. The attempts to ban British
citations expressed more of a mood on the part of legislators than anything else; in
practice they do not seem to have had much effect. See L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 29, at
98.
" Goebel, The Common Law and the Constitution, in CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN
MARSHALL 112-13, 119-22 (W. Jones ed. 1956). Justice Iredell, dissenting in
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), declared nonetheless that the common law was "the ground-work of the laws in every state in the Union, and . . . so far
as it is applicable to the peculiar circumstances of the country, and where no special act
of legislation controls it, to be in force in each state, as it existed in England (unaltered
by any statute), at the time of the first settlement of the country." Id. at 435.
11 Letter from James Monroe to John Breckenridge (Jan. 15, 1802), quoted in 3
A. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL: CONFLICT AND CONSTRUCTION
1800-1815, at 59 (1919).
40 Aurora, Jan. 30, 1805, quoted in 2 A. CHROUST, supra note 28, at 66. Mary
K. Tachau maintains "that the animosity felt toward the English political and imperial
connection was not extended to the English legal system." M. TACHAU, supra note 25,
at 78. She is right in terms of the actual operations of the state and federal court
systems. But it cannot be denied that there was a sizable body of public opinion against
the use of the British common law in America. That the common law persisted in
practice even while enduring public excoriation may be attributed in large measure to
the endemic reluctance of the legal profession to change its ways, and to the sheer
immensity of the task of reforming a legal system.
41 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).
42 Id.
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"soon acquire the force of precedents," and thereafter be "more difficult to be shaken than the most cogent arguments, when drawn from
reason alone."

B.

'4 3

Federal Common Law and the Problem of States' Rights

The Hudson decision rested on two arguments. The first emphasized federalism, that "[t]he powers of the general Government are
made up of concessions from the several states."' 44 A second theme
branched off into what modern constitutional interpretation would
identify as a separation-of-powers principle. Only the Supreme Court
"possesses jurisdiction derived immediately from the Constitution; 4' 5 all
other federal courts take their jurisdiction from Congress, whose power
to create inferior federal courts "necessarily implies the power to limit
the jurisdiction of those Courts to particular objects."' 4' For the Republicans, these arguments were essentially derived from the same underlying concern, which was to deny that federal courts had been given a
general common-law jurisdiction by the Constitution. The intent of the
opinion emerges when it is placed in the context of the partisan struggles of the 1790's. The opinion was designed to refute a supposed contention of the Federalists: that federal courts possessed a jurisdiction
akin to the common-law courts of England-a connotation that would
have entirely displaced the independent authority of the states.
In addition to fearing the effects of a greatly expanded jurisdiction
for the federal judiciary, Jefferson and his followers were worried
about a concomitant escalation in the power and reach of the other
branches of the federal government. St. George Tucker's 1803 edition
of Blackstone's Commentaries, which contained a discourse presenting
the Republican view of federal common law, bared the concern:
This question is of very great importance, not only as it
regards the limits of the jurisdiction of the federal courts;
but also, as it relates to the extent of the powers vested in the
federal government. For, if it be true that the common law
of England, has been adopted by the United States in their
national, or federal capacity, the jurisdiction of the federal
courts must be co-extensive with it; or, in other words, unlimited: so also, must be the jurisdiction, and authority of the
4S Tucker, Appendix to 1 W.
Tucker ed. 1803).
44 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 32.
45 Id.
46 Id.

BLACKSTONE,

COMMENTARIES 380 note E (S.

1242

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 133:1231

other branches of the federal government; that is to say, their
powers respectively must be, likewise, unlimited.47
A certain logic supported Tucker's reasoning. An accepted axiom
of his era was that judicial power had to be "co-extensive" with legislative authority. Originally the idea was, as James Wilson explained to
the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, that "the judicial [powers] were
commensurate with the legislative powers [and] went no further."4
This both limited judicial authority and provided "the means of making
the provisions" of congressional laws "effectual over all that country
included within the Union."4' 9
Tucker turned this principle on its head by arguing that the Federalist plan to extend the jurisdiction of federal courts would necessarily
entail a commensurate expansion of the powers of the national legislature. The Federalists, Tucker maintained, must intend "the establishment of a general consolidated government, which should swallow up
the state sovereignties, and annihilate their several jurisdictions, and
powers, as states."5 For Tucker such a consolidated federal government would violate the fundamental premise of the Union, by which
the federal government had "powers limited to certain determinate objects; viz. their intercourse and concerns with foreign nations; and with
each other, as separate and independent states; and, as members of the
same confederacy: leaving the administration of their internal, and domestic concerns, to the
absolute and uncontrollable jurisdiction of the
51
states, respectively."
47 Tucker,

supra note 43, at 380 note E.

'1 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION

OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITuTION 515 (J. Elliot ed. 1836) [hereinafter cited as ELLIOT'S DEBATES].

'1 Id. See also 3 id. at 517 (Edmund Pendleton, Virginia Convention) ("[T]he
power of that judiciary must be co~xtensive with the legislative power, and reach to all
parts of society intended to be governed."); id. at 532 (James Madison, Virginia Convention) ("[T]he judicial power should be correspond with the legislative .

. . .");

4

id. at 156 (William R. Davie, North Carolina Convention) ("[T]he judicial power
should be coExtensive with the legislative."). Years later, Chief Justice Marshall would
describe as a "political axiom" the principle "that the judicial power of every well
constituted government must be co-extensive with the legislative, and must be capable
of deciding every judicial question which grows out of the constitution and laws." Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 384 (1821).
1o Tucker, supra note 43, at 412 note E.
"I Id. Peter Du Ponceau, writing in 1824, easily dispatched the notion that the
scope of powers of each of the three branches of the federal government must be
identical:
It must not be believed that our Constitution has given to the national
legislature powers co-extensive with those that it has conferred upon the
judiciary. There are many cases in which the judiciary can act, nay, when
it must act, on subjects which the legislation of Congress cannot reach.
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Although Tucker's enumeration of federal powers seems remarkably short by modern standards, his description fairly tracks the language used by the old Federalists during the ratification debates. The
expression "consolidated government" had been invoked by the Antifederalists as a slogan to describe what they projected the federal establishment would become. 2 While history eventually proved the Antifederalists right in many respects, those defending the new Constitution
denied that consolidation was their purpose. Speaker after speaker
echoed Edmund Pendleton, who assured listeners in the Virginia Convention that national authority "only extends to the general purposes of
the Union. It does not intermeddle with the local, particular affairs of
the states."5 3 Likewise, Francis Corbin told the same assembly, "The
powers of the general government are only of a general nature, and
their object is to protect, defend, and strengthen the United States; but
the internal administration of government is left to the state legislatures . . .-.
Federalists had insisted at the ratification conventions that the
Constitution's structure did not embrace a consolidation plan. "[A]ny
authority" exercised by the federal government, James Iredell had said,
Thus, in civil matters, the federal Courts have jurisdiction of all controversies between two or more states, between a state, plaintiff, and citizens of
another state, between citizens of different states, between citizens of the
same state claiming lands under grants of different states, and between a
state or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens, or subjects. It cannot be pretended that Congress have the power to legislate on all the various subjects that may give rise to those controversies, although the judiciary are authorised to decide on all and every of them, whenever properly
brought within their jurisdiction. And it matters not whether the law
which they dispense be the common law, or any other applicable to the
subject.
P. Du PONCEAU, supra note 6, at 32-33 (footnote omitted).
52 As Patrick Henry said during the Virginia debates, "That this is a consolidated
government is demonstrably clear; and the danger of such a government is, to my mind,
very striking." 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 48, at 22. Antifederalists also saw the
connection between extensive legislative and judicial powers. George Mason criticized
the proposed article III on this basis. Quoting the "arising under" language from that
provision, he argued:
What objects will not this expression extend to? Such laws may be formed
as will go to every object of private property. When we consider the nature of these courts, we must conclude that their effect and operation will
be utterly to destroy the state governments; for they will be the judges how
far their laws will operate. . . . To those who think that one national,
consolidated government is best for America, this extensive judicial authority will be agreeable; but I hope there are many in this Convention . . .
who see their political happiness resting on their state governments.
Id. at 521-22 (Virginia Convention).
13 Id. at 40.
" Id. at 107.
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must be "expressly given to it."'55 These were "particularly enumer-

ated"56 powers, George Nicholas observed at the Virginia sessions; "accurately and minutely defined," 5 7 James Wilson advised delegates in
Pennsylvania. Regarding the content of those enumerated powers, Federalists gave an account very similar to Tucker's. Madison, wh6 had
been among the more forward proponents of national powers at the
Convention (even endorsing a congressional negative on laws passed by
state legislatures), 58 wrote in The Federalist:

The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to
the Federal Government, are few and defined. Those which
are to remain in the State Governments are numerous and
indefinite. The former will be exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace, negociation and foreign commerce;
with which last the power of taxation will for the most part
be connected. The powers reserved to the several States will
extend to all the objects, which, in the ordinary course of
affairs, concern the lives, liberties and properties of the people; and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of
the State.59
Republicans felt betrayed, to say the least, when the Washington
and Adams administrations adopted programs that the Republicans
considered to have no justification in any of the delegated powers.
When defending his plan for a national bank (which was based on the
model of the Bank of England), Hamilton advised Washington that "it
is unquestionably incident to sovereign power to erect corporations, and
5 4 id. at 166 (North Carolina Convention).
58

3 id. at 451.

5. 2 id. at 468.
58 The proposed article would have given Congress the right "to negative all laws

passed by the several States, contravening in the opinion of the National Legislature the
articles of Union." 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 21
(M. Farrand ed. 1911). Madison spoke in favor of a similarly worded proposal, saying
"[n]othing short of a negative" could protect against the states' "propensity . . . to
disturb the system." 2 id. at 27. Without a negative, the states could "pass laws which
will accomplish their injurious objects before they can be repealed by the [General
Legislature] or be set aside by the National Tribunals." Id. It has been argued that the
nationalists at the Convention worked to broaden federal judicial jurisdiction and to
establish a system of inferior federal courts in order to compensate for the defeat of the
negative plan, and thus to ensure federal control over the states. Although advocates of
states' rights did not oppose the jurisdictional proposal, they did object to the creation of
inferior federal courts. The plan as adopted, leaving to Congress the decision to establish inferior federal courts, resulted from a compromise between the nationalists and
advocates of states' rights. See J. SCHMIDHAUSER, THE SUPREME COURT AS FINAL
ARBITER IN FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS, 1789-1957, at 13 (1958).
51 THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 313 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
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consequently to that of the United States, in relation to the objects intrusted to the management of the government."'
More generally,
Hamilton insisted that when a government was given authority over a
particular object, "it is incident to a general sovereign or legislative
power to regulate a thing, to employ all the means which relate to its
regulation to the best & greatest advantage."'
Jefferson, then Secretary of State, had submitted his own report to
Washington, and among other points he noted "that the very power
now proposed as a means, was rejected as an end, by the Convention
which formed the constitution." 6 2 He was very likely right. Madison,
in fact, had proposed to the Convention a power "to grant charters of
incorporation where the interest of the U.S. might require."6 3 Rufus
King objected that "the States will be prejudiced and divided into parties by [Madison's proposal]-In Philad[elphia] & New York, It will
be referred to the establishment of a Bank, which has been a subject of
contention in those Cities."164 The proposal lost at the Convention, 65 but
President Washington signed Hamilton's bill.66
11 A. Hamilton, Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act to Establish a Bank
(Feb. 23, 1791), reprinted in 8 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 63, 99 (H.

Syrett ed. 1965).
61 Id. at 100-01.
62 T. Jefferson, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bill for Establishing a
National Bank (Feb. 15, 1791), reprinted in 19 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON

277 (J. Boyd ed. 1974). Jefferson wrote that all actions of the federal government must
be specifically grounded in one of the delegated powers. As to the "necessary and
proper" clause, he argued in effect that the proposed action literally must be required
to accomplish the enumerated end. Sheer "convenience" was not enough to make an
action "necessary," since that "would swallow up all the delegated powers." Id. at 278.
Jefferson warned Washington that "[to] take a single step beyond the boundaries thus
specially drawn around the powers of Congress, is to take possession of a boundless
feild [sic] of power, no longer susceptible of any definition." Id. at 276.
While this contention eventually became a central tenet of the Republican party,
Julian Boyd has argued that both Madison and Jefferson "had frequently upheld the
doctrine of implied or inherent powers advanced by Hamilton ...Madison most conspicuously in The Federalist No. 44 and [Jefferson] most radically in arguing for a
treaty he considered beyond the powers of the Confederation." Id. at 281 (editorial
note). Boyd suggests that the "implied powers" issue "was raised belatedly ...primarily as a weapon of defense." Id. Their real concerns were elsewhere, such as fear
that the Bank would become a pretext for "keeping the government in Philadelphia."
Id. More fundamentally, the Bank question reflected underlying tensions between
agrarian and mercantile interests on such issues as the desirability of centralized government and a credit economy. See B. HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLrTCS IN AMERICA
116 (1957).
63 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL

615.
Id. at 616.

CONVENTION OF

1787, supra note 58, at

See id.
Hamilton answered Jefferson's argument by first contending that "very different accounts are given of the import of the proposition and of the motives for rejecting
it. Some affirm that it was confined to the opening of canals and obstructions in rivers;
65
66
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Jefferson's private attitude toward Hamilton decisively changed at
the time of Hamilton's action regarding the Bank.67 Opposition newspapers denounced the Bank as unconstitutional."8 They charged that it
had been "foisted upon the nation by mercantile interests," 9 and would
benefit "stock-jobbers" 70 and "'interested sycophants' "" at the public's expense. Nevertheless, Jefferson, Madison, and their more moderate supporters of the early 1790's were not pushed into a coalition with
the radical elements of the Democratic movement until the coming of
the events surrounding the Alien and Sedition Acts.7 2 As Richard Ellis
relates:
[Flearing that Hamilton planned to make use of the army to
destroy his internal political opposition and put an end to the
Republic . . . Republicans' opposition to Federalist mea-

sures took on a new intensity and urgency. They uncompromisingly assaulted and denounced their opponents' centralizing policies, and they increasingly resorted to extremist
rhetoric to distinguish themselves from the Federalists.7 3
Opposition to the Sedition Act was founded in part on an emerging understanding that the free exchange of ideas is vital to the functioning of a democratic society. Sedition was a concept more suited to a
political relationship in which citizens were subordinate to a sovereign,
than it was to one in which citizens themselves were sovereign.7 4 But
Jefferson, notwithstanding his espousal of a free press, emphasized time
others, that it embraced banks; and others, that it extended to the power of incorporating generally." A. Hamilton, supra note 60, at 111. Then, conceding that the Bank

might have been discussed at the Convention, Hamilton rejected this fact as irrelevant:
[W]hatever may have been the intention of the framers of a constitution,

or of a law, that intention is to be sought for in the instrument itself,
according to the usual & established rules of construction. Nothing is more
common than for laws to express and effect, more or less than was in-

tended. If then a power to erect a corporation, in any case, be deducible by
fair inference from the whole or any part of the numerous provisions of
the constitution of the United States, arguments drawn from extrinsic circumstances, regarding the intention of the convention, must be rejected.
Id.

67 See L. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS 223 (1948); Carter, The Birth of a Political
Economist: Matthew Carey and the RecharterFight of 1801-1811, 33 PA. HIST. 274,

280 (1966).
6 See D.

(1969).
69
70

STEWART, THE OPPOSION PRESS OF THE FEDERALIST PERIOD

51-53

Id. at 362.

Id. at 51.

Id. at 52 (quoting Plain Truth, Philadelphia National Gazette, Oct. 17, 1792).
See R. ELLIS, supra note 36, at 272-74.
73 Id. at 274.
71

72

74

See L.

LEVY, JEFFERSON AND CIVIL LIBERTIES

54-55 (1963).
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and again the controversy's connection with the issue of states' rights. 5
And in the congressional debates, a hot topic of controversy was
whether the Act fell within the powers enumerated in article I.
A House Committee Report in 1799 on the proposed repeal of the
Sedition Act gave a thoroughly Federalist justification for Congress's
action:
[A] law to punish false, scandalous, and malicious writings
against the Government, with intent to stir up sedition, is a
law necessary for carrying into effect the power vested by the
Constitution in the Government of the United States, and in
the departments and officers thereof, and, consequently, such
a law as Congress may pass; because the direct tendency of
such writings is to obstruct the acts of the Government by
exciting opposition to them, to endanger its existence by rendering it odious and contemptible in the eyes of the people,
and to produce seditious combinations against the laws, the
power to punish which has never been questioned; because it
would be manifestly absurd to suppose that a Government
might punish sedition, and yet be void of power to prevent it
by punishing those acts which plainly and necessarily lead to
it; and, because, under the general power to make all laws
proper and necessary for carrying into effect the powers
vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United
States, Congress has passed many laws for which no express
provision can be found in the Constitution, and the constitutionality of which has never been questioned . . ..
71

76

See Jay, Part One, at 1091-92.
9 ANNALS OF CONG. 2988 (1799) (emphasis added). Federal judges presented

similar arguments in defending the Sedition Act in circuit court opinions. Justice Paterson, for example, recorded the following in a handwritten notebook titled "Opinions on
the Bench":
No government can long exist, where libellous publications against its executive and legislative authorities, their acts and measures are suffered to
pass with impunity. The power of punishing such offences is a necessary
instrument or mean of self preservation. No authority is expressly given to
Congress to make laws to punish frauds on the revenue, or forgeries of
bills or notes of the bank of the U. States, or resistance to the judicial
process of the U. States, or taking away or falsifying any record or process
of the same. And yet Congress have passed laws on these subjects, as coming within the general clause of the constitution.
W. Paterson, William Paterson Papers 1783-1804, at 531-33 [original in New York
Public Library; copy on file with the University of PennsylvaniaLaw Review]. In the
same notebook, Paterson said that the Sedition Act is "clearly within the words of the
const[itution] . ..that Congress shall have power to provide for the com[mon] defence
and general welfare of the U. States, to suppress insurrections, and to make all laws,
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Republicans were furious at this explanation and correctly recognized that its principle must "embrace the punishment of any offences
whatever."" Worse, the expansive use of the "necessary and proper"
clause would obliterate the limitations that the Framers had imposed
by conferring only enumerated powers:
The suggestion on which the authority over the press is
founded, is, that seditious writings have a tendency to produce opposition to Government. What has a greater tendency
to fit men for insurrection and resistance to Government,
than dissolute, immoral habits, at once destroying love of order, and dissipating the fortune which gives an interest in
society?
The doctrine that Congress can punish any act which
has a tendency to hinder the execution of the laws, as well as
acts which do hinder it, will, therefore, clearly entitle them
to assume a general guardianship over the morals of the people of the United States.
• . . It would be very easy to connect every sort of authority used by any Government with the well-being of the
General Government, and with as much reason as the committee had for their opinion to assign the power to Congress,
although the consequence must be the prostration of the
78
State Governments.
Aggravating the Republicans' apprehension that Federalists were
ignoring constitutional limits on the federal domain was the substance
of the asserted abuse. At the Convention, a motion had been made to
include a provision stating "that the liberty of the Press should be inviolably observed. '7 9 Roger Sherman interposed that "it is unnecessary-The power of Congress does not extend to the Press"-and the
proposal was defeated.8 0 At the ratification conventions, Antifederalists
clamored for a Bill of Rights to ensure liberties such as a free press.
The standard Federalist answer had been, "The general government
has no powers but what are expressly granted to it; it therefore has no
power to take away the liberty of the press." ' That Federalists at the
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the powers delegated to
them." Id. at 545.
77 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2158 (1798) (Rep. Gallatin).
78 9 ANNALS OF CONG. 3004-05 (1799) (Rep. Nicholas).
71 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 58, at
617.
80 Id. at 618.
81 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 48, at 315 (Charles C. Pinckney, South Car-
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time of ratification had the same observations regarding other personal
liberties 2 undoubtedly was not comforting to Republicans of the post1798 generation. To the Republicans a plain truth was involved: Federalists cared more about protecting values such as property and contract than respecting commitments that gave the people a direct voice in
government and ensured essential freedoms.8 3
The Federalist position that sedition was a federal common-law
crime 4 made it easy for Republicans to view the common-law question
as one implicating states' rights. The list of crimes cognizable by the
British common law was of considerable length, and, by the very nature
of that system, its capacity for expansion was unlimited. These fears
already had surfaced in the ratification debates. James Iredell explained to delegates at the North Carolina Convention that the Constitution included provision for only a select number of federal crimes:
"[The federal government will] have power to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offences against the
law of nations. [It will] have no power to define any other crime
whatever."8 " He specifically denied an Antifederalist accusation that
"the government might make it treason to write against the most arbitrary proceedings." 6 Representative Nathaniel Macon pointedly placed
Iredell's earlier statement in the congressional record, including as well
Iredell's assurance that the federal government could claim no powers
"but such as are so enumerated.

87

olina Convention); accord 2 id. at 449 (James Wilson, Pennsylvania Convention); 3 id.
at 469 (Edmund Randolph, Virginia Convention); 4 id. at 208 (Richard D. Spaight,
North Carolina Convention).
82 See, e.g., 4 id. at 208 (Richard D. Spaight, North Carolina Convention) (freedom of religion); 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra
note 58, at 310 app. A (Edmund Randolph, Virginia Convention) (freedom of religion). With the first amendment in place, Federalists defending the Sedition Act introduced a perverse twist of reasoning. Justice Paterson, one of the Framers, explained
that the amendment "supposes the power over the press to be in congress, and prohibits
them only from abridging the freedom allowed to it by the common law." W. Paterson,
supra note 76, at 539.
83 See S. BROWN, THE FIRST REPUBUCANS 25-26 (1954). Gordon Wood writes,
"Because the Federalists believed that the frenzied advocacy of a bill of rights by most
Antifederalists masked a basic desire to dilute the power of the national government in
favor of the states, they were determined to resist all efforts at amendment." G. WOOD,
supra note 21, at 537.
" See Jay, Part One, at 1077.
85 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 48, at 219.
86 Id.
87 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2152 (1798). Shortly thereafter, Justice Iredell stated to a

grand jury that his position at the ratification convention had been grounded in a "superficial view," and that he was now "convinced it was an erroneous opinion." Charge
to the Grand Jury for the District of Pennsylvania (Apr. 11, 1799), reprintedin Claypoole's American Daily Advertiser (Philadelphia), May 17, 1799.
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It did not calm the moment that the Federalists' interpretation of
the first amendment followed Blackstone almost to the letter. The Committee Report on the Alien and Sedition Laws stated that
the liberty of the press consists not in a license for every man
to publish what he pleases without being liable to punishment, if he should abuse this license to the injury of others,
but in a permission to publish, without previous restraint,
whatever he may think proper, being answerable to the pub-.
lic and individuals, for any abuse of this permission to their
prejudice."8
Representative Nicholas accurately asserted that this view was straight
from Blackstone, who he said was "mak[ing] a theory to justify the
actual state of the [English] law. . .. [T]he nature of their Government justifies more rigor than is consistent with ours,"" 9 which was one
under a written constitution that restricted congressional power over
the press. 0 Reliance on British principles in this manner made Republicans less than enthusiastic about the constantly reiterated Federalist
expression, that "[w]ithout recurring to the common law the Constitution could neither be explained nor executed." 91 For the Republicans,
this was mere subterfuge, yet another device to alter the Republic.
C.

Federal Common Law as a Separation-of-PowersIssue: The
Horwitz Thesis

Placing this emphasis on the connection between the federal common law and states' rights may appear unwarranted, particularly since
we are now more likely to regard the necessity for statutory crimes as a
component of constitutional due process, or, at times, freedom of expression. Morton Horwitz, while acknowledging the preoccupation of
Republicans with consolidation, writes that "it is difficult to understand
precisely what the Jeffersonian argument was all about."92 Republicans such as James Sullivan of Massachusetts, Horwitz points out, saw
no constitutional infirmity in federal common-law jurisdiction, so long
as the offense could be proscribed by Congress under its legislative
powers. "[T]here was no real issue," Horwitz concludes, "concerning
the proper allocation of powers between national and state govern9 ANNALS
81 9 ANNALS

OF CONG.

2988 (1799). The report noted that "[iln the several
3009 (1799).

States the liberty of the press has always been understood in this manner." Id. at 2989.
90

"1 10
9

OF CONG.

Id. at 3008-09.
ANNALS OF CONG.

411 (1800) (Rep. Bayard).

M. HORWrFZ, supra note 23, at 10.
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ments, and, in fact . . .the only respectable constitutional question involved the separation of powers between legislature and judiciary."9 3
Horwitz advances this argument in the course of presenting a
grander thesis-that Americans at that time were becoming increasingly cognizant of the instrumental character of adjudication and of the
discretionary powers wielded by judges. This recognition, in turn, he
associates with a progressive rejection of the common law as "a known
and determinate body of legal doctrine," whose basis was "'the law of
nature and its author.' ,,11
Historians, Horwitz contends, "[d]ue to an
excessive preoccupation with the political and constitutional dimensions
of the struggle over common-law crimes . . .have not fully appreciated the underlying change in the conception of law that laid the foundation for the constitutional struggle." 95
Critics have disputed Horwitz's success at demonstrating such a
clear attitudinal shift in Americans' conception of law,96 and there is
skepticism regarding his overall claim that common-law courts were
systematically biased toward certain classes.9" With regard to federal
common-law crimes, it surely was true that various individuals derided
the "discretion" and "legislating" of judges.9" Nevertheless, by removing his analysis almost totally from the political struggles of the period,
Horwitz fails to perceive the principal reasons for anxiety over judicial
activity.
Horwitz observes that "the only respectable constitutional question" concerning federal common-law jurisdiction was a separation-ofpowers argument. From the standpoint of current constitutional doctrine, that statement is accurate. For purposes of historiography, however, an argument should not be dismissed merely because it now lacks
appeal. Republicans of that generation were obsessed with states'
rights, and regarded consolidation as a real possibility fostered by a
party whose membership was thought to include monarchists.9 9
Horwitz does buttress his assessment that the concern focused on
93 Id.

"Id. at 4 (quoting Otis, A Vindication of the British Colonies, in 1
563 (B. Bailyn ed. 1965)).

PAMPHLETS

OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

Id. at 11.
96 See, e.g., Simpson, The Horwitz Thesis and the History of Contracts, 46 U.
CHI. L. REv. 533 (1979).
See Epstein, The Social Consequences of Common Law Rules, 95 HARV. L.
REV. 1717, 1717-18 (1982).
,BSee Jay, Part One, at 1052.
" Professor Tribe reminds us that, in roughly the pre-Civil War period, tyranny
was associated with "centralized accumulation of power in any man or single group of
men," and "the vitality and autonomy of the states" was relied upon as "a major source
of individual rights and security." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTTUTIONAL LAW § 12, at 2 (1978).
95
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separation of powers by maintaining that "[m]ost thoughtful representatives" of the Republican position saw no separation-of-powers problem, provided that Congress authorized the development of commonlaw crimes.100 Actually, the thought of leading Republicans, such as
Justice Johnson, was not so simple."° Many Republicans did concede
congressional power to declare crimes, so long as they fell within the
scope of an enumerated power.1 0 2 Their idea of the range of enumerated powers, however, was extremely constrained, usually limited to
those expressly mentioned in the Constitution. 3 In addition, Republicans rejected the Federalists' broad reading of the "necessary and
proper" clause.1 4 Republicans in the late 1790's accused Federalists of
scheming to dissolve any limitations on federal authority through the
wholesale incorporation of British common law, which would have rendered legislative authority boundless. 1 5 By writing Hudson "broadly"
(to recall Justice Johnson's expression), the Supreme Court dashed any
such expansion of federal power. Furthermore, there was a difference
in Johnson's mind between Congress's defining specific offenses in a
criminal code and its authorizing the judicial development of commonlaw crimes.10 6
Attitudes toward the authority to make common law were undoubtedly in transition, but the American states would rely on common-law crimes until well into the nineteenth century.107 Moreover,
the conception of law as a body of principles subject to "discovery"
found many adherents throughout the 1800's, including the Court that
wrote Swift v. Tyson."' When assessing ideological shifts, we need to
bear in mind that, as in contemporary society, the public under investigation was diverse, changeable, and inconsistent. Furthermore, there is
usually no single factor that explains the events of a period, and isolating "causes" from "effects" is immensely difficult. In this period, one's
philosophy of federal judicial authority was the result of years of developing arguments, which themselves were influenced by societal events.
100 M. HORWrrz, supra note 23, at 10, 271 n.39 (citing Trial of William Butler
for Piracy 34-35 (1813) [original pamphlet in Harvard Law School Library; copy on
file with the University of PennsylvaniaLaw Review]); Tucker, supra note 43, at 42930 note E. For a discussion of Butler, see infra notes 305 & 312.
101 See infra text accompanying notes 304-12.
102 See, e.g., 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2159 (Rep. Gallatin); see also Jay, PartOne,
at 1103-04.
10.

See Jay, Part One, at 1103.

106

See supra text accompanying notes 77-78.
See supra text accompanying notes 10-11 & 34-40.
See infra text accompanying notes 307-08.

107

See Jay, Part One, at 1063.

104

105

10841

U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). For a discussion of Swift, see infra text accompanying notes 180-85.
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Virtually every statement about the common law produced a rebuttal,
which itself induced a reaction.
We must also be wary of what political actors say, and focus instead on what they actually do. In casting theories about the past, our
quest for coherent explanation may succeed in attributing logic to an
ideology when none existed. Horwitz, for example, cites Justice Iredell
as representative of "the jurist of the eighteenth century," for his statement in Chisholm v. Georgia1" 9 "'that the distinct boundaries of law
and legislation [must not] be confounded,' since 'that would make
courts arbitrary, and, in effect makers of a new law, instead of being
(as certainly they alone ought to be) expositors of an existing one.' ,,no
Yet a scant few months later, Iredell reversed himself on the question
of federal common-law crimes and joined in instructing the jury in
Henfield's Case,"" a case the Republican press denounced as a prosecution for a crime not statutorily defined." 2
Similarly, Judge William Cranch of the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia declared that "the least possible range ought to be left
for the discretion of the judge." ' Scarcely two years earlier he and
another Federalist judge had directed the district attorney to prosecute
the editor of a Republican newspaper for common-law libel. The publication, National Intelligencer, one of the Jefferson administration's
prime organs, had printed a letter attacking the judiciary and defending
Jefferson's removal of Federalist marshals and government attorneys.
When the Republican prosecutor refused to proceed, and the grand
jury to indict, the case was dropped. Still, Cranch's actions were viewed
as an obnoxious example of judicial partisanship, and contributed to
1 14
Jefferson's decision to dismantle the 1801 Judiciary Act.
These seeming inconsistencies by Iredell and Cranch may be attributed to their actual belief in a common law of crimes fixed by natu109 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).

110 M. HoRwrrz, supra note 23, at 9 (quoting Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 448)
(emphasis added by Horwitz) (minor discrepancies corrected to match language in
Chisholm).
1 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1119-20 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6360); see also supra note

87.
112 See Jay, Part One, at 1066. During the ratification debates in North Carolina,
Iredell had declared that a federal official "may be tried . . . for common-law offences,
whether impeached or not." 4 ELLIOT's DEBATES, supra note 48, at 37.
11. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) iii (1804) (remarks by Judge Cranch in preface to volume).
Raoul Berger cites this as an example of the preinstrumentalist view that judges should
not "make law as an instrument of social change." R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JU-

DICIARY
11

306 (1977).
See 1 C. WARREN,

98 (1932).

THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATEs HISTORY
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ral law.1 15 Or it may be that, in the manner of political actors of every
era, what is stated in principle has little relevance to practice. One possibility is that the judges had no coherent or set position. Like most of
us, their ideologies were probably a shifting maze of values, hypotheses,
emotions, and whatever else comprises the human psyche-all in a
never completed process of personal evolution.
More importantly for understanding this era, the opponents of
these judges viewed them through eyes fixed on conspiratorial motives.
The judges were seen as part of a Federalist plot, whose main objective
was a consolidated national government. Even Hamilton had made solemn declarations about the need to avoid judicial discretion through the
application of known rules. 11 6 Republicans considered him capable of
anything, including warping the Constitution to achieve a monarchy.
The gauge of reality in these times was actions, not pious pronouncements. Theory was vital, but it was inseparable from the swirling controversies and posturing personalities of the day. Abstract positions
abounded; they fluctuated and mutated with events, and became distorted beyond recognition by opponents.
D.

Theories of FederalJudicialJurisdiction in the Early Republic
1.

Federal Common Law and Article III

Republicans of the Hudson era rallied against a proposition that
no serious rival was advancing. It would have been untenable to maintain that the body of British common law had been adopted by the
Constitution, or that the federal judiciary possessed a jurisdiction
equivalent to that of the central courts in England. No ingenious argument was needed to show that the proposition could not be sustained.
In a Convention dominated at every turn by jealous state interests, such
a general jurisdiction was entirely implausible. 17 To be sure, a constitution could not have been written without common-law terminology.
As Du Ponceau would elaborately put it, "We live in the midst of the
115 Iredell was of the opinion that the common law formed the "ground-work" of
laws in each state. See supra note 38.
116 See Jay, Part One, at 1057. Hamilton later found it to "be useful to declare
that all such writings &cwhich at common law are libels if levelled against any Officer
whatsoever of the [United States] shall be cognizable in the Courts of the [United
States]." Letter from Alexander Hamilton to Jonathan Dayton (Oct. or Nov. 1799),

reprinted in 23 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 604 (H. Syrett ed. 1976).

Hamilton evidently intended this declaration to be accomplished by legislation, because
he sent the recommendation to the Speaker of the House along with other legislative
recommendations (including increased military expenditures and an expansion of the
federal judiciary).
" See Eliot, supra note 12, at 505.
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common law, we inhale it at every breath, imbibe it at every pore . . .
[W]e cannot learn another system of laws without learning at the same
time another language. '118 Receiving a system of law, along with the
authority to apply it, was another matter entirely.
The way in which article III evolved in the Convention offers
some support to a claim that the Framers envisioned an expansive federal jurisdiction. From a unanimous resolution on July 18, 1787, that
"the jurisdiction of the national Judiciary shall extend to cases arising
under laws passed by the general Legislature, and to such other questions as involve the National peace and harmony," ' the Convention
produced the specific grants now in article III. Along the way, the delegates purposefully altered (without recorded discussion) the language,
"laws passed by the general legislature," to read simply, "the laws of
the United States." 2 ' Commentators have argued that an assembly of
lawyers must have appreciated that this change invited "laws" to be
1 21
read in the widest way, to include both statutory and common law.
It is likely that we will never know with assurance what was
meant by the deliberate use of "laws" in article III. Although to an
eighteenth-century lawyer (which is what a majority of the Framers
were) "laws" would have been taken to include rules emanating from
decisions, 1 22 its addition to article III could not have been meant to
accomplish a general reception of British common law. Americans of
,,8 P. Du PONCEAU, supra note 6, at 91.
1192 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 58, at
39. Madison's notes for the same day differ from this account, which is from the Journal. According to Madison, "under the Nail. laws" was adopted that day instead of
"laws passed by the General Legislature." See id. at 46. The report of the Committee
on Detail (Aug. 6, 1787) essentially uses the Journal version. See id. at 132-33, 186.
120 See id. at 423-24, 431.
121 See 1 W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CoNsTrIUriON IN THE HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES 620-22 (1953). Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938),
would later explain that "laws" in section 34 of the 1789 Judiciary Act included both
statutory and common law. See infra text accompanying notes 413-16; Note, Federal
Common Law and Article III: A JurisdictionalApproach to Erie, 74 YALE L.J. 325,
331-32 (1964).
122 See Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U. L. REv. 383, 388-89 (1964). Justice Paterson observed in the late 1790's that
[c]ases in law and in common law are synonymous expressions; so used by
all legal writers and so understood by all lawyers. This is also the popular
as well as the appropriate meaning of the terms. What are cases in law
arising under the const[itution], as distinct from cases arising under the
statutes of the U. States, and how are such cases to be tried? Clearly they
are cases to be tried and decided by rules and principles, which existed
and were in force prior to and independent of any legislative act of
Congress.
W. Paterson, supra note 76, at 561. Paterson, of course, had been a delegate to the
Convention.
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that day, especially lawyers, would have expected a specific reception
clause for that purpose, akin to those found in the states.1 2 s Given the
existing variations in state common law,"2 4 it would have been impossible to insert such a clause into the Constitution without provoking a
considerable row.
What seems most plausible is that the Convention left unresolved
the future role of the judiciary, except in the broadest outline. Probably
nothing more could have been done, since the extent of federal powers
was not a matter of general agreement. With the judiciary, moreover,
there were specific theoretical problems (arising from the novel federal
system being structured) that complicated the question of what jurisdiction federal courts were to exercise. From the discussions of the period
that have been preserved, one suspects that some of these difficulties
were not well appreciated for a number of years.
To the extent the common law provoked any real controversy in
the ratification period, it came from Antifederalists such as George
Mason and Patrick Henry, who complained that under the proposed
Constitution the people were not "secured even in the enjoyment of the
benefit of the common law.

12 5

The Antifederalists used the term com-

mon law to mean the great rights associated with due process-trial by
jury of the vicinage, the unreviewability of jury fact-finding,12 protection against excessive bail, prohibition of unreasonable fines and cruel
and unusual punishments, freedom from warrantless searches,1 7 the
necessity of grand jury indictment, the conduct of trial by established
procedures (such as the right to counsel and cross-examination), 2 ' and
128 See Goebel, supra note 38, at 103-04. Between 1776 and 1784 all but two
states provided by statute for the selective reception of British decisional law and statutes. See E. BROWN, supra note 26, at 23-24. A majority of these utilized a reception
clause along the lines of the New Jersey Constitution of 1776: "[T]he common law of
England, as well as so much of the statute law, as have been heretofore practiced in this
colony, shall still remain in force, until they shall be altered by a future law .....
Hall, The Common Law: An Account of Its Reception in the United States, 4 VAND.
L. REV. 791, 799 (1951).
124 See 1 THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 27, at 31;
Jay, Part One, at 1056.
12

Mason, Objections to This Constitution of Government, in 2 THE
1787, supra note 58, at 637; accord 3

OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF

RECORDS

ELLIOT'S

supra note 48, at 446-48 (Patrick Henry, Virginia Convention).
See, e.g., Lettersfrom the FederalFarmer(III) (Oct. 10, 1787), reprinted in 2

DEBATES,
126

THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERAuST

234, 244 (H. Storing ed. 1981). The Federal

Farmer thought that these and other rights were denied in the proposed constitution: "I
do not see a spark of freedom or a shadow of our own or the British common law." Id.
127

See, e.g., Letters of Centinel (II) (1787), reprinted in 2
supra note 126, at 143, 152-53.

THE COMPLETE

ANTI-FEDERALIST,

128 See 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 48, at 109-11 (Abraham Holmes, Massachusetts Convention).
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so on. Far from claiming that the Framers intended to incorporate the
British common law, the Antifederalists argued that Congress's power
to regulate the proceedings of federal courts made the fate of these common-law procedural protections uncertain: "[W]e are ignorant whether
[such proceedings] shall be according to the common, civil, the Jewish,
or Turkish law . .

,""I Some pointed to an apparent commitment

on the part of Federalists to replace the common law with civil law,13 0
while others warned that nothing prevented Congress from establishing
"that diabolical institution, the Inquisition."13'
- Antifederalists coupled their disgruntlement over the exclusion of
common-law due process protections with what they saw as a related
point: federal courts "must in time take away the business from the
state courts entirely." ' 2 This "extensive jurisdiction," Mason warned,
which encompassed "all cases arising under the system and the laws of
Congress, may be said to be unlimited, ' 1' 33 since "[s]uch laws may be
formed as will go to every object of private property." ' ' Invariably the
federal judiciary was linked with "the direct tendency of the proposed
system . . . to consolidate the whole empire into one mass." ' 5 After

writing these last words, the essayist Agrippa went on to assert that the
combination of an extensive federal jurisdiction and the supremacy
Id. at 400 (Thomas Tredwell, New York Convention).
See PENNSYLVANIA AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, 1787-1788, at 780
app. (J. McMaster & F. Stone eds. 1888) (remarks of John Smilie at Pennsylvania
Convention, as noted by James Wilson).
1 2 ELLIoT's DEBATES, supra note 48, at 111 (Abraham Holmes, Massachusetts Convention). Holmes asserted that Congress was "nowhere restrained from inventing the most cruel and unheard-of punishments, and annexing them to crimes; and
there is no constitutional check on them, but that racks and gibbets may be amongst the
most mild instruments of their discipline." Id.
1 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 48, at 164 (Samuel Spencer, North Carolina
Convention); see also PENNSYLVANIA AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, 1787-1788,
supra note 130, at 779 app. (remarks of Robert Whitehill at the Pennsylvania Convention, as noted by James Wilson) ("The judicial department is blended with and will
absorb the judicial Powers of the several States; and Nothing will be able to stop its
Way.").
133 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 48, at 523 (Virginia Convention).
1" Id. at 521. William Grayson told the Virginia Convention that the federal
courts' jurisdiction would be of "stupendous magnitude," "impossible for human nature
to trace [in] its extent." Id. at 565.
135 Letters of Agrippa MV)
(Dec. 11, 1787), reprintedin 4 THE COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST, supra note 126, at 77. Antifederalists warned that under a consolidated
government, states would be powerless to resist claims by British creditors, see 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 48, at 566 (William Grayson, Virginia Convention);
states would be "carried to the federal court" and forced to honor depreciated continental currency at face value, id. at 319 (Patrick Henry, Virginia Convention); and individuals would be abused by federal revenue collectors, id. at 577. On the importance of
the "consolidation" issue in ratification arguments, see H. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI12I

131

FEDERALISTS WERE FOR

10-14 (1981).
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clause would result in the application of federal rules of decision in
both state and federal courts. 136 Others were convinced that "the powers of the judiciary may be extended to any degree short of almighty. '137 This extension would be facilitated, wrote Brutus, by the
courts' use of the British device of expanding jurisdiction through legal
"fictions." ' Even Edmund Randolph, who would resign himself to
voting for the Constitution's ratification, saw the instrument deficient
"inlimiting and defining the judicial power."1 3 9
Responding to these charges concerning the judiciary, defenders of
the Framers' work were obliged both to give assurances that the common-law rights on which the Antifederalists insisted would continue to
be recognized and to disclaim an extensive jurisdiction for the federal
judiciary. Their success in simultaneously maintaining these two positions demonstrates that the common law was then seen in an entirely
different light than it would be by the end of the 1790's. Part of the
explanation for this change, however, lies in the fact that many of the
arguments we now consider came from men who emerged as ardent
Republicans in the next decade.
In the main, Federalists of the ratification era expressed amazement at the protest over the common law. Two types of argument characterized their rebuttal. First, Federalists sought to defeat the assertion
that the common law was needed for its due process protections by
stressing what adoption of the common law by the Constitution would
entail. Edmund Randolph and Edmund Pendleton contended, as would
be heard frequently some years later, that a constitutional reception of
138 See

Letters of Agrippa, reprinted in 4

THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST,

supra note 126, at 77-78; see also Essays of Brutus (XII) (Feb. 14, 1788), reprintedin
2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 126, at 427.
137 2 ELLIOT's DEBATES, supra note 48, at 401 (Thomas Tredwell, New York
Convention).
18 Essays of Brutus (XII) (Feb. 14,
FEDERALIST, supra note 126, at 427-28.

1788), reprinted in 2 THE

COMPLETE ANTI-

Likewise, the Federal Farmer suggested that
"a very common legal fiction" could be employed to augment federal jurisdiction-the
locus of a case, such as the place of contracting, would be irrebuttably presumed to lie
in the "federal city." Letters from the Federal Farmer (XVIII) (Jan. 25, 1788), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 126, at 346. In Pennsylvania, Centinel wrote that "[e]very person acquainted with the history of the courts in
England, knows by what ingenious sophisms they have, at different periods, extended
the sphere of their jurisdiction over objects out of the line of their institution . ..."
Letters of Centinel (I) (Oct. 5, 1787), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLTE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 126, at 140. Dissenting members of the Maryland Convention argued
in favor of the following amendment, surely one of the more futile proposals of all time:
"That the federal courts shall not be entitled to jurisdiction by fictions or collusion." 2
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 48, at 550.
13' Letter from Edmund Randolph to Virginia House of Delegates (Oct. 10,
1787), reprinted in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra
note 58, at 127 app. A.
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the common law would leave it "immutable,"'-" incapable of legislative
revision. Madison, in a letter to Washington that specifically addressed
Mason's contention, noted the necessity for such legislative control, as
"every State has made great inroads & with great propriety in many
instances on this monarchical code."1 1 If the Convention "had in general terms declared the Common law to be in force," Madison remarked, "they would have broken in upon the legal Code of every
State," bringing from England "a thousand heterogeneous & antirepublican doctrines, and even the ecclesiasticalHierarchy itself, for
1 42
that is a part of the Common law. 1
On a second track, the early Federalists denied that the due process rights of the common law had been excluded by the Constitution.
"There is nothing in that paper to warrant the assertion," George
Nicholas stated.1 43 He went on to demonstrate how closely the matter
of the common law had been associated with the general dispute over
the missing Bill of Rights:
But the gentleman says that, by this Constitution, they have
power to make laws to define crimes and prescribe punishments; and that, consequently, we are not free from torture. . . . Congress have power to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offences
against the laws of nations; but they cannot define or prescribe the punishment of any other crime whatever, without
violating the Constitution. If we had no security against torture but our declaration of rights, we might be tortured tomorrow; for it has been repeatedly infringed and disregarded. A bill of rights is only an acknowledgment of the
preexisting claim to rights in the people. They belong to us
as much as if they had been inserted in the Constitution. 4 4
This link between the Bill of Rights and the common law is important in understanding the theory of federal law being advanced.
Federalists repeatedly contended that a Bill of Rights was unnecessary,
140 See 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 48, at 469-70 (Edmund Randolph, Virginia Convention); id. at 550 (Edmund Pendleton, Virginia Convention).
141 Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Oct. 18, 1787), reprinted
in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 58, at 130
app. A.
142 Id. Edmund Randolph likewise said before the Virginia Convention that constitutional incorporation of the common law would be "destructive to republican principies," which he illustrated by suggesting that it would result in use of the "writ of
burning heretics." 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 48, at 469-70.
143 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 48, at 451 (Virginia Convention).
144

Id.
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since the powers of the federal government, and Congress in particular,
were few and restricted.' 4 Their line of defense was the same one that
they had erected against the claim of an overreaching federal judiciary.
"Of the two objects of judicial cognizance, one is general and national,
1 46
and the other local," explained Edmund Pendleton in Virginia.
These "objects"

were "separate and distinct,

'1 47

several advocates

maintained, and William R. Davie ventured that in "no instance"
could "the internal policy of the state . . .be affected by the judiciary

1 48
of the United States."
The Federalists thus advocated a modest role for the federal judiciary in the same manner that they maintained that national legislative
authority should be strictly limited. Answering the allegation that the
"arising under" jurisdiction would swallow up all state court business,
John Marshall asked, "Has the government of the United States power
to make laws on every subject? . . .Can they make laws affecting the
mode of transferring property, or contracts, or claims, between citizens

of the same state? Can they go beyond the delegated powers?"' "49 Fed-

eralists emphasized that in most instances of federal jurisdiction the
state courts would retain concurrent powers,' 5 0 and it was often suggested that the state judiciaries would handle the bulk of federal judicial business.' 5 1
By submerging the concern for the common law with the overall
matter of federal powers, the Federalists successfully shifted the ratification debates away from the issue. In fact, the judiciary did not become a dominant source of Antifederalist objections.' 52 Left undevel145

See, e.g., Letter from George Washington to Marquis de LaFayette (Apr. 28,

1788), reprinted in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra

note 58, at 297-98 app. A; 2 ELoiT's DEBATEs, supra note 48, at 78-79 (Joseph
Varnum, Massachusetts Convention); id. at 93 (Theophilus Parsons, Massachusetts
Convention); id. at 437, 453-54 (James Wilson, Pennsylvania Convention); id. at 540
(Thomas M'Kean, Pennsylvania Convention); 3 id. at 203-04 (Edmund Randolph,
Virginia Convention); id. at 246 (George Nicholas, Virginia Convention); 4 id. at 14041, 161-62 (William Maclaine, North Carolina Convention); id. at 142 (Samuel Johnston, North Carolina Convention); id. at 148 (James Iredell, North Carolina Convention); id. at 259-60 (Charles Pinckney, South Carolina Convention); accord G. WOOD,
supra note 21, at 539-40.
146 3 EI.UoT's DEBATES, supra note 48, at 548.
147 4 id. at 139 (Richard Spaight, North Carolina Convention); id. at 140 (William Maclaine, North Carolina Convention).
148 Id. at 160 (North Carolina Convention).
149

3 id. at 553 (Virginia Convention).

See, e.g., 4 id. at 141 (Samuel Johnston, North Carolina Convention); id. at
163 (William Maclaine, North Carolina Convention); 3 id. at 554 (John Marshall,
Virginia Convention).
150

151

See C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 539 (1928).

152

See J.

(1961).

MAIN, THE ANTIFEDERALISTS: CRITICS OF THE CONsTrruTION

158
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oped by the manner in which the issue evolved was a theory of federal
jurisdiction that might have explained what sources of law federal
courts could draw upon. Indeed, the most revealing aspects of the Federalist posture in these years lie in what they failed to say about the
relationship of the common law to the proposed federal court system.
While denying that the common law had been adopted in "general
terms," Madison and others of his persuasion nevertheless did not dismiss a role for the common law in the nation's legal system. Yet there
was a peculiar ambiguity in what was said on this score. Madison
wrote that "[t]he Common law is nothing more than the unwritten law,
and is left by all the Constitutions equally liable to legislative alterations."'153 Essentially he thought that this was not a proper subject for a
constitution.'" While noting that a Virginia ordinance had declared a
portion of the common law to be in effect, Madison explained that this
was done "merely to obviate pretexts that the separation from G. Britain threw us into a State of nature, and abolished all civil rights and
obligations. '
Presumably Madison would have accepted a type of "unwritten
law" for subjects appropriately within federal judicial competence. He
had complained at the Convention of the "multiplicity" and "mutability" of the laws of "the several States,"158 and saw the Supreme Court
as a vehicle for providing uniformity in cases involving ambassadors
and admiralty and maritime affairs. He went further to contend that in
those areas federal jurisdiction should be exclusive.157 Given that in his
society judicially created law greatly exceeded that deriving from statutes, 58 it would be unusual to suppose that Madison intended to limit
federal jurisdiction to actions based on the latter source. Certainly Randolph must have thought a national unwritten law to be operating,
since he reported to Congress shortly after the 1789 Judiciary Act took
effect that "the common law was . . . already the law of the United
Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Oct. 18, 1787), reprinted
in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 58, at 130
app. A.
'" This would require "a digest of laws, instead of a Constitution," wrote
Madison. Id.
153

155 Id.
2"

318.

1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787,

supra note 58, at

See 3 ELLiOT'S DEBATES, supra note 48, at 532 (Virginia Convention).
115This state of affairs would persist. See The Common Law, 19 N. AM. REv.
411, 437-38 (1824) ("The statute law is quite inconsiderable in comparison with the
enormous mass of the common or unwritten law, that law of which the evidence is to
be found in books of reports of the English and American courts, and the books made
from them ....
).
157
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States. Most probably this will be seldom, if ever, controverted."'1 59
How can these remarks of Madison and Randolph be reconciled
with their rejection of any general reception of the common law? The
answer probably lies in an attitude, shared by others, toward the nature
of federal jurisdiction. Delegates to the Convention had addressed the
specific grants of jurisdiction, not the form of their exercise. Much as
state constitutional conventions had left the duties of courts undefined,
in the expectation that they would continue operating as always, 6 0 the
Framers referred only to "[tihe judicial power of the United States."''
They probably anticipated that federal courts would act in the way
courts were accustomed to operating, "exercis[ing] all functions and
powers which Courts were at that time in the judicial habit of exercising."' 6 2 Congress could control the extent of lower court jurisdiction,
and accordingly "that general sense of justice pervad[ing] the
Union . . . would depend upon the wisdom of the legislatures who are
to organize it . . . ."263

Still, this conception left unclear the extent to which the making of
common law would occur, for example, in the exercise of admiralty or
diversity jurisdiction. In addition, the status of such law with respect to
the states was largely left open, despite Federalist denials that the
supremacy clause would operate to make all federal law dominant. For
instance, if a common-law commercial issue arose in a diversity case,
could a federal court apply the rule that it thought controlled the issue,
or must it follow the decisions of some state? If the former were the
guiding principle, would this federal common law be binding on future
state courts? Would the situation be different if the issue were one of
admiralty-or equity?
159 E. RANDOLPH, JUDICIARY SYSTEM, H.R. Doc. No. 17, 1st Cong., 3d Sess.
(1790), reprintedin 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MISCELLANEOUS 25 (W. Lowrie &
W. Franklin eds. 1834). Randolph nevertheless considered it important to state explicitly in section 34 of the Judiciary Act that the common law was in effect. He proposed
an amendment: "and, moreover, that the common law, so far as the same be not altered
by the supreme law, by the laws of particular States, or by statutes, shall also be a rule
of decision." Id. at 33. No action was taken on the recommendation. For a discussion of
Randolph's proposal, see Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the
JudiciaryAct of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARv. L. REv. 1513,
1521-23 (1984).
160 See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
161 U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1.
162 C. WARREN, supra note 151, at 332; accord Note, The Federal Common
Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1512, 1515-16 (1969).
163 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 48, at 258 (Charles Pinckney, South Carolina Convention).
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2.

Section 34 and "General Law"

The usual answer to these last questions has been that the Framers intended Congress to decide not only the scope of federal jurisdiction, but also the source of law to be used by the courts.'" In any
event, that has seemed the likely purpose of section 34 of the 1789
Judiciary Act, which declared that "the laws of the several states . . .
shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the
courts of the United States in cases where they apply." 6 5 The "in cases
where they apply" limitation in section 34, however, has long struck
legal commentators as rendering the whole provision entirely circular-"almost perversely uninformative." 16' 6
Among lawyers of the period that we are investigating, section 34,
notwithstanding its peculiar wording, appears to have generated very
little controversy. In a recent study of this enactment, William Fletcher
notes that it "was generally understood to be merely declaratory of existing law; that is, even if the section had never been enacted, the federal courts would have followed the local law of the states in cases
where it applied. ' 167 For other cases, the rules of decision would come
from what Fletcher labels "general law," that which "existed by common practice and consent among a number of sovereigns."' 8 He illustrates this with the example of the law of marine insurance, demonstrating that federal courts, even when sitting in diversity, felt free to
develop a general law of marine insurance, irrespective of local law on
the subject. 69
Justice Wilson, in his charge to the grand jury in Henfield's
Case,170 expounded this theory by distinguishing matters subject to "local laws" from those decided under "the law of nations" or "the law of
merchants."1 71 Far from being extraordinary, Wilson's view was
1 72
shared by persons of diverse sympathies, such as St. George Tucker
and James Sullivan. The latter wrote in 1801:
18

185

See, e.g., 1 J.

GOEBEL, supra note 15, at 229.
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (current version at 28

U.S.C. § 1652 (1982)).

168 Mishkin, The Variousness of "FederalLaw": Competence and Discretion in
the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 797, 800
n.16 (1957); accord M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL PoWER 81 (1980); Note, supra note 162, at 1515.
167 Fletcher, supra note 159, at 1527.
28 Id. at 1517.
18l
170
271

171

See id. at 1554-75.
11 F. Gas. 1099 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6360).
Henfield, 11 F. Cas. at 1107.
See Tucker, supra note 43, at 424-30 note E.
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It seems to be the opinion of the best writers, ancient and
modern, that as contracts arose from commerce, they ought
to be governed by the jus gentium, the law of nations,
known and established over the commercial world ...
There is no act of any particular legislature, for the recovery
of money due on policies, bills of exchange, charter parties,
freight, &c. but we find the same form of contract, the same
manner of construction, and the same remedies, all over the
world.

17 3

Sullivan was exaggerating the actual uniformity of commercial law, but
the idea of bringing the law of merchants under the rubric of the law of
nations was accepted.17 4 Similarly, the body of legal rules and principles that we now call the "law of conflict of laws" or "private interna1 75
tional law" would have been included within the law of nations.
Accordingly, Lord Mansfield could write, concerning a point of
marine insurance law, that "[t]he mercantile law, in this respect, is the
same all over the world."176 By this he meant that merchants behaved
similarly everywhere, and their practices would be applied universally
to define norms of behavior.17 7 Again, this may not have stated the actual truth of uniformity; rather, he referred to a process by which all
courts were to investigate international customs and practices. Consistent with this view, Chief Justice Marshall would state in Gibbons v.
Ogden178 that the right to engage in commerce "derives its source from
those laws whose authority is acknowledged by civilized men through17 9

out the world."

17s J. SULLIVAN, THE HISTORY OF LAND TITLES IN MASSACHUSETTS 352 (Boston 1801). Sullivan went on to give the example of rules for determining privity of
contract:

These do not arise on the force of an act of Parliament, but from the
nature of things. The idea, that an act of legislation can create a privity
where there is none, is as absurd as it would be to suppose it could change
the colour of substances, or the nature of animals.
Id. at 353.
11" See Comment, Rules of Decision in Nondiversity Suits, 69 YALE L.J. 1428,
1443 n.113 (1960).
171 Rheinstein, The ConstitutionalBases ofJurisdiction,22 U. CHI. L. REv. 775,
805 (1955).
17
Pelly v. Governor of the Royal Exch. Assurance, 1 Burr. 341, 347, 97 Eng.
Rep. 342, 346 (K.B. 1757).
177 See Goebel, Ex Parte Clio (Book Review), 54 COLUM. L. REV. 450, 457-58
(1954) (reviewing W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITrION IN THE HisTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1953)).
17
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
179 Id. at 211.
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Long before Swift v. Tyson' was decided, federal courts recognized the division between general and local law:18 1 only if the issue fell
under the latter heading was it considered necessary to follow the law
of a particular state.1" 2 St. George Tucker explained this demarcation
in 1803 by reference to
controversies between citizens of different states; and between citizens of any state and the subjects or citizens of foreign states . . . . In these cases, the municipal law of the
place where the cause of controversy arises, whether that be
one of the United States . . . or any other country; or the
general law of merchants; or, the general law of nations according to the nature and circumstances of the case, must be
the rule of decision, in whatever court the suit may be
brought. Thus if a bond be given in Philadelphia, the rate of
interest must be settled according to the laws of Pennsylvania. . . . If a ransom bill be drawn at sea, the law of nations in that case must be consulted. If the controversy relate
to lands, the law of the state where the lands lie must be
referred to; unless the lands be claimed under grants from
different states; in which case the territorial rights of each
1 83
state must be inquired into.
Despite the early recognition of matters "general" as opposed to
"local" in commentaries and opinions, there is scarcely a clear statement from that time as to the precise relationship between section 34
and the choice-of-law question. In looking at this statute, we expect to
find some indication whether "general law" was within the category of
cases in which state law did not "apply." That it was not so understood, or even discussed, in those terms is demonstrated by federal
courts being obligated to follow state statutes regarding general law
matters and "settled" constructions given the statutes by the state
180 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
181 Swift "summed up prior attitudes and expressions in cases that had come
before this Court and lower federal courts for at least thirty years, at law as well as in
equity. The short of it is that the doctrine was congenial to the jurisprudential climate
of the time." Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 102-03 (1945); accord T.
FREYER, HARMONY & DISSONANCE: THE SwiFT & ERIE CASES IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM 26-40 (1981); R. NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY:
STATESMAN OF THE OLD REPUBLIC 338 (1985).
182 See Fletcher, supra note 159, at 1534-38.
lS Tucker, supra note 43, at 421 note E. During the Virginia ratification debates, John Marshall used similar examples in contending that federal courts in diversity cases would be obliged to follow state law under the principle of lex loci. See 3
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 48, at 556-57, 559.
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courts. 184 As will be discussed below, a federal court's authority to
make an independent interpretation of general law did not depend on
its being considered a form of federal law. Instead, Story's thesis in
Swift was based on the notion that unwritten law was something to be
discovered and was merely evidenced by judicial opinions, irrespective
of whether they were issued by state, federal, or foreign tribunals."8 5
Leaving those issues aside for the moment, the important point is
that section 34 did not address what is now termed federal common
law. In referring to admiralty cases, legal writers would not call the
applicable unwritten law "federal." The typical attitude was that expressed by William Rawle: "[T]he whole system of maritime affairs
with its connexions and dependencies is withdrawn from the several
states by their own consent, and vested in the general government ... ."18 To us this sounds as if Rawle meant that admiralty
law had been federalized. His point, however, was jurisdictional: only
the federal courts could hear these kinds of cases. So too did Thomas
Sergeant write that, when a federal court was "sitting as a court of
See Fletcher, supra note 159, at 1534-38.
To hold this view of unwritten law, Story did not necessarily have to embrace
a natural law theory:
Whether Story literally believed that law predated cases, that deciding was discovering, is doubtful ....
The interconnected nature of his
opinions does however attest to his belief in law as science ....
Holism
was the key. Rules were systematically connected to principles. The common law was connected to constitutional law, and both were informed by
the civil law-a process that should be informed by comparative law ...
and legal history ....
R. NEWMYER, supra note 181, at 113. In a "scientific" approach, law was discovered
in the sense that the jurist was required to expound the logical connections between
cases. That Story would use decisions and commentaries from a variety of legal systems
attests at least to a faith in the ability of human reason to produce consistent results
through systematic investigation. But here lies a great unresolved tension in Story's
thought. His treatise on the conflict of laws was premised on the assumption that the
laws of different states would conflict due to the varying conditions among the states.
See J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 1-2 (3d ed. Boston 1846)
(1st ed. Boston 1834). Resolving conflicts was to Story the business of "private international law," id. at 13, and the purpose of his book was to urge that "some common
principles [be] adopted by all nations" to form an international body of conflicts principles. These principles applied to matters clearly "general" in the Swift formulation,
such as contracts, see id. at 362-63, 367-68, 399, 401, 414-16, 429-32, 580-81, and
negotiable instruments, see id. at 513-14, 947-48. Presumably Story reconciled the existence of conflicting laws with his ideas of "scientific" law by assuming that "variances"
resulted sometimes "from accident . . . sometimes from superior skill . . . and sometimes from a choice founded in ignorance, and supported by the prejudices of imperfect
civilization." Id. at 1. But even he recognized that conflicts occurred at times "from
design . . . and knowledge of local interests," id., an acknowledgement that devastated
the concept of law as science.
I'l W. RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONsTrrTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 202 (2d ed. Philadelphia 1829) (1st ed. Philadelphia 1825).
184

185
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Equity or Admiralty," section 34 was irrelevant since it referred only to
1 87
"trials at common law.)

As is well known, the regime of general law ultimately collapsed
under the weight of two irresolvable pressures. First, the demarcation
between general and local law became increasingly muddled. Second,
state courts persisted in their own interpretations of general law, defeating the goal of uniformity that Madison had advanced in defense of
article III. These developments were not simply happenstance. They
reflected a basic weakness in the prevailing theory of federal jurisdiction, one traceable to a more fundamental inadequacy in the conception
of constitutionalism.
3.

The Irrelevance of "Federal Common Law" to Federal
Jurisdiction

Article III was a grant of jurisdiction with the potential for reaching the totality of litigation that the Framers regarded as important to
the nation. William R. Davie emphasized to the North Carolina convention that- "the general judiciary ought to be competent to the decision of all questions which involve the general welfare or peace of the
Union."18 8 It was an "obvious consideration," said Hamilton, that
there be a method of "giving efficacy to constitutional provisions," in
order "to restrain or correct the infractions of them" on the part of
states."8 9 Equally plain was the need for an authority to provide "uniformity in the interpretation of the national laws," which necessitated
"the judicial power . . . being coextensive with [the] legislative." 19 0
Federal judicial power was also seen to be "[t]he only means . . . of

enforcing obedience to the legislative authority." 91 Well versed in the
enforcement problems plaguing the national government under the Articles of Confederation, Madison urged that "[c]ontroversies affecting
the interest of the United States ought to be determined by their own
judiciary, and not be left to partial, local tribunals." 92
National judicial affairs were not limited to enforcing and interpreting federal statutes and the Constitution. Diversity, admiralty, and
187 T. SERGEANT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 148 (2d ed. Philadelphia 1830) (1st
ed. Philadelphia 1822).
1" 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 48, at 158.
189 THE FEDERAUST No. 80, supra note 59, at 535.
190

Id.

supra note 48, at 158 (William R. Davie, North Carolina Convention).
192 3 id. at 532 (Virginia Convention); accord 4 id. at 145-46 (James Iredell,
North Carolina Convention) ("At present, Congress have powers which they cannot
execute.").
191 4 ELL OT'S DEBATES,
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maritime grants, for example, covered all commerce of national significance, since most important trade crossed state lines and was by sea.19
Madison explained to the Virginia convention that these jurisdictional
grants, along with those concerning ambassadors, foreign ministers, and
treaties, would result in a uniformity of decision that was critically important "[a]s our intercourse with foreign nations will be affected by
decisions of this kind."19' 4 Here two elements combined. First, "the denial of justice" to foreigners was considered "by all writers" to be "one
of the just causes of war."19 5 To avoid this danger, Hamilton wrote, "it
is by far most safe and most expedient to refer all those in which [foreigners] are concerned to the national tribunals."'9 6 Hamilton commented that "[a] distinction may perhaps be imagined between cases
arising upon treaties and the laws of nations, and those which may
stand merely on the footing of municipal law.'

1 97

Although the "former

kind may be supposed proper for the federal jurisdiction, [and] the latter for that of the states," Hamilton doubted that this distinction would
be appreciated abroad:
But it is at least problematical, whether an unjust sentence
against a foreigner, where the subject of controversy was
wholly relative to the lex loci, would not, if unredressed, be
an aggression upon his sovereign, as well as one which violated theoa stipulations in a treaty or the general law of
nations.'

A second reason for providing a federal forum to foreigners was to
encourage their commercial intercourse with this country. "We well
know," Madison remarked, "that foreigners cannot get justice done
them in these [state] courts, and this has prevented many wealthy gentlemen from trading or residing among us."'9 9 Encouraging commerce
by this means applied equally to relations among American entrepreneurs in different states, who had been hampered by "tardy, and even
defective, administration of justice . . .in some states."

'

Many of the

Framers looked forward to a tremendous, if undefined, expansion of
193 See L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 29, at 228; Stolz, PleasureBoating and Admiralty: Erie at Sea, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 661, 671-73 (1963).
194 3 ELLIoT's DEBATES, supra note 48, at 532; accord id. at 570-01 (Edmund
Randolph, Virginia Convention).
"1 4 ELLiOT's DEBATES, supra note 48, at 159 (William R. Davie, North Carolina Convention).
I" THE FEDERALIST No. 80, supra note 59, at 536.
197 Id.

198 Id.
199

3 ELLIoT's DEBATES, supra note 48, at 583 (Virginia Convention).

Id. at 533 (James Madison, Virginia Convention).
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trade and manufacture, which they thought could flourish only under a
regime of stable, predictable commercial law. 20 1 Diversity jurisdiction
afforded both a neutral forum and the possibility of consistent judicial
procedures. 20 2 It is also reasonable to conclude that diversity was expected to protect against erroneous choices of law by biased state
20 3

courts.

"Harmony between the states is no less necessary than harmony
between foreign states and the United States," Edmund Randolph reminded the Virginia Convention.2 °' He highlighted several border disputes of the day that had produced threats of military confrontation
and actual reprisals from the state governments involved. Border disputes were not the only possible source "from which bickerings and
animosities [could] spring up among members of the Union," Hamilton
wrote, since "the spirit which produced them will assume new shapes
that could not be foreseen, nor specifically provided against."20 5 As
proof that state law could not govern such controversies, he referred
to "fraudulent laws which have been passed in too many of the
states. ' 20 6 In modern terminology, the law applicable to most such relationships among states would be federal common 20 7 or constitutional
See Frank, HistoricalBases of the FederalJudicialSystem, 13

LAW & CON3, 27 (1948).
J. GoEBEL, supra note 15, at 233 n.187. Achieving uniform rules of
procedure was long frustrated, however, by the Process Acts in effect before 1872, Act
of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 4, 1 Stat. 93; Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, 1 Stat. 275; Act of July
22, 1813, ch. 14, 3 Stat. 19; Act of Mar. 3, 1821, ch. 51, 3 Stat. 643; Act of May 19,
1828, ch. 68, 4 Stat. 278, and by the Conformity Act in effect from 1872 to 1938, Act
of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, 17 Stat. 19. These acts required federal courts to follow the
forum state's procedures in common-law cases. See Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the
Constitution-PartII, 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 541, 596 (1958).
203 See R. BRIDWELL & R. WHITTEN, THE CONSTITUTION
AND THE COMMON
201

TEMP. PRoB S.
202 See 1

LAW: THE DECLINE OF THE DOCTRINES OF SEPARATION OF POWERS AND FEDERAL-

30-31 (1977). While federal courts prior to Erie could engage in independent
choice-of-law determinations, see McCormick & Hewins, The Collapse of "General"
Law in the Federal Courts, 33 ILL. L. REV. 126, 138 (1938), they are now obliged to
honor the selection of nonfederal law that a court of the forum state would make. See
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor EIec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
204 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 48, at 571; accord THE FEDERALIST No. 80
(A. Hamilton), supra note 59, at 536.
205 THE FEDERALIST No. 80, supra note 59, at 537.
206 Id. at 537. Hamilton was probably referring to "fraudulent" debt relief laws
of various states; diversity jurisdiction was expected, said Edmund Pendleton, "to stop
[their] pernicious effects." 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 48, at 549 (Virginia Convention); see also id. at 534-35 (James Madison, Virginia Convention); 4 id. at 159
(William R. Davie, North Carolina Convention). Most likely these speakers assumed
that the federal courts would achieve this end by applying the contract clause of article
I, section 10. Pendleton referred to "[p]aper money and tender laws" as being "in
opposition to the federal principle, and restriction of this Constitution." 3 id. at 549
(Virginia Convention).
207 See, e.g., Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S.
ISM
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law.2 0° In the era studied here, "federal common law" was not a meaningful term.
Federal courts were to achieve the purposes set out for them by
the Framers through their mere availability to litigants. A federal forum, it was asserted, would eliminate the various forms of bias that
typified state tribunals. Related discussions concerning the need for
uniform application of federal law centered on the Constitution, congressional statutes, and general law of the transnational variety. Conversants viewed the last of these as an understood body of existing principles, or at least a jurisprudence capable of being understood through
the exercise of reason. Irrespective of whether lower federal courts were
created, the Supreme Court would serve as the mechanism for insuring
uniformity of interpretation of the general law in areas considered important to the national welfare. Further, the device of exclusive federal
jurisdiction over selected areas provided a means of avoiding diverse
state rulings.
One can easily see how this arrangement would seem useful for
resolving a series of pressing and pragmatic concerns. However, a hard
question had been raised during ratification, and it involved the sources
of law for the future federal courts. But the context in which the point
arose allowed Federalists easily to dismiss the issue. When it was argued that, in a diversity case, state law might be ignored in favor of a
uniform national law, the answer was simple. The federal government
had only a few, narrowly constrained powers, which obviously would
not extend to any matter "internal" to the states. For cases involving
general law, it was assumed that state courts were already obliged to
follow a transnational jurisprudence. 0 9 Accordingly, the new federal
judicial powers could not impinge upon the states. Section 34 of the
1789 Judiciary Act,210 interpreted as merely setting forth a principle
that would be valid even if the statute were not in existence, was an
expression of this understanding of states' rights.2 1 '
92, 110 (1938) (asserting that "whether water of an interstate stream must be apportioned between . . . two States is a question of 'federal common law' ").

20 Likely candidates would be the contract clause or the dormant commerce
clause. The latter is essentially a species of federal common law. See J. ELY, DEMOC-

187 n.13 (1980).
See Note, Federal Common Law and Article III: A JurisdictionalApproach
to Erie, 74 YALE L.J. 325, 334 (1964).
210 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (current version at 28
U.S.C. § 1652 (1982)).
211 Thomas Sergeant stated the constitutional compulsion behind section 34:
Indeed, Congress cannot constitutionally impair the obligation of laws
passed by the states, by setting up a different rule of decision in relation to
contracts, property real and personal, &c., when such state laws are not
RACY AND DisTRusT

20"
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What commenced the downfall of this model of judicial authority
was the perception that the Federalists of the late 1790's had expanded
the extent of federal powers at the expense of the states. It may be that
the failure to include a provision comparable to section 34 in the 1801
Judiciary Act 212 was designed by Federalists to facilitate future expansive assertions of common-law jurisdiction by federal courts. Yet the
lack of recorded controversy over that move, in contrast to the sharp
clashes over the very existence of common-law jurisdiction, makes it
plausible that section 34 was regarded as simply unnecessary.
In any event, it was not any ambiguity peculiar to section 34 that
created the confrontation over federal jurisdiction. More basic than any
statutory enactment was a fundamental disagreement over what powers
the Constitution assigned to the federal establishment. As a consequence of this dispute, and the way in which it was played out against
the prevailing philosophies of law and sovereignty, there never developed a comprehensive theory of federal jurisdiction that might justify
the federal courts' exercise of a common-law jurisdiction, and the creation of a distinctive nonstatutory, nonconstitutional law that would be
binding on the states.
Several themes coalesce to explain this lack of development. The
first, relating to the view that law of the unwritten variety was
"found," and thus not the product of a sovereign's exercise of power, is
examined in the following subsection. Intertwined with the idea of general law, this theory helps explain how the Framers and their contemporaries could have supposed that an extensive federal jurisdiction
would be exercised without interfering with the states' sovereignty. A
second theme, involving the prevailing theory of territorial sovereignty,
and the way that it impeded the formulation of an uniquely federal
common law, is discussed in the subsequent subsection.
a. The Idea of Law as Distinctfrom Sovereign Interests
Although concerns over judicial lawmaking were voiced as early as
Henfield, there were at the same time ready responses. When presented
with the charge that, under the proposed Constitution, the "laws may
be executed tyrannically," John Marshall had replied to the Virginia
Convention: "Where is the independency of your judges? If a law be
repugnant to the constitution and laws of the United States. The powers
vested in Congress are limited, and were not intended to interfere with
these powers, as vested in the state governments.
T. SERGEANT, supra note 187, at 150.
212 Judiciary Act of 1801, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 89, repealed by Act of Mar. 8, 1802, ch.
8, § 1, 2 Stat. 132, 132.
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exercised tyrannically in Virginia, to what can you trust? To your judiciary. What security have you for justice? Their independence. Will it
not be so in the federal court?"21 Madison used a different approach
to counter objections to the exercise of diversity jurisdiction: "Were I to
select a power which might be given with confidence, it would be judicial power. This power cannot be abused, without raising the indignation of all the people of the states."21 4
Marshall's faith in judicial independence and Madison's reliance
on popular restraint of judges were conflicting stances, and by the first
decade of the nineteenth century, judicial independence would in fact
collide with popular sentiments. When such sentiments were uttered,
the conflict-to the extent that people perceived it-was not as important as the assurance that one or both mechanisms would check judicial
abuse. Provided the abuses were easily recognizable, as the Federalists
assured, one might consistently claim that judges would be insulated
from pressures to exceed their authority, and simultaneously hold public censure out as a corrective measure. But abuse of judicial office
turned out not to be a plain concept, at least when the behavior in
question fell short of obvious excesses, such as conducting biased trials.
From Henfield through the sedition prosecutions of the late
1790's, a far more subtle development strengthening the federal judicial
lawmaking power was under way. Involved in the sedition cases was
the federal government's assertion of a sovereign interest in seeing that
the defendants were convicted. In developing unwritten principles to
accomplish this end, the federal courts at times drew upon the general
law of nations. Nevertheless, it was the national interest that justified
the exercise of power. A Gideon Henfield could not be deprived of liberty merely for violating the law of nations-there was no international
government that could accuse him. The theory was rather that his
transgression of the law of nations threatened the domestic peace, and
thereby constituted a violation of United States law.
The proposition that the federal government could develop unwritten law to vindicate its own interests was not difficult to maintain. It
had long been recognized that sovereign states possessed the power of
self-protection. James Sullivan had no trouble writing that
[a]nimals, of every description, are armed with the means of
self defence; and it must be a miserable government, which
has not the means of defending itself from insults and injury. . . .Every power, necessary to the maintenance of the
3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 48, at
214 Id. at 535 (Virginia Convention).
213
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government against invaders of every description, in the civil
line, may be exercised by the national judicial power. Should
it be said that the judiciary is to wait, until the Legislature
shall make laws, the answer is, that this would be placing
the question, whether the government should, or should not,
exist in the Congress alone. 2 15
This position was susceptible to broad interpretations. Governments do not exist merely for the sake of their own preservation, particularly if one accepts that sovereignty resides in the people. Instead,
those who happen to be in power are charged with attending to the
concerns of those who employ them. Between the time of the Revolution and the adoption of the Constitution, this citizen-sovereign relationship existed only with respect to state governments, which possessed
the full range of sovereign powers. Behind the legislation of these states
was, John Marshall wrote, a "substratum"2 1 of unwritten law formed
from "the common law of England [which] was, and is, the common
law of this country. 21 7 In the federal structure created by the Constitution, on the other hand, sovereign powers are distributed between two
levels of government. Consequently, in constructing a theory of federal
judicial power one might view the national government itself as having
been formed against the background of this same "substratum" of unwritten law. The content of that background would depend on the subjects designated as within federal competence by the initial constitutional delegation. As the following remarks of James Sullivan indicate,
this theory of federal judicial power was held by some at the end of the
eighteenth century:
But the great end, for which the government is constituted, is
expressed in the preamble [of the Constitution,] and
whatever is there expressed, is the common law of the whole
country; because, that though it is not written at large, or
215 J. SULLIVAN, supra note 173, at 344-45. Justice Paterson's justification for
common-law crimes was that "[tihe principles of self defence and preservation, which
pervades [sic] nations, as well as individuals, renders [sic] the punishment of offences an
indispensable requisite in every government." W. Paterson, supra note 76, at 565.
216

R. FAULKNER, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF JOHN MARSHALL 59-60 (1968)

(quoting 2 D. ROBERTSON, REPORTS OF THE TRIALS OF COLONEL AARON BURR 402

(Philadelphia 1808)).
217 Murdock v. Hunter, 17 F. Cas. 1013, 1015 (C.C.D. Va. 1808) (No. 9941). To
Marshall, the common law was an "ancient permanent and approved system," Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 47 (1825), "which is really human reason
applied by courts, not capriciously, but in a regular train of decisions, to human affairs,
according to the circumstances of the nation, the necessity of the times, and the general
state of things .... ." Livingston v. Jefferson, 15 F. Gas. 660, 663 (C.O.D. Va. 1811)
(No. 8411) (Marshall, C.J., concurring).
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formally enacted, it is declared to be the public mind, that
those principles shall be the law of the nation. 18
It should be stressed that Sullivan's opinion was not universally
held,"' especially by those who thought it outrageous to define federal
authority in terms of the Constitution's preamble, rather than the specifically enumerated powers. Had Sullivan's argument been followed to
its logical conclusion, an entirely different theory of federal judicial jurisdiction might have emerged. A federal court, in fashioning a common-law decision, would not be limited to selecting between "general"
or "local" law in exercising its constitutionally and statutorily defined
jurisdiction. A decision could rest instead on a distinctively federal common law, on the theory that a federal interest so required. Having the
force of federal sovereignty behind them, the resulting federal commonlaw principles would be binding on state judiciaries. The United States
Supreme Court would have constitutional power to review state court
decisions on matters appropriately governed by federal common law.
Nothing like the theory of jurisdiction just articulated was generally accepted until far into the nineteenth century. 2 The subsequent
development of federal common law would require a conceptual departure from the theories of jurisdiction prevalent in the pre-Hudson period. Retarding this eventual breakthrough was the legacy of that earlier time, when it had been necessary to adapt the existing theory about
common-law powers to an unprecedented federal judicial system.
Under the formulations of the Framers, the interests of the federal government were not thought to require the creation of a distinctive federal law. Matters of general law possessed by definition a transnational
SULLIVAN, supra note 173, at 345.
The author of Trial of William Butler for Piracy (1813) [original pamphlet in
Harvard Law School Library; copy on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law
Review], apparently Justice Johnson, see Jay, Part One, at note 49, expressly rejected
the contention "that the criminal Common Law jurisdiction results to [the federal government] from necessity to enable it to protect itself." Trial of William Butler for
218

J.

219

Piracy, supra, at 19.
2 0 It was well established that an issue of general common law presented no federal question for purposes of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction. See, e.g., Murdock v.
City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 638 (1874); Delmas v. Insurance Co., 81
U.S. (14 Wall.) 661, 665-66 (1871) (dictum); Hill, The Erie Doctrine in Bankruptcy,
66 HARV. L. REV. 1013, 1026 (1953). Nonetheless, federal courts in the latter part of

the 1800's began to formulate a type of common law that was considered to present a
federal question and did bind state courts. This practice occurred, for example, in cases
involving interstate carriers. See Von Moschzisker, The Common Law and Our Fed-

eral Jurisprudence (Part 3), 74 U. PA. L. REV. 367, 380 (1926); cf. Hill, The Lawmaking Power of the Federal Courts: ConstitutionalPreemption, 67 COLUM. L. REV.
1024, 1029 n.30 (1967) (collecting cases from the early 1900's) [hereinafter cited as
Hill, Law-making Power].
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character, while local law was identifiable with the range of concerns
that the Framers indicated would remain "internal" to the states.
There were no other categories into which to fit a common law that
might be "local" to the federal government, unless the matter arose
within the jurisdiction of a federal territory, such as the District of
Columbia.
A clear indication of this early theoretical framework comes from
the supremacy clause of the Constitution, which was not designed to
apply to common-law cases: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land . ...2" For the same
reasons that the Constitution could not have contained a general reception clause for the common law, the supremacy clause could not have
made a reference to unwritten law that would be binding on the states.
Moreover, it would have made no sense to do so. General common law
was already "binding" on the states by the very nature of its transnational character; local common law naturally was entirely the affair of
a particular jurisdiction.
Federal jurisdiction was created in large part to ensure that interpretations of this general law were uniform and were not applied prejudicially. To advance this end Congress was authorized to grant the
federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over certain areas. Not surprisingly,
the 1789 Judiciary Act made admiralty an exclusive federal area and
provided access to the national courts for a significant number of suitors
who might have a question of general law to be litigated.22 2
221 U.S. CONsT. art. VI (emphasis added). Some commentators doubt the signifi-

cance of the word "made" in article VI and advance arguments such as this: "[The
Framers] intended the 'law of nations' to be applied with binding force by the federal
courts although this law was judge-made." Note, supra note 162, at 1514 (footnote
omitted). Supporting the view that the "law of nations" was to be "binding" is the
"wealth of evidence attest[ing] the framers' belief that the federal government should
have exclusive power to deal with foreign affairs." Id. at 1521 (footnote omitted). Although the Framers did hold this belief, the overall argument neglects the fact that the
Framers meant to utilize the device of exclusive federal jurisdiction to accomplish federal dominance over foreign affairs.
222 Section 9 of the Act conferred exclusive federal jurisdiction over civil admiralty
and maritime cases, allowing for "a common law remedy, where the common law is
competent to give it." Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). The Act also allowed an alien to sue in
federal court "for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States." Id. Under the same section, the United States could bring a common-law suit
in its own name in federal court, if the amount in dispute was at least $100. Further,
most cases against "consuls or vice-consuls" would be heard exclusively in federal
court. Id. Diversity jurisdiction was set up by section 11, and included cases involving
alien parties. Id. at 78-79. Section 12 ensured that diversity cases in which the states
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Given this conceptual setting, one can readily understand why the
storm over federal common law broke in the context of criminal cases.
For a considerable period in early American judicial history, the federal
courts were free to develop a common law for civil cases, particularly in
the commercial field, without provoking serious objections of the sort
raised in Hudson. In cases depending on general law, these courts
could apply law drawn from all the familiar sources recognized in
Great Britain. Federal courts often relied on principles of English law
without explicitly citing them.22 3 Those cases falling under equity jurisdiction were not even within the terms of section 34, and thus British
Chancery practice was the primary reference.2 24 Even for cases based
on local law, "the conception of the common law as in essence a body
of principles had its effects."12 2 5 A point that Marshall often made was

that all of the states' "distinct systems . . . originat[ed] in the same
great principles."2'26 This philosophy, Julius Goebel maintained, explains Marshall's "pronounced . . . preference for statements in terms

of principle; why throughout his tenure it is upon the English sources
that he places first reliance.

122 7

Moreover, "[o]n the common law side,

it was impossible to conduct any disputation on any proposition of law
in a nation of lawyers trained in the common law, no matter how vagarious the version prevailing in any state, without recourse to sources
in general use."'2 8
were given concurrent jurisdiction could be removed to federal court. Id. at 79-80. Although there was a $500 "amount in controversy" requirement for diversity cases, that
would not have precluded any case of significance-the ones likely to provoke the concerns articulated by the Framers. In section 13, the Supreme Court was given exclusive
original jurisdiction over civil cases "where a state is a party, except between a state
and its citizens; and except also between a state and citizens of other states, or aliens, in
which latter case it shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction." Id. at 80. In
addition, the Supreme Court was given exclusive jurisdiction in cases "against ambassadors, or other public ministers . . . consistently with the law of nations; and original,
but not exclusive jurisdiction of all suits brought by ambassadors, or other public ministers, or in which a consul, or vice consul, shall be a party." Id. at 80-81.
223 T. FREYER, supra note 181, at 36; see, e.g., Boyce v. Anderson, 27 U.S. (2
Pet.) 150 (1829); Coolidge v. Payson, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 66 (1817).
224 See Eliot, supra note 12, at 513; see also United States v. Howland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 108, 115 (1819) (priority in bankruptcy).
225 1 THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 27, at 34.
221 Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 46 (1825).
2217Goebel, supra note 38, at 118.
221 1 THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 27, at 34.
State and lower federal courts typically relied on English law, both substantive and
procedural-notwithstanding public outcries during this era about the inappropriateness of so doing. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text. Professor Tachau succinctly explains why: "Where else would lawyers and judges who had been educated in
the traditions of English law look for precedents and procedures but in English
sources?" M. TACHAU, supra note 25, at 93.
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Considering all this, it is not remarkable that the Supreme Court
failed to construe section 34 until 1825, when Marshall referred to it as
"the recognition of a principle of universal law; the principle that in
every forum a contract is governed by the law with a view to which it
was made."' 229 But state law in the early nineteenth century, particularly that applicable to commercial transactions, was usually "unsettled
or not to be found, ' 230 owing in large measure to the lack of familiarity
of those courts with commercial matters.2 31 By contrast, the federal
courts gained important expertise in business cases (including those involving complicated real property questions) coming within the diversity jurisdiction. And the District of Columbia, situated in an expanding commercial zone,232 became a major forum for cases involving
marine insurance, negotiable instruments, insolvency, and real property.233 Since the District was a federal entity, courts there could go
about the task of constructing a common law unimpaired by considerations of states' rights.23 " Between 1801 and 1815, District of Columbia
cases constituted thirty-five percent of the Supreme Court's appellate
236
docket.23 5 During the same period, only 4.5% came from state courts.
That criminal cases provided the moment for a general assault on
federal common-law jurisdiction was somewhat fortuitous. Had the
Federalists managed to parlay their brief surge of popularity following
the XYZ affair23 7 into a successful bid in the 1800 elections, matters
might have been different. One possibility is that the 1801 Judiciary
Act, including its expansive provisions for jurisdiction over federal
questions, would have remained in force for a while. A federal court
not situated in the District of Columbia might conceivably have been
presented with a case involving nondiverse parties, with a subject matter not within another explicit article III grant of jurisdiction, such as
admiralty, in which the plaintiff's claim rested on an alleged commonlaw right. For example, the issue might have been a commercial law
2" Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 48 (1825).
230 1 J. GOEBEL, supra note 15, at 655.
21 See Frank, supra note 201, at 26.
232 See H. JOHNSON, FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN MARSHALL, 1801-1815
(PART Two) 378
23S See id. at

(1981).
620.

2
A consequence of the District's status was that persons there could be charged
with common-law offenses. See United States v. Watkins, 3 D.C. (3 Cranch) 441, 452
(1829). This apparently is still true. See United States v. Davis, 167 F.2d 228, 229
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 849 (1948); Logan v. United States, 483 A.2d 664,
675 n.17 (D.C. 1984).
235 See H. JOHNSON, supra note 232, at 378.
236 See id.

237

See L. BANNING,

IDEOLOGY 253-54 (1978).

THE JEFFERSONIAN PERSUASION: EvOLUTION OF A PARTY
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question that ordinarily would have been decided under the general law
of merchants. The federal courts would then have been obliged to rule
on whether article III encompassed a common-law jurisdiction based on
the nature of the subject involved. Given the development of jurisdictional theory at this stage in our history, we may surmise that the issue
would have been resolved against the plaintiff, for the court would have
been hard pressed to explain on what theory the case fell within the
article III grant of jurisdiction.
Mercantile law, referred to as the law merchant, provides a good
illustration of how a "general" law could not have been considered one
of the "laws of the United States" for purposes of jurisdiction. Due to
its supposedly international character, the law merchant was often
treated by English legal writers as distinct from the common law of
England.2"8 As a consequence, the works of foreign jurists were utilized
by courts in the development of the law merchant.2 39 Nevertheless, the
law merchant was considered a part of English law; Blackstone wrote
that the law merchant, "however different from the general rules of the
common law, is yet ingrafted into it, and made a part of it." 240 Justice
Wilson likewise offered the law merchant as an instance in which the
common law had received another system by "a friendly correspondence."1241 In part these expressions meant that the common-law courts
had taken jurisdiction over cases that previously were decided under the
law merchant by other English courts (such as chancery and the court
of admiralty). 242 Another side of the matter was the conscious effort,
most noticeable during the tenure of Lord Mansfield as Chief Justice
of the King's Bench (1756-1788), to formulate the law merchant as a
comprehensive body of rules reflecting the needs of merchants, unencumbered by the technicalities of the common law.243 Mansfield employed and consulted special mercantile juries,2 44 and allowed evidence
of customs to settle controversies by recognizing them as binding rules
238 See Adler, Business Jurisprudence,28 HARV. L. REv. 135, 139 n.18 (1914);
Burdick, What is the Law Merchant?, 2 COLUM. L. REv. 470, 477-78, 482 (1902). See
generally D. ROBERTSON, ADMIRALTY AND FEDERALISM 63 (1970).
289 See F. KEMPIN, LEGAL HISTORY 90-91 (1963); Burdick, supra note 238, at
481-82; Scrutton, General Survey of the History of the Law Merchant, in 3 SELECT

ESSAYS

IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY

7, 14 (E. Freund, W. Mikell & J.

Wigmore eds. 1909).
"" Tucker, supra note 43, at 75.
14' Henfield, 11 F. Cas. at 1107.
242 See H. JOHNSON,THE LAW MERCHANT AND NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS IN
COLONIAL NEW YORK 1664-1730, at 37-39 (1963); Burdick, supra note 238, at 47880; Holdsworth, The Development of the Law Merchant and Its Courts, in 1 SELECT
ESSAYS IN ANGLo-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 20, at 289, 326-31.
24
See Burdick, supra note 238, at 482.
244 See Scrutton, supra note 239, at 14.
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in cases in which the law was uncertain.24 5
In deciding whether the law merchant was a law of the United
States for jurisdictional purposes, a federal court would have confronted
the accepted understanding that the law merchant was, notwithstanding
the grand claims of transnational uniformity, the law of particular sovereigns. It might be unobjectionable for a federal court in diversity
cases to treat the law merchant as "general" in deciding choice-of-law
questions, and thereby to ignore what state courts had held on the
questions involved. To assert that the law merchant constituted "Laws
of the United States

' 24 6

for article III jurisdiction would have provoked

the same forces that opposed a federal common law of sedition on
grounds of interference with state sovereignty. 247 Inasmuch as it would
have been absurd then to suggest that Congress had authority to legislate as to purely intrastate commercial transactions, creating a commonlaw authority in the same area would have been perceived as a usurpation of states' rights. The conflict with the states would have been, if
anything, more acute than it was with the exercise of jurisdiction over
common-law crimes. Because state courts had concurrent jurisdiction
with the federal courts in most civil cases, the Supreme Court could
have reviewed questions of common law from state courts that were
2 48
"Laws of the United States" under the 1801 Judiciary Act.
b.

Theories of Sovereignty and FederalJurisdiction

One can easily imagine, then, that the Supreme Court that decided
Hudson-or perhaps even a Supreme Court with a majority of Federalist personnel-would have adopted a limited view of federal commonlaw jurisdiction had it been presented with a civil case of the type just
supposed. It might be argued that criminal cases with partisan overtones presented unique possibilities for public reaction, and the political
245 See F. KEMPIN, supra note 239, at 97-98; D. ROBERTSON, supra note 238, at
62-63; Scrutton, supra note 239, at 13-14.
246 U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2.
247 Federal jurisdiction was never based solely on the law merchant's effect on
interstate commerce. See Miller, Swift v. Tyson and Some Considerationsof Philosophy in American Law, 11 Miss. L.J. 243, 258 (1939).
248 That a case involved general commercial law was never deemed sufficient to
confer appellate jurisdiction on the Supreme Court. Cf T. FREYER, supra note 181, at
39-40 ("[N]o one imagined that federal judges possessed authority over state courts, any
more than state judges had the power to instruct their brothers on the federal bench.").
Early commentators expressed regret over this fact, because it was considered an impediment to achieving uniformity in commercial law. Nevertheless, it was assumed that
a constitutional amendment was needed to give the Supreme Court jurisdiction over all

commercial cases. See, e.g., Wallace, Remarks Upon Uniformity in Commercial Law, 1
HAZARD'S U.S. COM. & STATISTICAL REG. 53, 54 (1839).
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climate encouraged the warping of jurisdictional argument. But the argument justifying common-law jurisdiction was actually stronger for
criminal than for civil actions. William Rawle, who had been the Federalist United States Attorney in Henfield, wrote in 1829 that a government's authority to prosecute criminals was founded upon "the law
of nature, the usual appellation of the common law."" 9 Prior to the
Constitution, Rawle continued, crimes at common law were punishable
by the states; however, when the Constitution was adopted certain
criminal cases "were either expressly or by implication withdrawn
from the immediate cognizance of the states. 2' 5 0 In those fields where

federal authority now supplanted that of the states, "[tihe people possessed . . . the full right to the punishment of offences against the law

2 51
of nature, though they might not be the subject of positive law.)
While particular criminal cases might arise under the Constitution, as
a consequence of its being "the formation of a new and peculiar association,"2 5 the same could not be said in the civil context. Rawle concluded that "[o]f a civil nature nothing can properly be said to arise
under the Constitution, except contracts to which the United States are
parties."2 53
Why would Rawle pick out contracts involving the United States
and crimes as the only instances of common-law cases in which the
Constitution itself furnished jurisdiction? His premise was that "controversies in which states and individuals of certain descriptions are
concerned," namely cases falling under all the other article III heads of
jurisdiction, "would exist although the Constitution did not exist"""
and would be subject to resolution by state tribunals. With the provision in section 34 for the application of state rules of decision, Rawle

249

250

W. RAWLE, supra note 186, at 261.

Id.

Id. at 261-62. Rawle, finding support in article III, thought that certain cases
"may arise under the Constitution which do not arise under the laws." See id. at 254.
Including criminal cases in this category, he wrote:
1. On the formation of society, prior to positive laws, certain rules of
moral action necessarily arise, the foundation of which is the observance of
justice among the members of the society.
2. On the formation of the Constitution of the United States, such
rules arose without being expressed: the breach of them constitutes offences against the United States.
3. If no judiciary power had been introduced into the Constitution of
the United States, the state courts could have punished those breaches.
4. The creation of such judiciary power was intended to confer jurisdiction over such and other offences, not to negative or destroy it.
Id.at 259.
252 Id. at 261.
253 Id. at 254.
251

254

Id.
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argued, Congress rightly had avoided "a strange anomaly" by
"declar[ing] that whatever relief would be afforded by other judicial
tribunals in similar cases, shall be afforded by the courts of the United
255
States.
Following Rawle's train of thought entails a painful mental process for us. When he states that cases involving "contracts to which the
United States are parties" arise under the Constitution, it seems as
though he is advocating the application to such cases of the sort of federal common law heralded in Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States.2 5
On the contrary, Rawle thought the applicable law to be "the laws of
the several states," despite recognizing "that every state in the Union
has its peculiar system and rules of decision in cases for which no positive statutes are provided. '2 5 7 Rawle was apparently endorsing what
Marshall wrote some years before: "That on adopting the existing constitution of the United States the common & statute law of each state
remained as before & that the principles of the common law of the state
would apply themselves to magistrates of the general as well as to magistrates of the particular government."'2 5
Part of what is reported in the last few paragraphs flows from the
philosophy that unwritten law is a body of principles to be discovered.
Beyond this, Rawle was contending that "in all civil cases those rules of
decision founded on reason and justice which form the basis of general
law, are within the reach and compose parts of the power" of article
III courts. 2 59 Still another theme, even more elusive to modern comprehension, is also present: in citing crimes and contracts with the United
States as the only instances of jurisdiction "arising under the Constitution," Rawle was elaborating a doctrine of federal sovereignty. Those
were the only instances in which new cases arose due to the adoption of
the Constitution. These cases arose because the United States was a
255

Id. at 255.

318 U.S. 363 (1943). Clearfield held that "[t]he rights and duties of the
United States on commercial paper which it issues are governed by federal rather than
local law." Id. at 366. This law was to be derived from "the federal law merchant,"
which "stands as a convenient source of reference for fashioning federal rules applicable to these federal questions." Id. at 367.
257 W. RAwLE, supra note 186, at 254.
258 Letter from John Marshall to St. George Tucker, reprinted in Appendix A,
infra. Rawle also quoted Marshall's remark that the British common law was the
"'substratum of the laws of every state,'" and endorsed another judge's conclusion that
"'every nation has its common law.'" W. RAwLx, supra note 186, at 267 n.* (quoting
2 D. ROBERTSON, REPORTS OF THE TRIALS OF COLONEL AARON BURR 402 (Philadelphia 1808) (actual quote is "[British] laws form the substratum of our laws");
Guardians of the Poor v. Greene, 5 Binn. 554, 558 (Pa. 1813) (actual quote is "every
country has its common law")).
256

259

W.

RAwLE,

supra note 186, at 255.
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new sovereign, and the authority to enter into contractual relations and
to punish crimes sprang from the sovereign powers attached to its creation. These were new cases in that the government in question was a
freshly created entity. The United States might enter into contracts as
any private individual could, and they would be "obligatory on the
party, though merely implied by reason of principles not found in the
2 60°
text of any statute, but originating in universal law.
To some extent, Rawle's vision of federal jurisdiction was constrained by the shared assumption of the day that the national government had few lawmaking responsibilities. Nonetheless, this does not explain a curious thread running through almost all of the commentary of
this time regarding jurisdiction. Both Rawle and Du Ponceau, for example, wrote to the effect that although federal courts "have not jurisdiction from the common law," they do have "jurisdiction of the com262
mon law." 2 Likewise, Marshall, in referring to William's Case,
noted that "the common law was not relied on as giving the court jurisdiction, but came in incidentally as part of the law of a case of which
the court had complete & exclusive possession."2 3 Marshall then
added, "I do not understand you as questioning the propriety of thus
applying the common law, not of England, but of our own country. ' 2&4
Obviously "common law" was being employed by these writers in
two different senses: first, as a system of established rules, including the
accepted practices of reasoning used to enunciate and apply those rules;
and second, as a means of defining the jurisdiction of courts. Du
Ponceau noted that these two usages were often confused, but thought
this not to be "astonishing":
In England, the jurisdiction of almost every tribunal is derived from the common law, that is to say from ancient usage. From the same source proceeds, at the same time, almost the whole of the English jurisprudence. Jurisdiction
and law flow together in a mixed stream, which in that
country there is little necessity to analyse in order to separate
2060Id.
261 P. Du PONCEAU, supra note 6, at 20. Citing Du Ponceau's work with approval, Rawle wrote that common law could furnish a "rule or mean for [the] exercise"
of a federal court's jurisdiction; it was not "a source of jurisdiction." W. RAWLE, supra
note 186, at 267 & n.t.
262 29 F. Cas. 1330 (C.C.D. Conn. 1799) (No. 17,708).
26" Letter from John Marshall to St. George Tucker, reprinted in Appendix A,
infra; see also Addison, supra note 13, at 1083 (complaining that the Republicans had
introduced "[c]onfusion . . . by an ambiguous application of the phrase common law,
using it sometimes as a limit of jurisdiction, and sometimes as a rule of judgment").
26 Letter from John Marshall to St. George Tucker, reprinted in Appendix A,
infra.
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its component parts; while in this country, a phenomenon
has suddenly appeared, of a national judiciary in a manner
assimilated to municipal tribunals by the various limitations
of its powers, not as between the different Courts of which it
might be composed, and with a view to settle their respective
bounds of authority, but as between them and the tribunals
of component parts of the nation, which, though dependent
to a certain extent on the national government in all its
branches, are still sovereign to all other purposes within
their respective limits. The common law, therefore, is not the
source to 'be recurred to to unravel the intricacies of this
268
system.
This is a hard passage to untangle, and Du Ponceau himself admitted that he had been struggling with the concepts involved. One
message comes across with clarity: federal courts are unlike the common-law courts of England in a fundamental respect. The statement
that common-law jurisdiction and the law of a case were merged "in a
mixed stream" meant that a claim at law was associated with a particular form of action, which could be heard only in certain of the King's
courts and according to designated rules of procedure. "The inquiry
was not whether plaintiff should recover under the law of the land, but
whether plaintiff had proved a case in trespass, or in covenant, or in
whatever form of action he had brought. If not, plaintiff lost the case,
whatever the merits of it were."' 6 Accordingly, the jurisdiction of these
courts was inseparable from the history of the substantive law with
which they were associated. Defining these jurisdictions involved not
only an ongoing contest among the permanent courts of the King, but
also a competition between these national courts and those of local and
specialized jurisdiction. Although the common-law courts gradually assumed control over most of the important judicial business of the kingdom, leaving the local courts as "petty courts, courts for the smaller
affairs of the smaller folk," 26 7 the local law itself was constantly impelled towards uniformity by the example of the common law.26 8 For
our purposes, the main point is that there was only one sovereign authority involved. Local law in the British setting bore no relation to
state law in America, the latter being an attribute of the original soverDu PONCEAU, supra note 6, at 6-7.
F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 10 (3d ed. 1985).
1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH

265 P.
268
267

(1952).
26

1936).

See 2 W.

HOLDSWORTH,

LAW 532

A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 398-400 (4th ed.
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eignty possessed by the states as a consequence of the Revolution. 6 9
By the end of the eighteenth century, American courts accepted the
doctrine of jurisdiction associated with the Dutch jurist, Ulrich Huber.170 In Huber's view, the reach of all laws was defined territorially:
"The laws of each state have force within the limits of that government
and bind all subject to it, but not beyond.12 71 Marshall restated this

principle in an 1812 decision:
The jurisdiction of courts is a branch of that which is
possessed by the nation as an independent sovereign power.
The jurisdiction of the nation, within its own territory, is
necessarily exclusive and absolute; it is susceptible of no limitation, not imposed by itself.

.

.

. All exceptions, therefore,

to the full and complete power of a nation, within its own
territories, must be traced up to the consent of the nation
2 72

itself.

As an example of nations consenting to a derogation of their territorial
sovereignty, Marshall cited the exemption of sovereigns and their ministers from arrest or detention in a foreign territory.2 73 Huber's illustrations involved what are now termed "conflict of laws" principles. 4
Territoriality was not the only aspect of sovereignty accepted at
this time. Another was recognized by Blackstone: "[T]here is and must
be in all [civil societies] a supreme, irresistible, absolute uncontrolled
authority, in which the jura summi imperii, or the rights of sovereignty, reside. 2

75

Quite apart from Blackstone's prestige,27

6

knowl-

...That the states' sovereignty was a product of their historical separation in the
colonial period and the various jealousies appearing during the Confederation does not
alter this conclusion. The issue is how sovereignty was perceived, and by 1787 "[s]tate
boundaries were important factors in separating the people of the United States." W.
CARPENTER, supra note 21, at 101.

270 See Nadelmann, Joseph Story's Contribution to American Conflicts Law: A
Comment, 5 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 230, 230-31 (1961).
271 U. HUBER, De Conflictu Legum Diversarum in Diversis Imperiis, in
PRAELECTIONUM JURIS CIVILIS ToMi TRES (2d ed. Leipzig 1707), reprinted and
translated in Lorenzen, Huber's De Conflictu Legum, 13 ILL. L. REv. 375, 403
(1919). On Huber's theories, see Hazard, A General Theory of State-CourtJurisdiction, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 241, 258-60; Yntema, The Historic Bases of Private Inter-

national Law, 2 AM. J. COMP. L. 297, 305-08 (1953).

'27 The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812);
accord United States v. Bevans, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 336, 386-87 (1818) (Marshall
wrote that "the jurisdiction of a state is co-extensive with its territory; co-extensive with
legislative power.").
271

See The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137

(1812).
24 See Lorenzen, supra note 271, at 401-04; Nadelmann, supra note 270, at 23031; Yntema, supra note 271, at 305-07.
27 Tucker, supra note 43, at 49. In England, Blackstone wrote, sovereignty resided in the King, the House of Lords, and the House of Commons. See id. at 50-51.
270 See E. BAUER, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION, 1790-1860, at 17-24
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edgeable Americans were conversant with this concept as a consequence
of the revolutionary experience. Prior to the commencement of actual
hostilities, a principal American argument against British rule had centered on the notion of "divided sovereignty." While many were willing
to concede that the English government had sole control over the external relations of the colonies, that is, foreign affairs and commerce,
Americans insisted that colonial assemblies possessed the "'exclusive
right of internal legislation,' including taxing.12 77 The British rejoinder
was as irrefutable as it was caustic. To accept the American view
would violate the very basis of sovereignty, that for a given territory
there could be only a single, indivisible, supreme power. Governor
Thomas Hutchinson rebuked the Boston Town Meeting in 1773: "[N]o
line . . . can be drawn between the supreme authority of Parliament

and the total independence of the colonies: it is impossible there should
be two independent legislatures in one and the same state . .

.".

By the time the final rupture occurred, Americans had resigned themselves to this logic, and saw themselves presented with a stark choice. It
was one that Benjamin Franklin had appreciated in 1768: "that Parliament has a power to make all laws for us, or that it has a power to
make no laws for us . .

"279

Throughout the Revolutionary period, American statesmen experimented with various theories to avoid the dichotomy presented by the
doctrine of indivisible sovereignty. 280 A typical position was that the
colonists owed no allegiance to Parliament, but retained a tie only to
the person of the King.281 Some also claimed that the theory of unitary
(1952); Pound, The Development of American Law and Its Deviation from English
Law, 67 LAW Q. REv. 49, 51 (1951); Waterman, ThomasJefferson and Blackstone's
Commentaries, in ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF EARLY AMERICAN LAW, supra note
23, at 454-56.
277 B. BAILYN, supra note 22, at 223 (quoting Dickinson, An Essay on the Constitutional Power of Great Britain over the Colonies in America, in 3 PENNSYLVANIA
ARcHIvEs 491, 515 (2d ser.) (J. Linn & W. Egle eds. 1896)); accord W. CARPENTER,
supra note 21, at 30. This was the position taken by the first Continental Congress. See
B. BAILYN, supra note 22, at 223.
278 B. BAILYN, supra note 22, at 220 (quoting SPEECHES OF THE GOVERNORS OF
MASSACHUSETTS, FROM 1765 TO 1775 340 (A. Bradford ed. 1818).

Letter from Benjamin Franklin to William Franklin (Mar. 13, 1768), reTHE WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 115 (A. Smyth ed. 1907).
280 Sorting out the various theories on the subject of sovereignty would require an
extended discussion, to which other writers have addressed themselves. See B. BAILYN,
supra note 22, at 198-229; G. WOOD, supra note 21, at 344-54.
281 See B. BAILYN, supra note 22, at 75 n.20; G. WooD, supra note 21, at 352;
McIlwain, The HistoricalBackground of Federal Government, in FEDERALISM AS A
DEMOCRATIC PRocEss 34-36 (1942); see also L. LABAREE, ROYAL GOVERNMENT IN
AMERICA 3 (1930) ("Throughout the seventeenth century and the first six decades of
27'

printed in 5
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sovereignty applied only to a nation, not to an empire.2" 2 James Iredell
wrote in 1774 that the theory was inapplicable "to the case of several
distinct and independent legislatures, each engaged within a separate
283
scale, and employed about different objects.
Although positions on sovereignty were often expressed with firm
conviction, a major accomplishment of the Revolutionary dialogue was
to expose the immense complexities of implementing a federal governmental structure. In the process, these exchanges set the outlines of future debate over the structure of the American national government,
both during the Confederation period and thereafter. A distinction between external and internal affairs appealed to the colonists, however
scornfully it was greeted on the other side of the ocean. For a variety of
reasons, the colonists traditionally had enjoyed a large measure of de
facto autonomy over their domestic affairs. 2 4 At the same time, it was
difficult to deny a formal tie to Great Britain, particularly in regard to
the empire's control over trade relations.2 8 5 From this historical setting-of a remote government having a vaguely defined "external" relation to separate colonial governments-the long debate over the powers of a national American government began.
In the struggles of the years before the Civil War, a particular
concept of the states-having become, in consequence of the Revolution,
"sovereign, and independent, not only of Great Britain, but of all other
the eighteenth, the colonies were recognized as dependencies of the English crown and
not of the English people nor even their representatives in parliament.").
282 See B. BAILYN, supra note 22, at 216-17.
283 Iredell, To the Inhabitants of Great Britain, reprintedin 1 LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL 219 (G. McRee ed. 1857).
2"
See B. BAILYN, supra note 22, at 202; J. SCHMIDHAUSER, supra note 58, at 45. Colonial policy was dominated by the Crown and its administrative officials, see L.
LABAREE, supra note 281, at 4-5, and by the close of the seventeenth century royal
control over colonial affairs was increasing, see R. MORRIS, STUDIES IN THE HISTORY
OF AMERICAN LAW 62 (2d ed. 1958). Appeals could be taken from colonial courts to
the Privy Council; this occurred in 795 cases between 1696 and 1783, resulting in 157
affirmances, 336 reversals, and 147 dismissals. See Goebel, supra note 177, at 462.
"[T]he colonists did not regard the appeal as good for nothing," id., but the Council
"was never . . .an efficient overseer of the routine work of the courts." L. FRIEDMAN,
supra note 29, at 43; accord Schlesinger, ColonialAppeals to the Privy Council II, 28
POL. Sci. Q. 433 (1913). See generally J. SMITH, APPEALS TO THE PRIVY COUNCIL
FROM THE AMERICAN PLANTATIONS (1950). Colonial legislation was also subject to
review by the Council, although "the practice of disallowance was not carried out with
great vigor." R. MORRIS, supra, at 63. One investigator found a disapproval rate of
only 5.5% (469 out of 8,563). See id. See generally E. RUSSELL, THE REVIEW OF
AMERICAN COLONIAL LEGISLATION BY THE KING IN COUNCIL (1915). In addition,
"the control over legislation was not popular in the colonies and various expedients
were used to evade it, such as delay in transmitting laws, the temporary enactment, and
the reenactment of disallowed legislation." J. GOEBEL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 763
285 See B. BAILYN, supra note 22, at 203.
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powers, whatsoever," 2 8 -was transfixing in its grasp on the imagination. Americans had long understood their social contract to be with a
state, rather than the nation. James Wilson had said that "when a confederate republic is instituted, the communities of which it is composed
surrender to it a part of their political independence, which they before
enjoyed as states."2 " This statement applied to the new constitution,
despite the fact that its ratification had been deliberately requested of
the people, not the states.28 8 Moreover, the federal government possessed powers that no single American state had ever enjoyed. Nevertheless, there was an irresolvable dilemma once the concept of pre-existing state sovereignty was acknowledged. The people voted in
conventions, but by states, and they saw themselves giving up a few
powers while leaving the bulk of state authority intact.
There was a competing view of the Union. Justice Paterson wrote
in the late 1790's that the Articles of Confederation had been "a league
entered into between the states, as such, and was purely federal;
whereas the [Constitution] partakes of nationality, and is the work of
the people as contradistinguished from states."2 9 Such a Union was
itself, in the terms of that era, a continuing social contract, which could
not be breached merely because a state became dissatisfied and decided
to retire to its own nationhood. No amount of verbal exchange could
settle this core dispute of antebellum America, and in the end only force
could produce a resolution.
Prior to the violence, the issue of sovereignty was debated in several contexts, all of which are familiar to students of American constitutional law. In Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,"' 0 Justice Story defended
appellate jurisdiction over the decisions of state tribunals: "It is a mistake, that the constitution was not designed to operate upon states,
in their corporate capacities. It is crowded with provisions which
restrain or annul the sovereignty of the states, in some of the highest
branches
of their
prerogatives. 2 91
Then, in
Cohens v.
286

Tucker, supra note 43, at 406-07.

217

1 THE WORKS

GOUGH,
28I

OF JAMES

WILSON 539 (J. Andrews ed. 1896), quoted in

J.

THE SOCIAL CoNTRACT 234 (1957).
See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 58,

at 88 (George Mason) ("The Legislatures have no power to ratify it. They are the
mere creatures of the State Constitutions, and cannot be greater than their creators.").
289 W. Paterson, supra note 76, at 555.
29' 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
29 Id. at 343. Story emphasized at the outset of his opinion that
[t]he constitution of the United States was ordained and established,
not by the states in their sovereign capacities, but emphatically, as the
preamble of the constitution declares, by 'the People of the United
States.' . . . The Constitution was not, therefore, necessarily carved out of
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Virginia,2" 2 the Court was faced with Virginia's argument that a state
criminal conviction could not be reviewed by the Supreme Court:
The State judges are bound by oath to obey the constitutional acts of Congress; but they are not so bound to obey the
decisions of the federal Courts: the constitution and laws of
the United States are supreme; but the several branches of
the government of the United States have no supremacy over
the corresponding branches of the State governments.2 93
In response, Marshall recited the supremacy clause, to which he added,
"This is the authoritative language of the American people; and, if gentlemen please, of the American States."'' 2 He then repeated Story's argument from Martin as to the various surrenders of state sovereignty in
the Constitution. Supreme Court review in constitutional cases was essential, lest "the government and its laws" be "prostrate[d] . . . at the

feet of every State in the Union."29
As constitutional law classes are often prodded to conclude, the
claims about sovereignty in Martin and Cohens are not logically inevitable. To pursue this idea further would distract us from the subject,
existing state sovereignties, nor a surrender of powers already existing in
state institutions ....
Id. at 324-25.
292 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
293 Id. at 325-26. The basis of Virginia's argument was that
[t]he States have parted with exterior sovereignty. As they cannot make
treaties, perhaps they have not jurisdiction in the case of ministers sent to
the federal government; as they cannot make war and peace, regulate commerce, define and punish piracies and offences on the high seas, and
against the law of nations, or make rules concerning captures on the
water, perhaps they have no admiralty jurisdiction.
Id. at 325.
294 Id. at 381.
295 Id. at 385. Marshall advanced his own theory of dual sovereignty:
That the United States form, for many, and for most important purposes,
a single nation, has not yet been denied. In war, we are one people. In
making peace, we are one people. In all commercial regulations, we are
one and the same people. In many other respects, the American people are
one; and the government which is alone capable of controlling and managing their interests in all these respects, is the government of the
Union. . . . The people have declared, that in the exercise of all powers
given for these objects, it is supreme. It can, then, in effecting these objects,
legitimately control all individuals or governments within the American
territory. The constitution and laws of a State, so far as they are repugnant to the constitution and laws of the United States, are absolutely void.
These states are constituent parts of the United States. They are members
of one great empire-for some purposes sovereign, for some purposes
subordinate.
Id. at 413-14.
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but it should be noted that there was a stronger argument for the
supremacy of the Constitution, federal statutes, and treaties, than for
the supremacy of a federal common law. For one thing, it was conceded
that the Constitution was intended to produce a supreme law in these
areas. That much granted, there was a fair amount of plausibility in
concluding that Supreme Court review was necessary to create a consistently applied national law. Moreover, as Story pointed out in Martin, it was "an historical fact, that this exposition of the constitution,
extending [federal] appellate power to state courts, was, previous to its
adoption, uniformly and publicly avowed by its friends, and admitted
by its enemies, as the basis of their respective reasonings, both in and
out of the state conventions." '2 96
No similar arguments were available to defend the supremacy of a
federal common law. Quite the contrary, for a theory that pictured sovereignty as indivisibly tied to a particular territory pulled thinking in
precisely the opposite direction. States emerged from the Revolution
with the powers of sovereigns. Their courts continued, as we have seen,
to operate within the bounds of their familiar common-law jurisdictions.2" They might, for reasons previously explored, depart from
much of common-law doctrine, but the general outline of their traditional systems remained intact, including the English practice of proceeding through the forms of action.2"' "Jurisdiction and law," to recall
Du Ponceau's nice turn of phrase, "flow[ed] together in a mixed
stream."2 99 Claiming cognizance over a common-law issue could be
perceived as asserting general jurisdiction over all cases related to the
corresponding form of action. Portions of the law merchant, for instance, had been absorbed into the English common-law courts by expansion of the writ of assumpsit.300 A federal court's insistence on jurisdiction based on the presence of a mercantile issue might have been
taken in more than a few quarters as a pretext for expanding judicial
authority generally over commercial cases involving individuals wholly
within the territory of a state. Being familiar with the manner in which
certain British courts had increased their jurisdiction through similar
"fictions," which often had resulted in the displacement of power from
courts accustomed to its exercise, an identical conspiracy would have
29
297

14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 351.
See supra text accompanying notes 25-29.

298 Mary K. Tachau's examination of the federal district court in Kentucky found
that only a few of the available English forms of action were actually permitted; these,
however, were vigorously applied. See M. TACHAU, supra note 25, at 83.
2 P. Du PONCEAU, supra note 6, at 6.
300 See F. KEMPIN, supra note 239, at 95.
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been perceived.301
The debate over federal common law had to take place within the
constraints of this understanding of jurisdiction and sovereignty. And
the battle raged amidst the ongoing dispute over national powers and in
the center of a partisan crossfire. The proposition that sedition was a
form of conduct within the power of the federal government to prohibit
naturally aroused the wrath of those concerned with the preservation of
state prerogatives. We need not revisit the remainder of the debate to
see what went wrong with the Federalist defense. Republicans pushed
them into a selection of two alternatives: either the jurisdiction of federal courts over nonstatutory crimes was based on the British common
law, or this jurisdiction was conferred by the Constitution. The former
no Federalist ever directly advanced. But to suspicious Republicans,
certain loose remarks by Federalists could have been plausibly interpreted to mean that federal jurisdiction was being equated with that of
the English common-law courts. Against the latter alternative, which
Federalists did defend, their opponents were able to argue convincingly
that a move was afoot toward consolidation. For the Constitution was
supreme, the common law a complete system-and so on.
4.

Congressional Authorization of Common-Law Jurisdiction

It is tempting to think that Federalists missed an easy escape from
this doctrinal trap. Why did they not argue that Congress could bestow
on federal courts jurisdiction over common-law offenses or over any
common-law matter that Congress itself might legislate under its delegated powers? We now know, after Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
301 On earlier Antifederalist warnings that the federal judiciary would expand
through similar fictions, see supra note 138 and accompanying text. The writer Brutus
gave an example:
The court of king's bench, in England, extended [its] jurisdiction [through
legal fictions]. Originally, this court held pleas, in civil cases, only of trespasses and other injuries alledged [sic] to be committed vi et armis ...
In process of time, by a fiction, this court began to hold pleas of any personal action whatsoever; it being surmised, that the defendant has been
arrested for a supposed trespass that "he has never committed, and being
thus in the custody of the marshall of the court, the plaintiff is at liberty to
proceed against him, for any other personal injury: which surmise of being
in the marshall's custody, the defendant is not at liberty to dispute." By a
much less fiction, may the pleas of the courts of the United States extend
to cases between citizens of the same state. . . . [T]his power will diminish and destroy both the legislative and judicial authority of the states.
Essays of Brutus (XII) (Feb. 14, 1788) (quoting with minor changes 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 42-43 (1st Am. ed. Philadelphia
1772), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 126, at 427.
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Mills,302 that the Supreme Court eventually found such common-law
jurisdiction for civil cases unobjectionable. 3" Certainly Lincoln Mills is
in line with the Du Ponceau-Marshall approach, as it authorizes the
making of common law while continuing to prohibit jurisdiction based
on the common law. But Hudson, we shall see, denied even this possibility. Moreover, the opinion did not address section 11 of the 1789
Judiciary Act, which gave circuit courts jurisdiction "of all crimes and
offences cognizable under the authority of the United States," 30 ' as a
possible source of jurisdiction over common-law crimes. 3 5
Justice Johnson's opinion in Hudson does show an awareness of
the reasoning urged by James Sullivan and William Rawle: "The only
ground on which it has ever been contended that this jurisdiction could
be maintained is, that, upon the formation of any political body, an
implied power to preserve its own existence and promote the end and
object of its creation, necessarily results to it."308 After acknowledging
this argument, Johnson promptly rejected it:
But, without examining how far this consideration is applicable to the peculiar character of our constitution, it may be
remarked, that it is a principle by no means peculiar to the
common law. It is coeval, probably, with the first formation
of a limited government; belongs to a system of universal
law, and may as well support the assumption of many other
powers as those more peculiarly acknowledged by the com302 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (federal court's authority to interpret and enforce collective bargaining agreements based on jurisdictional provisions of the Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947).
=The Supreme Court has cited Lincoln Mills as an example of "[f]ederal common law . . . comling] into play when Congress has vested jurisdiction in the federal
courts and empowered them to create governing rules of law." Texas Indus. v. Radcliff
Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 642 (1981). Commentators have been less certain that
Congress intended this result. See, e.g., Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and
the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. Rav. 1 (1957).
3 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 79.
305 Apparently, Justice Johnson did take up the issue of statutory jurisdiction
under section 11 in Trial of William Butler for Piracy, supra note 219. For a discussion of Johnson's probable authorship of this publication, see Jay, Part One, at 1016
n.49. The opinion states that advocates of this interpretation of section 11 "are obliged
to construe [the section] as meaning the same with 'all crimes and offences committed
against the United States,' or rather 'to every individual Act which if committed in
Great Britain would by the Common Law be deemed an offence against the Crown."'
Trial of William Butler for Piracy, supra note 219, at 29 (quoting Judiciary Act of
1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78). Further, the decision maintains that "under authority of the United States" means "authority to make laws, and those laws may give
authority to punish crimes . . . to wit, 'Crimes and offences against the United States
made punishable by laws passed in conformity to the powers delegated to that body by
the Constitution.'" Id. at 29-30.
3" 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 33.

1292

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 133:1231

mon law of England.
But if admitted as applicable to the state of things in
this country, the consequence would not result from it, which
is here contended for. If it may communicate certain implied
powers to the general government, it would not follow, that
the courts of that government are vested with jurisdiction
over any particular act done by an individual, in supposed
violation of the peace and dignity of the sovereign power.
The legislative authority of the Union must first make an act
a crime, affix a punishment to it, and declare the court that
shall have jurisdiction of the offence.
Certain implied powers must necessarily result to our
courts of justice, from the nature of their institution. But jurisdiction of crimes against the state is not among those powers. To fine for contempt, imprison for contumacy, enforce
the observance of order, &c., are powers which cannot be
dispensed with in a court, because they are necessary to the
exercise of all others: and so far our courts, no doubt, possess
powers not immediately derived from statute; but all exercise
of criminal jurisdiction in common-law cases, we are of opin3 07
ion, is not within their implied powers.
This passage evidences more than a desire to limit the scope of
national legislative powers; it addresses the form in which those powers
may be exercised. Even presuming the national government possesses
"the implied power to preserve its own existence," Congress may not
confer on the courts a general jurisdiction over common-law crimes,
but must specifically define the criminal acts and their punishments.3 0
Congress, in short, was denied the power to grant a federal court the
kind of common-law criminal jurisdiction that a court in England or
one of the states would have.
How could Hudson have come to this conclusion when it was well
understood that judicial power encompassed the authority to operate
Id. at 33-34.
"08 Id. at 33. Johnson undoubtedly did not mean that Congress would have to
specify every element of an offense, as in modem criminal codes. Existing federal criminal statutes typically specified an offense only by its name and punishment. See, e.g.,
An Act for the Punishment of certain Crimes against the United States, ch. 9, § 3, 1
Stat. 112, 113 (1790) ("That if any person or persons shall, within any fort, arsenal,
dock-yard, magazine, or in any other place or district of country, under the sole and
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, commit the crime of willful murder, such
person or persons on being thereof convicted shall suffer death."). As Justice Story
noted, federal courts were thus required to utilize common-law principles to supply the
definition of the crime. See United States v. Coolidge, 25 F. Cas. 619, 620 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1813) (No. 14,857), rev'd, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 415 (1816).
307
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under unwritten law? Justice Johnson explained that the powers of the
federal government were composed of concessions from the states. Other
than the Supreme Court's jurisdiction, "derived immediately from the
constitution," "[a]ll other courts created by the general government possess no jurisdiction but what is given them by the power that creates
them, and can be vested with none but what the power ceded to the
general government will authorize them to confer."3 09 For this reason,
Johnson found it unnecessary
to inquire, whether the general government, in any and what
extent, possesses the power of conferring on its courts a jurisdiction in cases similar to the present; it is enough, that
such jurisdiction has not been conferred by any legislative
act, if it does not result to those courts as a consequence of
their creation.310
Not only had Congress not authorized the hearing of "cases similar to
the present," but it could not: "[W]ith what propriety can [a federal
court] assume to itself a jurisdiction, much more extended, in its nature
very indefinite, applicable to a great variety of subjects, varying in
every state in the Union . . ."?311
While this last question was a rebuke of the circuit court's assumption of jurisdiction in the instant case, it made a much broader
point. Johnson was aiming at common-law jurisdiction itself-by nature "indefinite, applicable to a great variety of subjects," and tied to a
particular sovereign's territory ("varying in every state in the Union").
To allow federal courts to proceed in a common-law prosecution, even
with Congress's sanction, would in his mind necessarily mean that their
jurisdiction was of the "nature" of a common-law court in England.
Notice how this fits with his rebuttal of the contention that every government inherently possesses the ability to ensure its own existence.
Conceding as much, Johnson emphasized that this principle could not
logically be limited to implying a common-law jurisdiction over crimes
but "may . . .support the assumption of many other powers as those
'' 12
more peculiarly acknowledged by the common law of England.
309 11
310

U.S. (7 Cranch) at 33.

Id.
Id.

311
1I Id. at 34 (emphasis added). On circuit the year following Hudson, Justice

Johnson apparently wrote the opinion in Trial of William Butler for Piracy, supra
note 219. The report of the case contains similar evidence of Johnson's assumption that
the assertion of federal common-law jurisdiction inevitably implied the adoption of the
totality of British common law by the national government. Morton Horwitz has construed the same text to mean something different: that federal courts could act under a
common-law jurisdiction if it were granted to them by Congress. See M. HoRwrrz,
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Justice Story was convinced that Hudson represented a devastating blow to law enforcement and accordingly commenced a campaign
condemning the decision. Indicative of Story's activities is a May 1813
correspondence to Nathaniel Williams, lamenting that, due to the
"grossly and barbarously defective" criminal code of the United States,
"[t]he Courts are crippled; offenders, conspirators, and traitors are enabled to carry on their purposes almost without check."3 13 The previous
October, he had urged Williams, "Pray induce Congress to give the
Judicial Courts of the United States power to punish all crimes and
offences against the Government, as at common law."814
Story's desire for Congress to affirm a federal criminal jurisdiction
"as at common law" was founded on his belief that the alternative,
"passing laws in detail respecting every crime in every possible shape,"
was "utterly impracticable." ' Story set forth his plan for expanding
supra note 23, at 10. He quotes the following passage:
We do not deny, nor do we suppose it was ever denied-that, if [this
doctrine of implication could be maintained, and] Congress had by Law
vested in this Court jurisdiction over all cases to which the punishing
power of the United States might [under that implication] be extended, it
would then rest with this Court to decide (wild and devious as the track
assigned them would be) to what cases that jurisdiction extended.
Id. at 271 n.39 (quoting Trial of William Butler for Piracy, supra note 219, at 34-35)
(The material in brackets appears in the original but is omitted by ellipses in Horwitz's
recitation.).
Viewing the last sentence as it was originally written is important: far from being
supererogatory, the "doctrine of implication" is the focus of the opinion. "Implication"
and "implied powers" appear prominently in the opinion as contradistinctions to "express" powers enjoyed by the national government. See Trial of William Butler for
Piracy, supra note 219, at 26-32. Indeed, the parallel use of "implied powers" in Hudson and Butler, see supra text accompanying note 307, supports the assumption that
Johnson also wrote the latter. Jurisdiction by "implication" for common-law crimes is
constitutionally impossible, except in narrow circumstances. Other than treason, which
Butler said was defined by the Constitution itself, see Trial of William Butler for
Piracy, supra note 219, at 28-29, the only specific crimes mentioned in the Constitution
are "offences on the High Seas and against the Law of Nations," and the definition of
these "is expressly given as a Legislative power." Id. at 31.
This reference to legislation might suggest, as Horwitz has contended, that Johnson was primarily worried about judges making law. But Butler indicates that it would
be sufficient for Congress to have "distinguished [the crime] by an epithet which leaves
no doubt of its identity." Id. at 34. This might be done by using "language peculiar to
the Common Law," after which the courts would use that law "to regulate us in the
exercise of the jurisdiction thus conferred." Id. at 35. Obviously this "legislation by
designation" left a wide range for what we would now call judicial legislation, and
apparently Justice Johnson in Butler was unperturbed by that kind of judicial
activism.
s3 Letter from Joseph Story to Nathaniel Williams (May 27, 1813), reprintedin
1 LIFE AND L=Errs OF JOsEPH STORY, supra note 18, at 244.
14 Letter from Joseph Story to Nathaniel Williams (Oct. 8, 1812), reprintedin I
LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY, supra note 18, at 243.
"15 Untitled Manuscript of Joseph Story (1816), reprinted in 1 LIFE AND LET-
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federal jurisdiction in an 1816 legislative proposal, which he submitted
to Congress along with a manuscript explaining its provisions. 1 ' While
admitting that the Justices disagreed as to "whether the Courts of the
United States have from their very organization a general common law
jurisdiction," he asserted that "none of us entertain any doubt as to the
authority of Congress to invest us with this jurisdiction, so far as it
'3 17
applies to the sovereignty of the United States.
In the context of a society well acquainted with common-law prosecutions, Story was not without reason in lamenting the restrictions on
federal courts: "The smallest County Court or Court of pie poudre acts
*....
,8
upon [the common law] and enforces it, even as to crimes .
Apart from the politically sensitive matter of sedition, there were ordinary crimes against the government (counterfeiting and bribery, for instance) that could have justified the exercise of federal common-law jurisdiction. Federal common-law authority could have been confined to
those areas considered within federal competence generally, and further
constrained by Congress's ability to control jurisdiction. No new type of
judicial power would have been created-nothing departing from what
state courts normally did. Story suggested a useful analogy:
We well know that all crimes which are punishable at common law in England, are not punishable here. But this is, in
general, no result from positive acts of the Legislature; but
supra note 18, at 297-98.
Id. at 293. Story described the reaction of the other Justices to this proposal as

TERS OF JOSEPH STORY,
318

follows:
It received a revision from several of them, particularly Judges Marshall
and Washington, and was wholly approved by them, and indeed, except as
to a single section, by all the other Judges. Judge Johnson expressed some
doubt as to the eleventh section [on criminal jurisdiction]; but, as I understood him, rather as to its expediency than the competency of Congress to
enact it.
Id. at 300.
117 Id. at 299. There is no corroboration of Story's assertion that the other Justices approved this plan; in view of Hudson, it seems dubious that a majority agreed.
See supra text accompanying notes 307-08.
318 Id. at 298. As if in direct response, the opinion in Trial of William Butler for
Piracy, supra note 219, states:
Can any one doubt of the power of Congress . . . to pass laws, fully commensurate or even surpassing the Common Law provisions, for the punishment of offences against the sovereignty, rights, justice, peace, trade, or
police of the United States? And why have they not done it in any particular case? Unquestionably, because they did not think it necessary.
Id. at 26-27. Further, it would be "officious, forward and intrusive" for a federal court
to act where Congress had failed to legislate. Id. at 27. Only a few crimes were speifled in the Constitution, and aside from treason they were to be put into operation by
Congress. Id. at 14-16.
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from an application of common law principles to the nature
of our public institutions and constitutions of government. If,
then, State Courts may apply the common law to State Constitutions, why may not United States Courts apply it to the
Constitution of the United States? 1 '
Story was not content with lobbying Congress over federal common-law jurisdiction. Only a few years later, a case arose in his circuit
that allowed him to attempt to overrule or at least modify the Hudson
doctrine. The case was United States v. Coolidge,320 which involved a
crime on the high seas, a subject indisputably within the article III
grant of jurisdiction. Coolidge was tried for the alleged offense of forcibly rescuing a vessel after it had been lawfully seized by privateers
while it had been sailing illegally under a British license.3 2 ' Despite the
recent decision in Hudson, Story, sitting as Circuit Justice, ruled that
the defendants' acts were indictable at common law and within the ju22
risdiction of the circuit court by virtue of section 11 of the 1789 Act.
His Coolidge opinion was in large part a dissent from Hudson, which
he noted had "been made without argument, and by a majority only of
the court."3 23 Story wrote that "it is not an improper course to bring
the subject again in review for a more solemn decision, as it is not a
question of mere ordinary import, but vitally affects the jurisdiction of
3 24
the courts of the United States.
At the outset, Story admitted "that the courts of the United States
are courts of limited jurisdiction, and cannot exercise any authorities,
which are not confided to them by the constitution and laws made in
pursuance thereof. '3 2 5 His idea of limited jurisdiction differed sharply
319

Untitled Manuscript of Joseph Story (1816), reprinted in I LIFE AND LETnote 18, at 299.
Mass. 1813) (No. 14,857), rev'd, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.)

TERS OF JOSEPH STORY, supra
320 25 F. Cas. 619 (C.C.D.

415 (1816).
The setting was the British naval blockade during the War of 1812. The British counsel in Boston had been issuing licenses to American ships that enabled them to
pass through the Royal Navy's lines. Although Congress had not yet declared it illegal
to possess a British license, a Story opinion prior to Coolidge made a vessel that possessed the license liable to capture as a prize by privateers. See The Julia, 14 F. Cas.
27, 32 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 7575) ("existence and employment of such license
affords a strong presumption of concealed enemy interests"), affd, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch)
180 (1814). The Julia was an unpopular decision in New England because it allowed
American cruisers to prey upon vessels attempting to maintain their accustomed shipping activities. See G. DUNNE, JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY AND THE RISE OF THE SUPREME COURT 107-08 (1970).
331

32' Coolidge, 25 F. Cas. at 619-21.

at 621.

823
324

Id.

325

Id. at 619.

Id.
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from that expressed in Hudson: "[W]hen once an authority is lawfully
given, the nature and extent of that authority, and the mode, in which
it shall be exercised, must be regulated by the rules of the common
law. ' 326 Inasmuch as section 11 expressly gave circuit courts jurisdiction "of all crimes and offences, to which by the constitution of the
United States, the judicial power extends, 3 27 it remained only to specify what those crimes were. To answer this, "recourse must be had to
the principles of the common law. '3 28 Story thought there was nothing
improper about this analysis. "Innumerable instances" in the Constitution could be adduced to show an intent to explicate terms by their
common-law meanings. 29 Likewise, Congress "provided for the punishment of murder, manslaughter and perjury, . . . but it has no
where defined these crimes. Yet no doubt is ever entertained on trials,
that the explanation of them must be sought and exclusively governed
by the common law . . ".330
With this foundation laid, Story proceeded to list the classes of
cases that might constitute common-law crimes against the United
States: "I will venture to assert generally, that all offences against the
sovereignty, the public rights, the public justice, the public peace, the
public trade and the public police of the United States, are crimes and
offences against the United States."3 ' Reliance on state law was inadequate assurance, "for these [laws] are not always applicable, as suits
may be brought in the United States courts, which are not cognizable
by state courts; as for instance, equity and admiralty causes." ' 2
Story's reference to the problem created by exclusive federal jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime cases was not merely a reflection
of his exasperation that the "disgraceful" conduct of Americans trading
under British licenses was likely to go unpunished. 3 ' More critically,
he used the fact that Coolidge's alleged offense was within the express
326
327

Id.
Id. at 619-20.

"I Id. at 620. Story added, "When I speak here of the common law, I use the
word in its largest sense, as including the whole system of English jurisprudence." Id.
329 Id. at 619.
330 Id. at 620.
331 Id. These crimes included "treason, embezzlement of the public records, bribery and resistance of the judicial process, riots and misdemeanors on the high seas,
frauds and obstructions of the public laws of trade, and robbery and embezzlement of
the mail of the United States." Id.
332 Id.
" Letter from Joseph Story to Nathaniel Williams (Aug. 3, 1813), reprinted in
I LIFE AND L=Errs OF JOSEPH STORY, supra note 18, at 247. Story accurately
predicted the eventual outcome of Coolidge: "I should not be at all surprised that the
actors should escape without animadversion, owing to the defects in our criminal laws."

Id.
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article III grant of admiralty jurisdiction to distinguish Hudson. "The
admiralty is a court of extensive criminal, as well as civil jurisdiction,
and has immemorially exercised both. .

.

.We have adopted the law

of the admiralty in all civil causes cognizable by the admiralty: 34must it
3
not also be adopted in offences cognizable by the admiralty?
Despite the cogency of Story's argument, Coolidge was reversed by
the Supreme Court. 3 ' Justice Johnson issued the following brief opinion for the Court:
Upon the question now before the court, a difference of
opinion has existed, and still exists, among the members of
the court. We should, therefore, have been willing to have
heard the question discussed, upon solemn argument. But
the attorney-general has declined to argue the cause; and no
counsel appears for the defendant. Under these circumstances, the court would not choose to review their former
decision in the case of the United States v. Hudson and
Goodwin, or draw it into doubt.33 '
While the . Court's reluctance to decide an important question
without argument by the parties is surely understandable, this was an
odd way to end the long dispute over common-law crimes. A number of
commentators writing within a few years of Coolidge indicated that
they considered the question of common-law crimes raised in Coolidge
and in Hudson to be unresolved. William Rawle, Peter Du Ponceau,
and Thomas Sergeant all thought that the absence of argument in both
I" Coolidge, 25 F. Cas. at 621. This last point was difficult to dispute, at least so
far as civil admiralty and maritime law were involved, since the use there of decisionmaking by unwritten law could hardly be gainsaid. Story's opinion in The Julia, 14 F.
Cas. 27 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 7575), affd, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 180 (1814), for
instance, which was adopted by the Supreme Court on appeal, see 12 U.S. (8 Cranch)
at 190, relied on treatises and decisions, ancient and modem, from various international
sources-including British cases. Eventually the American courts produced a distinctive
American law of admiralty, yet "English precedents had a pervasive influence upon the
deliberations of the Court," if for no other reason than the frequent lack of other authority. 2 G. HASKINS supra note 36, at 452; accord 2 A. CHROUST, supra note 28, at
84 n.289; D. Sharpe, The Origins of American Admiralty and Maritime Law 275-76
(1969) (unpublished S.J.D. thesis, Harvard Law School).
...United States v. Coolidge, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 415 (1816).
331 Id. President Madison's Attorney General, Richard Rush, confessed error on
the ground that Hudson controlled the case. Id. at 415-16. Several of the Justices were,
if not in agreement with Story, at least willing to hear the arguments. Justice Washington indicated that he was prepared to hear the matter "[w]henever counsel can be found
ready to argue it," and would "divest [him]self of all prejudice arising from [Hudson]."
Id. Similarly, Justice Livingston, who almost surely was in the Hudson majority, allowed that he was "disposed to hear argument . . .but until the question is re-argued
[Hudson] must be taken as law." Id. Justice Johnson, however, "consider[ed] it to be
settled, by the authority of [Hudson]." Id.

1985]

ORIGINS OF FEDERAL COMMON LAW

1299

cases precluded a definitive resolution, and each constructed theories to
support the exercise of common-law jurisdiction by federal courts when
so authorized by Congress.337 A writer in the North American Review
of 1825 summarized the state of legal opinion on the subject of common-law powers for federal courts: "[W]e believe there are some of the
fairest, and most intelligent minds in the country, that have not been
quite able to come to a satisfactory conclusion."33
Justice Story did not let the matter rest. His extrajudicial efforts
on behalf of a common-law jurisdiction for federal courts were not limited to the area of crimes. As part of a general program to "extend the
national authority over the whole extent of power given by the Constitution," Story urged that "[the] Judicial Courts [should] embrace the
whole constitutional powers." 339 Regarding the need for jurisdiction
over "arising under" cases, Story contended: "[I]n thousands of instances arising under the laws of the United States, the parties are utterly without remedy, or with a very inadequate remedy."3 4 0 He adduced a number of examples, including situations in which officers of
the government withheld a right, such as land patents or customs clearances, or where the United States was incapable of protecting an interest created by national law, such as patent rights. 4 1
Despite Story's efforts, nothing like his proposal came into existence until the Judiciary Act of 18 7 5 .12 Although commentators might
have perceived infirmities in Hudson and Coolidge, these decisions
were never directly repudiated. In 1834, the Court decided a case of the
sort addressed by Story in his lobbying activities. Wheaton v. Peterss3
was a diversity case involving an asserted copyright on reports of Supreme Court decisions. In response to Henry Wheaton's claim of a
common-law copyright, Justice McLean wrote for the majority:
But, if the common law right of authors were shown to
exist in England, does the same right exist, and to the same
extent, in this country[?]
33 See W. RAWLE, supra note 186, at 258 n.*, 259-73; P. Du PONCEAU, supra
note 6, at 17-18; T. SERGEANT, supra note 187, at 274; see also H. WHEATON, SOME
ACCOUNT OF THE LIFE, WRITINGS, AND SPEECHES OF WILLIAM PICKNEY 114-16

(New York 1826) (endorsing the approach taken by Du Ponceau).
33 Common Law Jurisdiction, 21 N. AM. REv. 104, 106 (1825).
339 Letter from Joseph Story to Nathaniel Williams (Feb. 22, 1815), reprinted in
1 LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY, supra note 18, at 254.
340 Untitled Manuscript of Joseph Story (1816), reprinted in 1 LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY, supra note 18, at 294.
341 See id. at 294-95.
342 Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.).
34 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
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It is clear, there can be no common law of the United
States. The federal government is composed of twenty-four
sovereign and independent states; each of which may have its
local usages, customs and common law. There is no principle
which pervades the union and has the authority of law, that
is not embodied in the constitution or laws of the union. The
common law could be made a part of our federal system,
only by legislative adoption.
When, therefore, a common law right is asserted, we
3 44
must look to the state in which the controversy originated.
Wheaton shows that Hudson's restrictive view of the extent of federal common-law powers was transferred very early to the civil arena.
It may be that Justice Johnson and others on the Hudson Court were
mindful of the relationship between the two: if Congress could declare
a federal common-law jurisdiction for crimes, the same might be done
for civil cases. Story's suggestion-to employ the language "arising
under the laws of the Untied States"-could have served the purpose.
As long as the potential for expansion of jurisdiction remained, the
nightmare of a vast expansion of the federal establishment could be
brought back to mind.
In any event, we do know that a considerable amount of redirection would be needed before the modern common law associated with
the post-Erie Railroad v. Tompkins 4 5 era could be produced. Our
inheritance from Hudson remains, and has left us with a federal common law that is more a maze of contradictions than anything else.
II.

THE RELEVANCE OF THE

Hudson ERA TO MODERN FEDERAL

COMMON LAW

A.

Remarks on the Use of History by Courts

No historical account is ever complete, and this essay is hardly an
exception. We have examined only a sampling of opinion from a fairly
distant era on the relation between the common law and the federal
judiciary. Possibly that which is offered as an explanation for a phenomenon is itself an event that has its own story. Histories of the sort
attempted here also tend to be elitist, concentrating on leading actors
who had access to positions of power or at least channels of written
communication. In view of the inherent difficulties that arise when one
society attempts to understand another, these doubts could be multiId. at 658.
-5 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

34
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plied endlessly. All the more is this so when the two societies are separated by enormous gulfs in cultural perspective and considerable differences in time.
Having highlighted these reservations, we can ignore them in some
respects and profit from them in others. For those of us who enjoy
history, however amateurish or casual our understanding, the enterprise will be interesting regardless of its incompleteness. Each generation of historians produces fresh data about a period, new ways of rearranging old information, and insights into interrelationships not
previously recognized. In other words, there is plenty to occupy our
imaginations without worrying excessively over the inevitable shortcomings of human knowledge.
Nevertheless, the past has a tendency to exert unusual control over
the present, as our law continuously demonstrates. Precedent tends to
be self-justifying. The remarks of our famous predecessors may be
taken out of context and invoked in judicial opinions as a kind of inviolable text. Using history in this way avoids analysis of the continued
viability of a principle or practice. In a given case, this might be an
appropriate way of proceeding: it is sometimes better to stay with the
tried and true than to venture into the unknown. Any established practice worth repudiating will have some adherents, and modifying it will
inevitably defeat some expectations. More importantly, there can be
unrecognized benefits to maintaining a practice. To explore these
before making new decisions is difficult or impossible, and hence replacement expense is not easy to ascertain. Further, there are periods
when we should wait for a calmer hour to do our rethinking.
These reservations about altering principles obviously can be
pushed only so far, for otherwise nothing would ever change. The point
here is not to add to the literature on why courts put so much store in
established practices. If we assume that there is a value in being guided
by the past, the question becomes how courts should discover and use
legal history.
Legal history is, or should be, a form of political history. Without
attempting a precise definition, the point of such a study is to explain
"the shaping, distribution, and exercise of power' e in a given time
period. Past judicial decisions provide a basis for inquiry into all three
of these aspects of power relations in society.
An inquiry into judicial history is incomplete without reference to
the political events surrounding the juridical action. For example, an
346

H. LAsswE.L & A. KAPLAN, POWER AND SocIETY 75 (1950).
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account of Marbury v. Madison3 47 might simply recite that the Supreme Court declared its authority to hold an act of Congress unconstitutional. A somewhat more thorough investigation would go on to discuss the reasons advanced by the Court for its conclusion. In such an
account, the fact that the opinion was released in the highly charged
political atmosphere of the early nineteenth century makes little difference. But to understand why the decision turned out the way it did one
must be aware of the heated partisan struggles of the 1790's, which in
turn requires a knowledge of events occurring in England and other
parts of Europe. And that is only the opening foray. Political history
deals with the development of ideologies, and a thorough analysis
would include examining the evolution of the concept of judicial review,
which hardly appeared suddenly from the murky air of 1803. That in
turn demands an understanding of events and theories prevalent before
and at the time of the Revolution.
For the most part, courts do not engage in the type of historiography needed to trace the idea of judicial review to the politics of the
centuries preceding Marbury. A court will usually limit itself to consulting the holdings of prior cases, as typified by the present invocation
of Hudson. Courts are more or less adept at the latter exercise. When a
court embarks upon an ambitious historical investigation, the results
are frequently disappointing from the standpoint of professional historians. It is not simply a question of the limitations of time and resources,
although these play a major role.
Every judicial opinion is itself a political act, an exercise of power.
A process of justification is involved, and the use of the past is always
directed toward the resolution of a current controversy. No historiographical work is free from the values of its writer, but such studies
by judges are especially likely to entail the interpretation of prior events
in the light most favorable to present purposes. This appears inevitable,
and not particularly undesirable, so long as there is an awareness that a
political act is taking place.
Courts should engage in surveys of the history behind an issue, if
for no other reason than to be aware of the process by which judicial
power is developed and wielded.3'8 As political actors who possess
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
It is significant, for instance, that the institution of judicial review had its origins in the same era in which the common-law jurisdiction of federal courts was first
being debated. In developing a theory about the judiciary's place in a democratic society, the acceptance of judicial review needs to be juxtaposed against the sharp limitations placed on federal common law. Without engaging in a detailed comparison of the
two, it is enough to note that courts, and observers of courts, must always be aware of
the various faces of judicial activity.
848
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power in the community through public office, judges are conscious of
the authority that they hold. Of course, the degree of their cognizance
varies according to the individual, the setting, and the epoch. Yet judicial opinions throughout American history frequently show a sensitivity
to the issue of legitimacy. Doctrinal developments in any number of
areas appear to have been influenced heavily by the courts' need to
justify their competence to order the human affairs involved. Naturally
we can never be sure what motivates a particular judicial act, and it
would be foolish to propose any unified theory to explain generally
what causes judges to decide the way they do. Even if we personalize
the inquiry to the particular judge deciding a case, we usually are left
largely in the dark, and this is all the more true when the subject lived
long ago.
Consider the figure of Justice Johnson. In the years before Hudson he struck at least some as "bold, independent, eccentric, and sometimes harsh." 49 Johnson was likely smarting from the public rebuke
that he received at the hands of his party in response to an 1808 decision in which he criticized Jefferson for acting illegally during the embargo of that year. Sitting on circuit in Charleston, Johnson had issued
a writ of mandamus against the Collector of the Port, who had received
a directive from the President ordering him not to allow ships carrying
certain commodities to sail. 5 ° For his opinion that the executive had
exceeded his statutory authority, Johnson was denounced by the Republican press for impeding the President's policy. Worse, he was accused in a published commentary by Attorney General Caesar A. Rodney of having acted without jurisdiction. 351 In a remarkable public
defense, Johnson acknowledged that there was a serious question
whether the court had possessed jurisdiction, but he lamely explained
that the government had not raised the issue, and this "would, at least,
3' 5
excuse the act of the court. 1
Assuming that Johnson learned a lesson from the experience, does
this account for his opinions in a subsequent series of cases, including
Hudson and Coolidge, in which he insisted on a limited reading of
S49

1

C.

INGERSOLL, HISTORY OF THE SECOND WAR BETWEEN THE UNITED

STATES OF AMERICA AND GREAT BRITAIN 74 (Philadelphia
MORGAN, JUSTICE WILLIAM JOHNSON 75 (1954).

1852), quoted in D.

See Gilchrist v. Collector, 10 F. Cas. 355 (C.C.D.S.C. 1808) (No. 5420); see
WARREN, supra note 114, at 324-38 (1922).
I51 See D. MORGAN, supra note 349, at 61. The Attorney General's opinion, in
the form of a letter to Jefferson, was published in newspapers at the time and appears
in the report of the case. See 10 F. Cas. at 357-59.
"1 10 F. Cas. at 366. Johnson's reply was printed in several newspapers. See 1 C.
WARREN, supra note 114, at 334 & nn.1-2.
150

also 1 C.
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federal jurisdiction?'5 8 How does one factor in Johnson's ownership of
plantations and slaves and his outspoken defense of that peculiar institution?3 54 Did Johnson anticipate that Story, who he thought was attempting to expand admiralty jurisdiction beyond constitutional bounds
in De Lovio v. Boit, 55 would within a few years declare slavery a violation of the law of nations-and slave ships condemnable by federal
admiralty courts?. 56 If these facts suggest a Justice blindly committed
to states' rights, we must remember the occasions when Johnson went
357
along with expansive readings of national powers.
353 See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 20 (1831) (concurring opinion); Weston v. City Council, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 449, 470 (1829) (dissenting
opinion); Ramsay v. Allegre, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 611, 614 (1827) (concurring opinion); Bank of the United States v. Planters' Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904, 910 (1824)
(dissenting opinion); Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 871
(1824) (dissenting opinion); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 362
(1816) (concurring opinion).
3" See D. MORGAN, supra note 349, at 99-103. Johnson proclaimed that "the
Christian, who considers all conditions with a view to a state of probation, will often
see more to be envied in the life of the slave than in that of the master." Address to the
Literary and Philosophical Society of Charleston, South Carolina (Oct. 14, 1815),
quoted in id. at 102.
-5 7 F. Cas. 418 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 3776). De Lovio held that the article
III admiralty grant extends to all cases "originally and inherently" within the jurisdiction of British admiralty courts, id. at 443, and thus encompasses "all maritime contracts, torts, and injuries," id. at 444. On Johnson's reaction to De Lovio, see D. MORGAN, supra note 349, at 81. Johnson directed a vociferous attack on the Court's
expansion of admiralty jurisdiction in Ramsay v. Allegre, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 611,
614 (1827) (concurring opinion). There he argued that the Framers intended to set the
jurisdiction of federal courts in admiralty along the lines that state courts exercised
from the time of the Revolution. Id. at 638. He denied that British admiralty jurisdiction was intended as a standard of reference, and maintained that in any event "the
jurisdiction anciently claimed by [the English Court of Admiralty] was founded in
usurpation." Id.
338 See United States v. The La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832 (C.C.D. Mass.
1822) (No. 15,551). In grand jury charges in 1819, Story made comments that appear
to address directly Johnson's views on the relationship between Christianity and
slavery:
We believe in the Christian religion. It commands us to have good will to
all men; to love our neighbors as ourselves, and to do unto all men as we
would they should do unto us. It declares our accountability to the Supreme God for all our actions. . . . To me it appears perfectly clear, that
the slave trade is equally repugnant to the dictates of reason and religion,
and is an offence equally against the laws of God and man.
Charges to the Grand Juries for the Districts of Massachusetts and Rhode Island
(1819), quoted in 1 LiFE AND LETTERS OF JOsEPH STORY, supra note 18, at 341.
Concluding, he declared, "[I]f we tolerate this traffic, our charity is but a name, and
our religion little more than a faint and delusive shadow." Id. at 347.
35' For example, Johnson joined in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264
(1821), Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819),
and McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). Johnson gave a broad
reading to the commerce clause in his concurring opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) 1, 222 (1824). Earlier, he had held on circuit that South Carolina's Negro
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Turning over a few stones such as these does not suffice to reveal
the complex personality of an important political figure. Merely to embark on the task should be enough to sober anyone who thinks that a
reconstruction of the events and personalities of an era could ever approach completeness. Moreover, "completeness" is itself an illusive concept: how much we need to know about a figure from the past, and the
affairs of the day, depends on our purposes. We will never know them
as we do our contemporaries, or perhaps more importantly, as their
contemporaries knew them.
It is possible to carry this skepticism too far, and the reader might
wonder about a writer who concludes a work about history by seemingly doubting the worth of the entire effort. Putting aside the obvious
answer, that the task is its own reward, there is a response more specific to the topic at hand. Political histories are in part intellectual histories. We have observed, though our view is obscured, the development
of a related set of ideas over the course of a highly unusual generation.
From what is known about the history of Western culture prior to the
American Revolution, we can easily see that the question of common
law (in all the senses of that term) as it related to the federal judiciary
would have to be addressed. And so it was, although at times the attitudes of those involved must be inferred from their lack of attention to
what seems to us a significant problem. All of those in public life were
developing their various ideologies, and doing so in a context that had
only the remotest of resemblance to our own. While it is difficult for us
to imagine the common law provoking passionate oratory, the fact that
it did should serve as a warning that what was said in that era cannot
be applied bag and baggage to our own quite different time without
introducing serious distortions.
B.

Applying the History of the Hudson Era to Modern Federal
Common Law

This is not to deny that there is a parallel between the issues surrounding Hudson and Coolidge, and modern cases treating federal
common law. Reviewing some of the current judicial statements on the
scope of federal common law, we see that the focus continues to be on
the appropriateness of the exercise of a form of judicial power. There
are concerns now as then for states' rights and the necessity for decisionmaking by regularly elected representatives. Equally evident is that
these expressions are tied to the ideological orientations of the Supreme
Seamen Act, which banned free blacks from entering the state, violated the commerce
clause. See Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 F. Cas. 493 (C.C.D.S.C. 1823) (No. 4366).
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Court Justices. Granting that there are similar basic issues at stake, at
least when the labels are cast in sufficiently broad terms, does not mean
that the two eras saw matters in anything resembling the same light.
To illustrate these differences, consider Justice Powell's dissent in
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 5 8 in which the Court implied a private right of action under Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972359 in favor of a rejected female applicant to a medical school. By
inferring a federal cause of action from the antidiscrimination principle
of Title IX,3 60 the Court implicitly resolved the issue of federal subject
matter jurisdiction.3 6"
Justice Powell had two sets of objections to the decision. One falls
under the rubric of "judicial process": whether it is advisable, in a
democratic society, for a court to imply a private action from a statute
that contains no such express authorization.3 62 While Justice Powell
raised some hard issues, most of them are applicable to state as well .as
federal courts. In the other group of concerns, however, Powell singled
out federal courts, denying that they have the same power to create
rights of action that state courts have.
With this second level of objections, Powell aligned himself with
the stance that a majority of the Court had recently associated with
Hudson. Although he did not cite Hudson, Powell used the same approach that the Court would follow in Milwaukee v. Illinois.63 Like
the Milwaukee Court, Powell cited Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,3 " and
went so far as to call the Cannon majority's implication of a cause of
action an unconstitutional course of decisionmaking:1 65 "By creating a
private action, a court of limited jurisdiction necessarily extends its authority to embrace a dispute Congress has not assigned it to resolve."36 6
Powell had particularly strong words for Cort v. Ash,367 in which
the Court set forth guidelines as to when a private cause of action
might be implied from a federal statute that does not explicitly provide
for one.3 8 Cort, Powell noted, relied on decisions such as Texas &
441 U.S. 677, 730 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976).
360 See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 688-717.
361 For purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982), the claim must "arise" under federal law. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 746 n.17 (Powell, J., dissenting).
362 See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 743-49 (Powell, J., dissenting).
363 451 U.S. 304 (1980); see also Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981); United
States v. Standard Oil, 332 U.S. 301 (1947).
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
363 See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 742 (Powell, J., dissenting).
366 Id. at 746.
356

$59

367

422 U.S. 66 (1975).

Cort found four factors to be relevant in determining whether to imply a private cause of action:
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute
368
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Pacific Railway v. Rigsby,36 which the Cannon majority believed to
represent "the Court's earliest 'inference of a private right of action.' ",370 Summarizing Rigsby, Powell recited that it involved
[t]he narrow question . . . whether the standards of care defined by the Federal Safety Appliance Act's penal provisions
applied to a tort action brought against an interstate railroad
by an employee not engaged in interstate commerce at the
time of his injury. The jurisdiction of the federal courts was
not in dispute, the action having been removed from state
court on the ground that the defendant was a federal
corporation. 71
Powell emphasized that, when Rigsby was decided in 1916, "[u]nder
'3 72
the regime of Swift v. Tyson
the Court was free to create the substantive standards of liability applicable to a common-law negligence claim brought
in federal court. The practice of judicial reference to legislatively determined standards of care was a common expedient
to establish the existence of negligence. . . . Rigsby did
nothing more than follow this practice, and cannot be taken
as authority for the judicial creation of a cause of action not
373
legislated by Congress.
Federal cases implying private causes of action in fact appeared
long before Rigsby.1 4 For example, in 1847 the Court decided Waring
v. Clarke,'75 best remembered for its holding that the admiralty grant
of article III "was not intended to be limited or to be interpreted by
was enacted," Texas & Pacfic R. Co. v. Rigsby-that is, does the statute
create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy
or to deny one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the
legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? And finally, is
the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a
cause of action based solely on federal law?
Id. at 78 (citations omitted).
389 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
370 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 689.
371 Id. at 732 (emphasis added).
372 Id. (citing Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842)).
373

Id.

See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 375 &
nn.53-54 (1982) ("[Tlhe Rigsby approach prevailed throughout most of our
history ....
).
"15 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441 (1847).
374
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what were cases of admiralty jurisdiction in England when the constitution was adopted.

' 37 6

Waring involved a claim arising from a colli-

sion on the Mississippi River; the parties were all from Louisiana.3 7 7 A
majority concluded that the case was within the admiralty jurisdiction.37 8 Proceeding to the issue of liability, the Court sustained a finding for the libelants on the ground that the defendants' vessel was steering in the wrong channel at the time of the accident.3 79 While this was
sufficient to justify recovery, the Court went on in dictum to address
the libelants' contention that the defendants' ship was not running with
signal lights as required by a federal navigation statute imposing a fine
for violations. "We do not put our decision . . . upon this ground, but

we do say, if a collision occurs between steamers at night, and one of
them has not signal lights, she will be held responsible for all losses
until it is proved that the collision was not the consequence of it."38 0
Justice Powell might employ the same approach to analyze Waring that he used to distinguish Rigsby. In Waring, subject matter jurisdiction was based on the case being in admiralty. Admiralty jurisdiction
depended on the site of the accident (navigable waters) and the subject
of the claim (a collision between ships). 8 " Unless Powell were to dismiss the statutory implication as mere dictum, he would then have to
confront the absence of an explicit creation of jurisdiction or authorization of a private right of action in the navigation statute. He could
complete the argument, as he did in Rigsby, by placing Waring within
Swift's "regime."
But Powell and the other members of the Court probably would
not associate Waring with the Swift theory of common-law adjudication. Waring would instead be considered under a special category of
federal common law, in recognition that "[a]dmiralty law is judge-made
law to a great extent," 382 and that "the Judiciary has traditionally
taken the lead in formulating flexible and fair remedies in the law
maritime."38 3
376

Id. at 459.

Id. at 441-42.
Id. at 454-59.
379 Id. at 464-65.
S8o Id. at 465. Literally, the Court did not imply an action from the statute.
Rather, the opinion reveals the common-law assumption that negligence is actionable,
and that the statute provides a standard of care. The defendant might still prevail if,
despite a violation of the act, it could be shown that the negligence was not causally
related to the injury. See id.
381 See id. at 464 ("The locality of jurisdiction, then, having been ascertained, it
must comprehend cases of collision happening on it.").
37

318

382

Id. at 464.

$83 United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 409 (1975).
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Actually the Court might also offer the specific inclusion of admiralty in article III as a distinguishing characteristic. Borrowing from
David Currie's analysis of the difference between admiralty and diversity jurisdiction, the Court might rationalize common-law powers for
the former class of cases on the ground that "a uniform law was apparently one reason for the establishment of the admiralty jurisdiction in
1789," whereas "the diversity jurisdiction is generally regarded as intended only to insure unbiased protection against the provincialism of
state courts in the administration of their own laws."' " Finally, the
Court could recall Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in American Insurance Co. v. Canter38 5
The Constitution and laws of the United States, give
jurisdiction to the District Courts over all cases in admiralty;
but jurisdiction over the case, does not constitute the case
itself.3"8
After emphasizing that the admiralty and "arising under" grants are
conceptually distinct, Marshall concluded that
[a] case in admiralty does not, in fact, arise under the Constitution or laws of the United States. These cases are as old
as navigation itself; and the law, admiralty and maritime, as
it has existed for ages, is applied by our Courts to the cases
387
as they arise.
At first glance, Marshall's point seems a perfect crowning to the
argument: the grant of admiralty jurisdiction must be distinguished
from the body of law to be applied, just as a federal court in diversity
looks to non-federal rules of decision. However, Marshall's separation
of the body of admiralty law from a court's authority to adjudicate was
not merely a clever solution to a jurisdictional dispute, 8 8 but also a
'" Currie, Federalism and the Admiralty: "The Devil's Own Mess," 1960 Sup.
CT. REv. 158, 163 (footnote omitted).
385 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828).
886 Id. at 544.
387 Id. at 545.
3"
In Canter the question presented was whether a territorial court, staffed by
judges not holding life tenure, could exercise jurisdiction over an admiralty claim. The
Florida Territory had two types of courts, superior and inferior, and one of the latter
had entered an award in a salvage case. An attack was brought against the judgment on
the ground that the inferior court had no admiralty powers; it was argued that only the
superior court possessed that authority, by virtue of a grant of exclusive jurisdiction to
it over cases arising under the laws and Constitution of the United States. Marshall's
opinion held, in part, that admiralty cases did not "arise under" the constitution or
laws of the United States, and hence the inferior court was not barred from exercising
admiralty powers. See 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 546. The more famous aspect of the case is
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reflection of a way of comprehending law. The law was something
apart from the court's exercise of its jurisdiction, a corpus to be discovered and applied to the facts at hand. There was never any question
raised in Canter or Waring as to a federal court's authority to exercise
traditional common-law powers.
But times have changed, and from the positivist perspective associated with post-Erie thinking about federal judicial competence, it is
nonsensical to separate the court in question from the law it is applying. An admiralty court does not find law; rather, it engages in the
political act of adjudication over subjects properly within its sphere of
responsibility. The same goes for a diversity court, which is precisely
the reason why a federal court in such cases is required to act as if it
were a state court under the same circumstances.
It is understandable that the modern Court has been unable to
justify the making of common law by federal courts in admiralty cases
with anything more than a nod to longstanding practice.38 9 Even in the
post-Erie era, federal admiralty courts do exercise the prerogative of
courts of general jurisdiction to make common law, only constrained
within a particular subject matter. The ability to operate in a commonlaw manner over admiralty cases was never seen to require any congressional mandate. Indeed, it was long understood that Congress obtained its legislative authority in admiralty from article II.390 It is true
that Congress may control jurisdiction in the sense that it might not
empower federal courts to hear admiralty claims. Once Congress vested
the jurisdiction, however, the historical assumption has been that the
courts involved were to act as admiralty courts always had acted. 9 '
Part of that manner of acting has been to imitate the ancient tradition
of English courts in expanding jurisdiction through ingenious fictions
that barely disguised the political motivations involved. American admiralty in the nineteenth century followed this path, and at the time even
surpassed the English Court of Admiralty in pretensions to jurisdicMarshall's decision that Congress could vest admiralty powers in non-article III "legislative courts." See id.
389 See, e.g., Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 642 (1981)
("[A]dmiralty jurisdiction [is] one of the areas long recognized as subject to federal
common law.").
380 See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 47 (2d ed. 1975);
Shulman, The Demise of Swift v. Tyson, 47 YALE L.J. 1336, 1338 (1938). Professor
Hill argues that "the Court went so far as to base congressional competence on the
implications of the jurisdictional grant itself, apparently to ensure that the range of the
legislative power would be not a whit less than that of the judicial power." Hill, Lawmaking Power, supra note 220, at 1071 (footnote omitted).
391 See Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 385-86 (1924); R. BRIDWELL &
R. WHr=-FEN, supra note 203, at 36; G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 390, at 45.
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tion. 9 2 The principal difference was that in England the diminution of
the jurisdiction of the Court of Admiralty was accomplished by a transfer of cases to other national courts, while in America the parallel
would have been the assumption of jurisdiction by state courts.
The gap between Marshall's perception of the nature of admiralty
law and our own is evident from the approach he took toward its
source. Marshall denied that admiralty cases arose under the Constitution or laws of the United States. As a species of international law,
admiralty law was distinct from any national law, and federal courts
were empowered merely to find this law, which was "as old as navigation itself." This sounds strange to our modern ears, schooled on positivism. The idea of "the law" being an entity apart from the decisionmakers who have the power to impose it has been well interred.
Unsurprisingly, cases maintain that if federal courts have the authority
to act as common-law courts in admiralty cases, the jurisdictional grant
over admiralty in article III must be the source. 93 From an early nineteenth century perspective, this assertion would seem strange. To hold
that admiralty law was somehow authorized by the Constitution would
have been to contend that it is part of the Constitution, and hence unalterable by Congress."" That, we may recall, was exactly the grievance
that Republicans raised with respect to the Federalist claim that the
common law was applicable to the government of the United States.
Notwithstanding this recognition of common-law admiralty powers as springing from article III, the Court's general understanding of
federal common-law powers marches in a rather different direction.
Central to the Court's overall philosophy of federal common-law jurisdiction is the proposition that the mere grant of jurisdiction to a federal
court does not amount to an authorization to "formulate" common law.
Remarkably, the Court refers to Erie to prove the point.
Erie may have initiated a transformation in the way federal courts
envisioned their common-law reach, but nothing about the decision sustains the Court's current assumptions about federal common-law powers. Nowhere does Justice Brandeis' opinion intimate that a grant of
jurisdiction is inadequate to authorize the making of federal common
law. Common-law adjudication, the fashioning of unwritten principles,
is part and parcel of the traditional exercise of jurisdiction and was not
",2 This was the cause of Justice Johnson's bitter complaint about the Court's
expansion of admiralty jurisdiction. See supra note 355 and accompanying text.
191 See, e.g., Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 160 (1920) ("The
Constitution itself adopted and established, as part of the laws of the United States,
approved rules of the general maritime law ....
).
I" See 2 W. CROSSKEY, supra note 121, at 875.
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in the least trenched upon by Erie. Notably, on the same day that Erie
was announced the Court held in Hinderliderv. La Plata River &
Cherry Creek Ditch Co.395 that "whether the water of an interstate
stream must be apportioned between the two States is a question of
'federal common law' upon which neither the statutes nor the decisions
of either State can be conclusive." ' 8 Erie's condemnation of the "unconstitutionality of the course pursued" under what the Court labeled
"the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson" was not a repudiation of federal common law adjudication per se, but only of federal general common
law. 3 97 Erie quoted Justice Holmes's classic statement of the positivist
perspective: " '[L]aw in the sense in which courts speak of it today does
not exist without some definite authority behind it.' "398 A common-law
rule, in other words, must be associated with the sovereign that has
authority to promulgate it: either the state or the federal government.
And that sovereign must have the final word on interpretation of the
rule. The objection to the regime of federal general common law was
that the federal courts were disregarding the state judiciaries, the authoritative voices for a large segment of law.
Erie announced a principle of federalism; it did not declare the
necessity for a federal court to receive authorization from Congress
before it could engage in the making of common law within an area of
jurisdiction assigned to the federal judiciary by article III. Under Swift,
the Erie Court explained, "federal courts assumed, in the broad field of
'general law,' the power to declare rules of decision which Congress
was confessedly without power to enact as statutes." ' Brandeis could
not have been plainer-the flaw in the pre-Erie federal system was the
interference by federal authorities in matters that the Constitution left
to the states. "Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of
common law applicable in a State whether they be local in their nature
or 'general,' be they commercial law or a part of the law of torts."4 00
The vice was not that federal courts were engaged in the making of
common law, but rather that federal courts were exercising an authority that Congress had not the power to grant them.40 1
395 304 U.S. 92 (1938).

Id. at 110.
" Erie, 304 U.S. at 77-79.
398 Id. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab
396

Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
399 304 U.S. at 72.

Id. at 78.
John Hart Ely has written that "[clongressional legislation based upon the
commerce clause certainly could have covered the specific question at issue in Erie and
probably even that involved in Swift." Ely, The IrrepressibleMyth of Erie, 87 HARv.
L. REV. 693, 703 n.62 (1974). Although Ely does not explain why this "certainly"
400
401
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Hence, nothing about Erie has any connection to the issue of implied rights of action involved in Rigsby or Cannon, which dealt with
situations concededly within federal jurisdiction. Nor does Erie provide
any guidance to courts in determining whether a particular subject
matter is under federal or state sovereignty. That Erie did not consider
this issue is a consequence of the logic behind the question presented,
rather than any failure by the Court to reach a critical element of the
case. No one disputed that, in the absence of "general" law, the substantive law to be applied was that of either Pennsylvania or New
York. Consequently, there was no need to discuss the possible application of federal common law. The finding that federal courts had been
interfering with state sovereignty in the realm of general law gave no
hint as to when federal common law would be appropriate in other
cases. Erie never attempted a principled explanation of the outer limits
of federal common-law authority, or of the relationship of those theoretical limits to the potential scope of congressional authority. Not a
word in Erie spoke to the problems to come in cases such as Clearfield
Trust Co. v. United States," 2 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,40 3 or even Hinderlider. In these cases, in which the creation of
federal common law was authorized, there was little if any statutory
basis to justify the practice.4 0 '
It is undeniable that the granting of jurisdiction to a court does not
must be so, perhaps he was basing his assumption on the Court's approval of the Safety
Appliance Acts in Southern Ry. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911), together with the
expansion of the commerce clause promised by NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). A better approach would be to ask why Erie seemed studiously to avoid the issue of Congress's potential power under the commerce clause over
the precise question presented by the case. It was one thing to allow Congress to dictate
the requirements for equipment used by interstate railways, or even to set up a worker
compensation program for the railway industry. See Second Employers' Liability
Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (1912). Quite another level of intrusion into state realms of interest
would be involved if Congress were given express authority to displace ordinary rules
of tort law in a field long thought to be the province of private state law. Recall that
Erie predated United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), and Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111 (1942); even Jones & Laughlin went to lengths to relate the "effects" of
the company's asserted unfair labor practices on interstate commerce. Doubtless the
Erie Court had no enthusiasm for entering into a hypothetical discussion of what Congress might do about tort liability for interstate railroads in nonemployee situations.
Instead the Court merely invoked a kind of operative presumption, that Congress itself
had "no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a State," including "the law of torts." 304 U.S. at 78. Erie did not address the bounds of judicial
power where Congress did have the potential to legislate about a given matter, and
simply had not done so.
402 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
403 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
404 See Hill, Law-making Power, supra note 220, at 1042 ("[Fiederal judicial
competence in these cases derives from the Constitution itself.").
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inevitably confer upon it the ability to create common-law rules. That,
however, is merely a specific application of a broader proposition, that
the conferral of jurisdiction does not dictate the judicial processes attached to its exercise, unless the granting organ qualifies the conferral
of jurisdiction with specific limitations. Examples might be the withholding of equity powers from a court or the excision of classes of cases
that are associated with equity. In the absence of explicit directions to
the contrary, a court's mode of proceeding is defined by tradition, that
is, the outcome of political clashes and accommodations that have
stretched over the life of a culture. All courts, both state and federal,
continuously define their powers by reference to the society around
them, of which the other branches of government are a part. "[A]s is so
often true in our federal system, allocations of jurisdiction have been
carefully wrought to correspond to the realities of power and interest
and national policy."4 05
Jurisdictional statutes inevitably are cast in terms of generalized
references to subject matter, with few clues as to how a court is to
operate when real cases come along. A better instance of this could not
be found than section 1331, which since 1875 has given federal courts
jurisdiction over cases "arising under the . . . laws . . . of the United
States."40 6 Although the legislative history of the 1875 Act is sparse,
substantial evidence exists to indicate that its drafters intended to grant,
in the words of the Senate sponsor, "precisely the power which the
Constitution confers-nothing more, nothing less."'407 Certainly the use
in the statute of the exact wording of article III supports this interpretation.40 8 Nonetheless, from the very beginning the Court has construed
4' Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 374-75

(1959).
406 Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470 (current version at 28
U.S.C § 1331 (1982)).
4" 2 CONG. Rac. 4987 (1874) (statement of Sen. Carpenter). The Supreme Court
has "recently reaffirmed what has long been recognized-that 'Article III "arising
under" jurisdiction is broader than federal question jurisdiction under § 1331.'"
Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 103 S. Ct. 2841, 2846 n.8
(1983) (quoting Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 103 S. Ct. 1962, 1972
(1983)). It reached this conclusion in spite of Senator Carpenter's expressed opinion
that the 1789 Judiciary Act was unconstitutional because it "did not confer the whole
power which the Constitution conferred." 2 CONG. REC. 4986 (1874). The 1875 Act
drew very little contemporary comment, see Forrester, The Nature of a "FederalQuestion," 16 TUL. L. REv. 362, 375 (1942), despite the enormous implications of Carpenter's view. One commentator did note that the law was passed "with indecent
haste . . . before the justices of the supreme court knew anything about it." Editor's
Note, 3 CENT. L.J. 312, 312 (1876).
401 See Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L.

REv. 157, 160 (1953).
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section 1331 to confer less jurisdiction than authorized by article III.4"9
Had the Court given the statute its widest possible reading, it would
have made federal district courts "substantially courts of general jurisdiction, since large numbers of law suits could be said to depend potentially on relevant issues of federal law."4' 1 Rather than reach this politically untenable result, the Court has treated the "arising under"
portion of the 1875 Act as a charge to develop a federal common law of
judicial jurisdiction, going so far as to hold that federal common law
itself is a "law" of the United States for purposes of the jurisdictional
provision."1 1 This is an entirely appropriate development, reflecting the
process by which jurisdictional powers must inevitably be defined.
Nothing in this means that courts are somehow autonomous, selfdefining institutions. Quite the contrary, their actions continuously provoke reactions from many segments of society, legislatures not the least
among them. In terms of broadly restraining or shaping the operational
characteristics of courts, it is hard to imagine how a statute or constitution could accomplish the task. Traditions, like morality, cannot be
legislated.
Beyond this, the conferral of subject matter jurisdiction is unrelated to the issue of what law will be applied to a case. A court in one
state may apply the law, common or statutory, of another state or of the
federal government. A federal court operating under diversity jurisdiction usually will follow state law, but not necessarily: some issues may
be federal in nature or may be governed by the law of a foreign country. When jurisdiction is based on the fact that the claim "arises under"
federal law, the court may nevertheless feel obliged to resolve certain
issues by reference to state or foreign law.
In a special way, choice of law is unrelated to the form of the
409 See M. REDISH, supra note 166, at 64; Forrester, supra note 407, at'377.
410 Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Requirement That a Case Arise "Directly"

Under FederalLaw, 115 U. PA. L. Rv. 890, 891 (1967). In Osborn v. Bank of the
United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824), the Court appeared to read article III in
a way that left few limits on its scope. As Professor Redish explains, Osborn seems to
have held that "in any case where a federal issue could be raised-apparently regardless of how clear the answer or how small the likelihood that it actually will be
raised-Congress has the power under Article III to vest jurisdiction in the federal
courts." M. REDISH, supra note 166, at 56; accord H. FINK & M. TUSHNET, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: POLICY AND PRACTICE 30-31 (1984). Recently the Court said
that "Osborn . . . reflects a broad conception of 'arising under' jurisdiction, according
to which Congress may confer on the federal courts jurisdiction over any case or controversy that might call for the application of federal law." Verlinden B.V. v. Central
Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 492 (1983). The Verlinden Court left open the issue of
article III jurisdiction where the presentation of a federal question was merely a "remote" or "speculative" possibility. See id. at 492-93.
41 See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 100 (1972).
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exercise of judicial powers. A federal diversity court continues to operate under common-law assumptions when it puts itself in the place of a
state court, so that it retains the power to imply a right of action from a
state statute, or to create a common-law action by analogy to other recognized claims. It may be aiming to duplicate the outcome at which a
state court of the forum would arrive, but it must have the inherent
capacity to perform the functions that allow for a successful imitation.
When that same court turns its attention to an admiralty case, it is able
to act in a common-law fashion not because the law is federal but because it is a court acting within the tradition of common-law adjudication. In denying that a federal court has authority to imply a private
right of action from a federal statute, the Court conflates the issues of
choice of law and judicial powers. Such a statute does produce questions of federal law, but not insofar as the plaintiff's claim is concerned.
Inasmuch as section 1331 was, as the Court has declared, designed
"'for vindicating every right given by the Constitution, the laws, and
treaties of the United States,' ,,412
the plaintiff is left with no federal
rights. If a right exists for which a remedy can be fashioned, it must be
of state or foreign law origin. At the same moment, the Court has made
a determination regarding its common-law powers. Section 1331 was
not meant, at least in the case where the Court is rejecting the implied
right, as a congressional authorization to proceed in a common-law
manner.
Once we understand that Erie does not support the current efforts
to limit the making of common law by the federal judiciary, it becomes
evident why Hudson is a necessary addition for a Court committed to
that end. Hudson is taken to represent a model of the federal judiciary
in which powers are constrained in a way that the powers of state
courts are not. Further, Hudson is said to instruct that federal courts
are of "limited" jurisdiction and must receive explicit authorization
from Congress before they may exercise common-law powers. On this
view, Erie is a complementary decision. When state law must be resorted to, a federal court does engage in the process of making common
law, but only in furtherance of the goal of arriving at the same outcome
that a court of that state would.
Let us imagine for a moment that this reconstruction of Hudson's
meaning is precisely correct from a historical point of view and that the
Court is faithfully operating under the constitutional design for the exercise of federal judicial power. If that is so, Erie itself was wrongly
412

J.

Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 464 (1974) (quoting F.
65 (1928)).

LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT

FRANKFURTER &
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decided, since that case accomplished a wholesale revision of established
doctrine.
The analysis in Erie had two aspects. The first was an interpretation of section 34 of the 1789 Judiciary Act.4 " Based on Charles Warren's study, the Court concluded
that the purpose of the section was merely to make certain
that, in all matters except those in which some federal law is
controlling, the federal courts exercising jurisdiction in diversity of citizenship cases would apply as their rules of decision
41 4
the law of the State., unwritten as well as written.
Failure to follow this dictate, the Court concluded, had led to the "mischievous results" of forum shopping and unequal administration of the
laws.

41 5

A second aspect of Erie was the constitutional dimension discussed
above: federal courts have no authority to intrude upon areas of lawmaking, whether common or statutory, reserved to the states. "Except
in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Con416
gress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State.1
Warren surely was right in concluding that section 34 had been
intended to apply to both statutory and common law. No fancy textual
analysis was needed to prove the point. Federal courts long before Swift
honored established interpretations of local common law, just as they
followed settled constructions of state statutes.4 17 Swift did no more
than recite the accepted understanding of this procedure, with which
section 34 was thought to be consistent. There was no concept of a
federal general common law at the time of Swift. Throughout the nineteenth century, matters that Erie would place under that heading were
ordinarily referred to as state law.41 8 Swift addressed the occasions on
which this law related to "questions of a more general nature," including the construction of ordinary contracts and issues of general commercial law, as to which
the state tribunals are called upon to perform the like functions as ourselves, that is, to ascertain upon general reasoning and legal analogies, what is the true exposition of the
413 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (current version at 28
U.S.C. § 1652 (1982)).
414 304 U.S. at 72-73 (citing Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal
JudiciaryAct of 1789, 37 HARv. L. REv. 49 (1923)).
415
416
417

418

304 U.S. at 74-77.
Id. at 78.

See supra text accompanying notes 184-85.
See supra text accompanying notes 180-85.

1318

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 133:1231

contract or instrument, or what is the just rule furnished by
the principles of commercial law to govern the case."1 9
If the Court really wished to be faithful to the approach of its
predecessors, Erie should cause some consternation. It might appear bizarre to us, but Swift's rendition of the law-finding function of a common-law court was not perceived then as a threat to state sovereignty. 2 ° Neither the dissent nor contemporary legal commentary
raised any objection to this aspect of the case.42 Justice McLean joined
4 22
the opinion, even though he had written in Wheaton v. Peters
that
23
there was no common law of the United States.
Swift's summary of
the doctrine of general common law also comports well with the structure of article III. Why was the Supreme Court given the potential to
review diversity cases (which would have included cases coming from
state courts), if not to correct errors of law? Furthermore, when the
Constitution was drafted, the common law was interpreted through the
medium of British authorities. Differences may have existed among the
various states as to the applicability and interpretation of the British
common law, but it was a common reference point, and the mode of
reasoning about that law was a part of our inheritance.
Federal courts were from the earliest of proceedings understood to
have only a "limited jurisdiction." Then, as now, this expression was
taken as a succinct description of the essential nature of federal courts.
Part of this is the idea that Congress controls federal lower court jurisdiction. Neither in the nineteenth century nor at present, however, does
this serve to differentiate between federal and state courts. The jurisdiction of both is subject to the ultimate control of a legislature, or to some
other form of fairly direct popular revision. While the term "limited"
connotes for us the absence of a general power to fashion common law,
from the nineteenth-century standpoint this interpretation confuses the
scope of subject matter jurisdiction with the forms of judicial activity
that may be utilized in exercise of the judicial power. Thomas Sergeant
gave a typical account of "limited" federal jurisdiction in his treatise on
constitutional law:
A circuit court, though an inferior court in the language
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 19.
See T. FREYER, supra note 181, at 17-18.
See R. NEWMYER, supra note 181, at 336. One commentator has argued that
Swift was an "attempt to provide a legal framework in which judges could respond" to
the movement associated with codification and anti-legalism. Note, Swift v. Tyson Exhumed, 79 YALE L.J. 284, 310 (1969).
422 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
423 For Justice McLean's discussion of common law in Wheaton, see supra text
accompanying notes 343-44.
419

420
421
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of the constitution, is not so in the language of the common
law; nor are its proceedings subject to those narrow rules,
which the courts of Westminster applied to special courts, or
inferior courts held by charter. It is a court of original and
durable jurisdiction; analogous to the court of King's Bench
in England, and entitled to as liberal intendments and presumptions in its favour as any Supreme Court. Still, however, it is a court of limited jurisdiction, and has cognisance
not of cases generally, but only of a few specially circumstanced, amounting to a small proportion of the cases which
an unlimited jurisdiction would embrace ....:11
Federal courts are still "limited" in the way that Sergeant used the
word. Hotly disputed in the years before he wrote were the zones of
federal competence, and from the Republican view of national powers,
it might be deduced that there was no national common law. Since
then, federal authority has expanded vastly beyond the point that any
Jeffersonian would have considered within the original constitutional
understanding. In the sense that we presume judges will make rules at
times when the legislature has not acted, common-law adjudication
forms a backdrop to both state and federal legislation. If we choose to
restrict greatly what federal courts may do in the absence of legislation,
this is not a consequence of some historical agreement that these courts
were to be so "limited." In those days, the entire federal establishment
was repeatedly labeled a "limited" one.
There is another curious aspect of Erie. Immediately after declaring that the Swift doctrine must be abandoned for constitutional reasons, Brandeis wrote that a federal court is required to apply state law
except as to "matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts
of Congress. '42 5 This would have sounded very odd from the perspective of a century before. Admiralty law, or any of the multitudinous
branches of the law of nations, would not have been thought of as "governed" or in any way adopted by the Constitution. Federal courts were
given authority to decide cases according to the principles of this law,
yet the Constitution did not "govern" these areas. Federalists, we may
recall, at times made such comments about common-law crimes against
the United States, and the reaction was vehement. One of the main
aims of Hudson was to dispel whatever lingering doubts there were as
to whether the Constitution had received any.form of the British com4

T.

SERGEANT,

supra note 187, at 104 (footnotes omitted).

425 Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
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mon law.
Federal courts, as we have seen, retained far-reaching commonlaw powers after Hudson. If the Court wishes to renounce Swift's version of general common law, it should be with a frank recognition that
this amounts to a repudiation of the original understanding of federal
judicial powers, and of common-law interpretation itself.
Presented with this dilemma, commentators these days have tended
to veer in two different directions. One camp examines the various areas of federal common law now recognized and traces their origins to
particular concerns of the framing generation. Admiralty and the law
of nations are usually offered as fields of law that the Framers thought
implicated vital national interests. Consequently, they should be taken
as "merely illustrative of the classes of common law committed to federal jurisdiction and, pro tanto, subject to creation by the federal judiciary."' 4 26 The argument requires allusion to "an organic theory of the
Constitution-one that views it as a living document which must grow
to meet current needs. ' '42 7 It concludes that "[t]here may be other areas
of law that today affect important national interests and that should be
similarly incorporated into Article III.1142
There is admittedly some force to this contention. On the other
hand, an equally logical argument, starting from the same premises,
can lead in exactly the opposite direction. Martin Redish, for example,
grants the historical reasons for placing admiralty within article III:
"Maritime commerce with foreign nations at the time was conducted
primarily, if not exclusively, on the high seas." 4 9 It might be added
that the only important interstate or international commerce in the late
eighteenth century was by sea. Why not, on an "organic theory," extend federal power to fashion common law to all important areas of
national commerce? While conceding that "the conduct of multistate
commercial enterprises may give rise to different legal consequences in
different states," Redish suggests that this is "[o]ne of the prices paid
for a federal system."' 430 If the interest in uniformity "is not considered
a sufficiently strong basis for the creation of federal common law to
govern transactions or occurrences on land," then "[iut is unclear why
this lack of predictability is so significant in the case of maritime commerce that, solely in that area, it justifies the creation of federal com426 Note, Federal Common Law and Article III: A JurisdictionalApproach to
Erie, 74 YALE L.J. 325, 337 (1964).
427 Id.
428

429

430

Id.

M. REDISH, supra note 166, at 98.
Id. at 100.
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Both of these positions are logically supportable. The categories of
cases in which current doctrine allows federal common-law adjudication are nothing more than that-various categories. And the categories
themselves are not principled distinctions. To some extent they are
united by vague references to national interests. Clearfield, for instance, ventures that, in matters dealing with the commercial transactions of the United States, "[t]he application of state law, even without
the conflict of laws rules of the forum, would subject the rights and
duties of the United States to exceptional uncertainty."'" 2 But the same
could be said about other large-scale interstate commercial activities,"'
and the need for predictable rules could be invoked equally to extend
the scope of federal common law to those activities.4 Turning the argument around, we could as well conclude that the United States ought
to be treated like any other substantial business unit, and should have
to endure the vicissitudes of state law, at least to the extent that there is
no discrimination against the federal government. For well over a century the federal government was expected to conform to state law in its
contractual dealings.4 3 5 That was the understanding in the pre-Erie
days, when the federal courts could take an independent view of common-law commercial doctrines.
A wealth of evidence is available to demonstrate an original understanding that certain recognized bodies of law should be developed uniformly, and that interference by the states would have negative ramifications at home and abroad. But historically these areas were not
"federalized" in the way implicated by the current invocation of federal
common law. Uniformity was instead to be achieved by providing access to federal courts, sometimes exclusive of state courts. The only areas in which anything resembling modern federal common law was to
be applied were admiralty law and the law of nations. Both of these
possessed an element of transnationality that made untenable any
charge of interference with the territorial sovereignty rights of a state.
More basically, federal competence in these areas was part of the origi431

Id.

432

Clearfield, 318 U.S. at 367.

411 See Gorrell & Weed, Erie Railroad:Ten Years After, 9 OHIo ST. L.J. 276,

296 n.86 (1948); Mishkin, supra note 166, at 830.
43" See R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 179 (1985).
435 See Mason v. United States, 260 U.S. 545 (1923); H. HART & H. WECHSLER,
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 770-71 (2d ed. 1973); Comment,
Rules of Decision in Nondiversity Suits, 69 YALE L.J. 1428, 1439, 1442 & n.110
(1960); cf. Note, Bills and Notes-Federal Question-SubstantiveLaw, 18 TUL. L.
REv. 152, 155 (1943).
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nal constitutional bargain. An oddity of the early thinking in this country about the common law is that admiralty and the law of nations
were considered to be neither state law nor laws of the United States.
The best answer we get is something along the lines of Marshall's formulation in Canter, that the admiralty law "has existed for ages [and]
is applied by our Courts to the cases as they arise."4 "
Though Swift acknowledged that federal courts might take an independent view of general common-law doctrines, no one at the time
43 7
would have dared to place the label "federal" on the resulting work.
Here again the early formulations were at times unclear. A significant
branch of general law was related to the commercial field, which drew
upon the law merchant-a kind of international law in the same way
that admiralty was transnational. Still, commercial law was not considered a "law of the United States," and Swift did not so hold. Rather,
Story's opinion doubted that section 34 included state decisions on matters of general law, since this would have violated the "ordinary use of
language," by which "it will hardly be contended that the decisions of
Courts constitute laws. They are, at most, only evidence of what the
laws are, and are not of themselves laws. 4 8 Story and his colleagues
never had to confront the issue whether "the general commercial law"
was state or federal. 4 9 Notwithstanding this, a state could undoubtedly
legislate as to subjects within the confines of "general law," something
that could not be said of the federal government. From a modern point
of view, the concession that a state has legislative jurisdiction means to
us that the corresponding decisional law is "state." That is a fine example of one era transposing a phrase from the ordinary language of
another to its own usage without pausing to recognize that such a
transfer cannot occur without distorting what the original speakers
meant.
431 Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 546.
487 Later commentators were split as to whether federal courts acting in areas of
general common law were indeed creating "federal" law. Compare Von Moschzisker,
supra note 220, at 367-71 with 2 W. WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES 1038-39 (1910) and Bowman, The Unconstitutionality of the
Rule of Swift v. Tyson, 18 B.U.L. REv. 659, 663, 675 (1938).
488 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18.
4" Except for questions relating to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction,
when it was at times necessary to determine if a federal question was involved, the preErie practice did not require a clear demarcation between what we now call "federal
common law" and state common law. See Reifenberg, Common Law-Federal,30 OR.
L. REv. 164,. 166 (1951). Judge Wyzanski has noted that in the pre-Erie practice of
trademark law "it was not customary or necessary to distinguish nicely as to what rule
of law was applicable." National Fruit Prod. Co. v. Dwinell-Wright Co., 47 F. Supp.
499, 501 (D. Mass. 1942). It has been contended that the Swift era "retarded the
development" of federal common law. Friendly, supra note 122, at 407.
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CONCLUSION

The most we can conclude from a survey of jurisdictional theory
from the Hudson period is that it was generally conceded that federal
4 40
courts had what we would term significant common-law powers.
From that conclusion we can deduce nothing about the authority federal courts ought to be assuming today.4 41 Hudson was decided in a
peculiar setting of partisan disturbance, and grew out of a fear that we
can scarcely appreciate today-the belief that there was a scheme afoot
to install a consolidated national government through incorporation of
the British common law.
Complicating the production of any cogent theory of federal common-law powers were the burdens associated with pre-positivist thinking about the idea of law and the complexities of working out a judicial
system for an untried federal structure. Most importantly, the limited
view in that society of the extent of federal powers clouded any vision
of a federal judiciary exercising common-law powers that would be appropriate to a highly industrialized, extremely centralized, and intricately bureaucratic modern nation-state.
Those who think that they have found a "principled" explanation
of federal common-law jurisdiction in Hudson are simply reading what
they want from that opinion. This is not to imply that Hudson was
somehow fatally ambiguous. Placed in historical context, it was as lucid
as any account might have been of the constitutional lines between state
and federal powers. All such allocational theories are period pieces,
specific to their times, and formed by a range of attitudes about the
need for government at various levels (or at any level).
The point is not unique to the field of federal judicial jurisdiction.
After waging the long fight, the Court has now retreated from the field
of "identify[ing] principled constitutional limitations on the scope of
Congress's Commerce Clause powers over the States merely by relying
on a priori definitions of state sovereignty. '4 42 The "elusiveness of objective criteria for 'fundamental' elements of state sovereignty" 44 would
be no less apparent if the question were the principled delineation of
congressional powers; the Court avoids that quagmire by leaving the
matter totally (or so it seems) to the political process of congressional
legislation. No similar alternative is available to resolve the problem of
440 See Note, supra note 421, at 291-97.
441 "In 1842 no one could tell what the future development of the federal common

law would be." Id. at 305.
""' Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005, 1016
(1985).
443 Id.
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explaining the scope of federal common law. Probably that fact alone
goes further than anything else in elucidating why the Court has said
so little about its authority to make common law, particularly on those
occasions when it wanders far beyond any express authorization from
Congress.
We can now appreciate the inappropriateness of making sweeping
assertions about the respective roles of state and federal governments.
State and federal law are not so much separate categories as they are
interdependent concepts drawing vitality from one another. They reflect
what Frankfurter called "our abiding political problem."4 44 National
solutions are crucial for a wide range of problems, but every exercise of
power at that level entails the loss of local control. Many social issues
are poorly handled by large institutions. This much was well understood by the Framers. Yet their time was one of little national identity,
and they felt only a remote sense of shared obligations. A revolutionary
spirit of combination against an imposed imperial system, a belief that
445
individuals might "let regard be had only to the good of the whole,)
had evaporated in the resurrection of partisanship and interstate rivalries, and with it their world changed. They dealt with state entities of a
vastly different sort than we do, and the challenges now requiring national resolution had only the barest of analogies in 1787.
We are perhaps pressed to conclude that those of Jefferson's age
would have expected the Constitution, and hence the federal judiciary,
to evolve with the needs of a changing society. That, however, is an
extension of reasoning that cannot be made, and surely would not have
been accepted by individuals who literally could not have imagined the
culture we have produced. To a Jefferson who thought that in any
event a constitution was binding only on the current generation, 446 a
more obvious answer would have been to rethink the entire venture.
Such a response would have been understood by those who could picture themselves as having created the social contract that dictated the
precise terms of their relationship to the nation and each other.
Future constitutional questions would bear out the excessive optimism of James Wilson's soothing assurance that "the enumeration" of
444 Frankfurter, Distribution ofJudicial Power Between United States and State
Courts, 13 CORNELL L. Q. 499, 500 (1928).
441 Essex Result (Report of the Convention of Delegates at Essex County on the
Proposed Massachusetts Constitution, 1778), in T. PARSONS, MEMOIR OF THEOPHILUS PARSONS 365 (Boston 1859); accord G. WOOD, supra note 21, at 76-77. For an

account of intercolonial isolation and the temporary unity brought by the Revolution,
see A. SCHLESINGER, PRELUDE TO INDEPENDENCE 3-19 (1971).
441 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), reprinted in 7 THE WRrrINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 454-62 (A. Bergh ed. 1903).
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powers granted to the national government "will be found to be safe
and unexceptionable.1 447 The Framers' model of sharply delineated
state and federal powers (not to say separation of powers at the federal
level) followed a conception of language that made it possible to envision an essential difference between the two. Whether a matter is "internal" to a state, or "goes beyond its bounds"-to take one metaphor
from the time-is not resolvable by reference to some a priori allocation of powers. That will be determined by the will of political actors,
the audiences they address, and the circumstances of the epoch.
In the 1790's Americans learned something of the demands of nationhood. The intricate web of connections between domestic and foreign affairs required a complete reformulation of federal-state relations.
A process of maturation in a setting populated by numerous political
actors was all the more complicated by the recent experience under
monarchism, and the expectation that some wished a return, or even a
reunion. In a manner of speaking, it was a society that had lost the
innocence of a youth in which party divisions and provincial jealousies
might be dampened sufficiently to achieve the Revolution. From the
moment partisanship and state separatism reemerged-and they did
even before the Revolutionary fighting ended-no one was above the
charge of playing politics with the Constitution for the sake of power.
The Jeffersonian ascension was accompanied by the rhetoric of restoring the original understanding of the Constitution, but Jefferson himself would demonstrate by his deeds that a constitution is nothing more
than what a society wills it to be. That is an aspect of the human
condition that should engender hope rather than despair.

447

2 ELLIoT's DEBATES, supra note 48, at 425 (Pennsylvania Convention).
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A

Letter from John Marshall to St. George Tucker1
Washington, Nov. 27th, 1800
Dear Sir:
I had the pleasure a few days past of receiving a pamphlet written
by you on the question how far the common law is the law of the
United States for which I thank you. I have read it with attention &
you will perhaps be suprized at my saying that I do not suppose we
should essentially disagree. In political controversy it often happens
that the precise opinion of the adversary is not understood, & that we
are at much labor to disprove propositions which have never been
maintained. A stronger evidence of this cannot I think be given than the
manner in which the references to the common law have been treated.
The opinion which has been controverted is, that the common law of
England has not been adopted as the common law of America by the
constitution of the United States. I do not believe one man can be found
who maintains the affirmative of this proposition. Neither in public nor
in private have I ever heard it advocated, & I am as entirely confident
as I can be at anything of the sort, that it never has been advocated.
This strange & absurd doctrine was first attributed to the judiciary of
the United States by some frothy newspaper publications which appeared in Richmond something more than twelve months past, but I
never suspected that an attempt would be made to represent this as a
serious opinion entertained by respectable men, until I saw the argument contained in the report of a committee of the house of Delegates
in Virginia. You will pardon me for saying that notwithstanding the
respectability of the author of this report2 I could not read the part of it
respecting the common law without being reminded of a ludicrous story
1

The original of this letter is in the manuscript division of the Library of Con-

gress. In a conversation with the author, the current editor of the John Marshall papers, Charles F. Hobson, identified the recipient of the letter as St. George Tucker.
Although Tucker's name is not on the original, he almost surely wrote the pamphlet to
which Marshall refers. The pamphlet, Examination of the Question, "How Far the
Common Law of England is the Law of the FederalGovernment of the United States"
[original in rare book room, College of William and Mary; copy on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review], apparently appeared in early 1800, and eventually was reproduced by Tucker. See Tucker, Appendix to 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 378 note E (S. Tucker ed. 1803). Tucker's reference to the case of Isaac
Williams in a footnote of the pamphlet, see Examination, supra, at 3 n.*, provoked
Marshall's commentary.
2 Marshall is referring to James Madison's Report on the Virginia Resolutions,
reprintedin 4

THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOP-

TION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 546-80

(J. Elliot ed. 1836).
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told by Mr. Mason in the house of delegates in Williamsburg of a man
who amused himself by taking such a position as to cast his shadow on
a wall & then but at it as at a real enemy. So this report has gratuitously attributed to certain gentlemen an opinion never entertained &
has thus very gravely demonstrated that the opinion is founded in error.
What the precise opinion entertained on this subject may be I do
not profess to know but I believe that in the general definition of the
principle sensible men of the two parties would not disagree very materially. In the application of principles there would perhaps be more
difference than in this definition.
With respect to the case of Isaac Williams which you have mentioned in a note, I cannot believe that you & Judge Ellesworth [sic] (if
I understand that case rightly) would disagree. Isaac Williams was
prosecuted on two separate indictments-the one for privateering under
a french commission against the British & the other for privateering
under the same commission against his own countrymen. He was found
guilty on both indictments. In the one case he was guilty of an offence
against a public treaty of the United States & in the other of an offence
against the United States on the high seas. I believe it is not controverted that both these crimes are clearly punishable in the federal
courts. The defence set up, so far as I understand it, was that by taking
a commission in the service of France which was itself a crime, Isaac
Williams withdrew himself from the cognizance of our courts by ceasing to be an American citizen. I mistake your opinions very much if
you would have countenanced this defence.
In the case of Williams the common law was not relied on as giving the court jurisdiction, but came in incidentally as part of the law of
a case of which the court had complete & exclusive possession. I do not
understand you as questioning the propriety of thus applying the common law, not of England, but of our own country.
My own opinion is that our ancestors brought with them the laws
of England both statute & common law as existing at the settlement of
each colony, so far as they were applicable to our situation.
That on our revolution the preexisting law of each state remained
so far as it was not changed either expressly or necessarily by the nature of the governments which we adopted.
That on adopting the existing constitution of the United States the
common & statute law of each state remained as before & that the
principles of the common law of the state would apply themselves to
magistrates of the general as well as to magistrates of the particular
government. I do not recollect ever to have heard the opinions of a
leading gentleman of the opposition which conflict with these. Mr. Gal-
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latin in a very acute speech on the sedition law was understood by me
to avow them. On the other side it was contended, not that the common
law gave the courts jurisdiction in cases of sedition but that the constitution gave it.
I am dear sir yours truly
J.

Marshall [signature]
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B

John Marshall on the Question of Federal Common-Law

Jurisdiction
As far as anyone has been able to determine, Marshall never made
a public statement-certainly never in a judicial opinion-directly on
the question of federal common-law crimes, or the larger issue of the
common-law jurisdiction of federal courts.' He remained silent in both
United States v. Hudson2 and United States v. Coolidge,3 two cases
that gave him the opportunity to state his views. It is reasonable to
assume that by the time of Hudson, Marshall saw little to gain by
filing a dissenting opinion, and something to be lost by an overt display
of division on a sensitive issue.
Marshall was one of the American ministers to France in the
XYZ affair, and consequently he was out of the country when the partisan dispute over the common law erupted during the debates over the
Alien and Sedition Acts.4 Shortly after returning, Marshall declared his
candidacy for Congress from Virginia, ' a state that would hardly have
been receptive to favorable utterances about federal common law.
In the course of the 1798 congressional campaign, Marshall published his well-known answer to the Freeholder.Marshall disassociated
himself from the Alien and Sedition Acts on policy grounds, but he did
not mention the question of their constitutionality; nor did he take on
the issue of common-law crimes, which was by then closely related to
the Acts in the public's mind.6
Marshall is usually credited with writing an answer to the Virginia Resolution that not only defended the constitutionality of the
Alien and Sedition Acts, but also declared, "That rule is the common or
unwritten law which pervades all America . . . and which declaring
libels against government to be a punishable offence, applies itself impartially and protects any government which the will of the people may
establish."'7 Marshall's role in writing this paper, however, has not
1

See 2 I. RHODES, THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 48 (1969).
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).

s 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 414 (1816).

4 Marshall was absent from July 1797 to June 1798. See 2 A. BEVERIDGE, THE
LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL CONFLICT AND CONSTRUCTION 1800-1815, at 219, 344
(1919).
5 See id. at 376.
6 See L. BAKER, JOHN MARSHALL, A LIrFE IN LAW 304-05 (1974).

7 Address of the Minority of the Virginia Legislature, reprinted in L. BAKER,
supra note 6, at 309.
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been definitely established,' and, in any event, his "authorship . . .
was not popularly known; and it produced little effect." 9
Marshall's circumspection may have been influenced by the fate of
a Pennsylvania state judge, Alexander Addison. Addison was a staunch
Federalist, and his jury charges and writings supported party causes,
including the doctrine that there was federal jurisdiction over commonlaw crimes."0 The Pennsylvania legislature impeached and convicted
Addison in 1803. Although the impeachment was based on his refusal
to allow another judge, a Republican, to address a grand jury, Addison
was widely disliked by Republicans for his outspoken partisan positions." In light of the general Republican assault on the courts at the
time of the Addison affair, it would not have been an opportune time
for Marshall to speak out on one of the most sensitive issues for
Republicans. He did, however, earlier comment favorably to George
Washington on an Addison charge that endorsed federal common-law
criminal jurisdiction, saying that he hoped it would "make some im12
pression on the mass of people."'
It does appear reasonably certain that Marshall wrote a letter to
St. George Tucker in November 1800, which is reproduced in Appendix A, and discussed in both parts of this essay. Tucker had sent Marshall a pamphlet, apparently produced in 1800, titled Examination of
the Question, "How Far the Common Law of England is the Law of
the Federal Government of the United States. "'IIn response, Marshall
told Tucker that the latter would "perhaps be surprized" that he did
not "essentially disagree" with the views it contained.' 4 Tucker's pri8

See S. KURTZ,

THE FEDERALISTS: CREATORS AND CRITICS OF THE UNION

1780-1801, at 176-77 (1972) (arguing that the address was a collaborative effort of
Henry Lee and John Marshall); 3 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 499 n.1 (C.

Cullen ed. 1979) (attributing the authorship to Henry Lee).
2 A. BEVERIDGE, supra note 4, at 405.
10 See Liberty of Speech and of the Press, A Charge to the Grand Juries of the
County Courts of the Fifth Circuit of the State of Pennsylvania (1798) (original in
Library of Congress); Analysis of the Report of the Committee of the Virginia Assembly (1800), reprinted in 2 AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING DURING THE FOUNDING
ERA 1760-1805, at 1055 (C. Hyneman & D. Lutz eds. 1983).
11 See R. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE
YOUNG REPUBLIC 164-65 (1971).
2 Letter from John Marshall to George Washington (Jan. 8, 1799), reprinted in
4 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 8, at 3.
13 Tucker, Examination of the Question, "How Far the Common Law of England is the Law of the Federal Government of the United States" [original in rare
book room, College of William and Mary; copy on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review], reprintedin Tucker, Appendix to 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 378 note E (S. Tucker ed. 1803).
4 Letter from John Marshall to St. George Tucker (Nov. 27, 1800), reprinted in
Appendix A, supra.
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mary concern in this publication was to deny that "any grant of general jurisdiction in cases at common law" had been conferred on the
federal courts by the Constitution. 5 Nonetheless, Tucker recognized
that federal courts had the authority to fashion unwritten law, and to
draw upon British law (among other sources) in the process:
[The] maxims and rules of proceedings [of the common law
of England] are to be adhered to, whenever the written law
is silent, in cases of a similar, or analogous nature, the cognizance whereof is by the constitution vested in the federal
courts; it may govern and direct the course of proceeding, in
such cases, but can not give jurisdiction in ANY CASE,
where jurisdiction is not expressly given by the
constitution."
Marshall's judicial opinions tend to correlate with Tucker's statements. He insisted that the jurisdiction of federal courts was not "regulated by the common law," but rather "by written law," which could
not be "transcend[ed]. ' 1 7 But this view posed little obstacle to federal
common-law prosecutions: section 11 of the 1789 Judiciary Act conferred general criminal jurisdiction on circuit courts, 8 and, as in
United States v. Williams, 9 the common law helped provide the definition of the crime. Perhaps the most well-known instance of Marshall's
reliance on the common law to assist in expounding the elements of a
crime was in the trial of Aaron Burr. To decide whether Burr had
"levied war" within the meaning of the treason statute, Marshall
placed emphasis on British authorities, which he said "form[ed] the
substratum of our laws."20
In an 1809 circuit case, United States v. Smith,2 2 Marshall refused
to impose a common-law punishment where Congress had prescribed
only a fine and forfeiture. He declined to decide, though, "the question
whether an indictment can be supported in this court on common law
principles."2 2 Similarly, in United States v. Bevans,23 he refused to allow a federal prosecution for a murder on an American naval ship sit15 Tucker, supra note 13, at 35.
16 Id. at 40.
17 Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 93 (1807).
'8 For a discussion of section 11, see Jay, Part One, at 1018-19.
1 29 F. Gas. 1330 (C.C.D. Conn. 1799) (No. 17,708). For a discussion of Williams, see Jay, Part One, at 1086-89.
20 United States v. Burr, 25 F. Gas. 55, 156 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,693).
21 (C.C.D. Va. 1809).
22 H. JOHNSON, FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN MARSHALL, 1801-1815 (PART
Two) 641 (1981) (quoting case manuscript records).
22 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 336, 390 (1818).
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ting in Boston Harbor because Congress had exempted from federal
jurisdiction cases not "within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the
United States."2 4 Marshall may have meant nothing more than that in
both cases Congress had actively legislated in the area to the exclusion
of common-law proceedings. Justice Washington, an ardent supporter
of federal common-law jurisdiction, held exactly this in United States v.
Passmore. 5
R. Kent Newmyer, in a new biography of Justice Story, argues
that Marshall was with the majority in Hudson, and cites Livingston
v. Jefferson"6 for the proposition that Marshall "had already made up
his mind that federal common law was a matter for legislative codifica27
tion."1
But Livingston cannot be used for support of Newmyer's assertion. This was the famous case brought by Edward Livingston against
Thomas Jefferson in the circuit court of Virginia; the complaint alleged
that while Jefferson was President he had caused a trespass and destruction of property on Livingston's premises in New Orleans. Marshall held that the circuit court had no jurisdiction since the action was
"local," and hence could be brought only in the place where the land
was located. 8 The "local action" rule was based on the "common law
of England,"2 9 which had been brought "when our ancestors migrated
to America." 3 0 Marshall went on to say that while the "decisions of
British courts, made since the Revolution, are not authority in this
country . . .they are entitled to that respect which is due to the opin24 Id. In the trial of Aaron Burr, Marshall ruled that there was no competent
evidence to demonstrate an overt act on Burr's part at Blennerhassett's Island-the
alleged assembly point of the conspirators' armed forces. Nor could he be charged as an
accessory before the fact:
[T]he common law attaches to him the guilt of that fact which he has
advised or procured .... To decide, then, that this doctrine is applicable
to the United States would seem to imply the decision that the United
States, as a nation, have a common law which creates and defines the
punishment of crimes accessorial in their nature.
United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 55, 176 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,693). Marshall
declined to take this step, which would have required holding without conferring with
the other members of the Supreme Court that "accessorial crimes are not, in the case of
treason, excluded by the definition of treason given in the constitution." Id. It bears
emphasizing that Marshall was not referring to a case of a pure common-law offense,
but rather "the operation of the common law upon the statute." Id. at 177. As noted
earlier, see supra text accompanying note 20, Marshall did borrow heavily from British sources to define the act of "levying war" in the treason statute.
25 27 F. Cas. 458, 459 (C.C.D. Pa. 1804) (No. 16,005).
26 15 F. Cas. 660 (C.C.D. Va. 1811) (No. 8411).
27 R. NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY 101 (1985).
28 Since Jefferson could not be served with process in Louisiana, Livingston was
left with "a clear right without remedy." 15 F. Cas. at 664.
29 Id.
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ions of wise men. ' 1 Marshall even refused to apply a Virginia statute
that arguably allowed the case to go forward, stating "that the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States depends, exclusively, on the constitution and laws of the United States."'3 2 If anything, Marshall was
defining the jurisdiction of the court by incorporating a common-law
principle into federal law.
Until additional evidence is uncovered, the inescapable conclusion
appears to be that Marshall avoided reaching the question of the precise scope of federal common-law jurisdiction. As was discussed in the
accompanying essay, Marshall most likely regarded the whole issue as
something of a nuisance. Marshall, and other Federalists, never had the
ambition to claim that federal courts had the full jurisdiction of the
central courts of England. At the same time, for any case within federal
jurisdiction, Marshall would draw extensively upon common-law principles. He evidently thought that section 11 of the 1789 Judiciary Act
authorized a common-law jurisdiction for criminal cases. It seems most
probable, however, that he was aware that there were not enough votes
to sustain that position in Hudson, and, with his strong desire for public unity in the Court's decisions, considered the issue too inconsequential to cause a stir with a dissent.
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